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
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THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
ITALY,

Written in *Italian* by  
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI,  
A Nobleman of *Florence*.  
IN TWENTY BOOKS.



Translated into ENGLISH by the  
Chevalier AUSTIN PARKE GODDARD,  
Knight of the Military Order of St. Stephen.



V O L. VIII.  $\frac{257686}{4-8-31}$

Containing the FIFTEENTH and SIX-  
TEENTH Books of the HISTORY.



L O N D O N:  
Printed by JOHN TOWERS, in *Piccadilly*.  
M.DCC.LV.

THE  
HISTORY

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


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
# H I S T O R Y

O F

The WARS in ITALY.



B O O K XV.



## T H E C O N T E N T S.

*Pope Adrian arrives at Rome. Enters into a Confederacy with the Emperor and Venetians against France. Island of Rhodes taken by Solyman Sultan of the Turks. Death of Pope Adrian, and Election of Clement VII. Duke of Bourbon deserts from the King of France, and enters into the Service of the Emperor. King of France sends an Army into Italy, and makes a League with Pope Clement. Imperialists invade France, over-run Pro-*

## THE HISTORY OF

vence, and besiege Marseilles, but are forced to abandon that Enterprize, and retreat. King of France follows them into Italy, takes the City of Milan, and besieges Pavia. Emperor's Army advances to relieve the Place, a Battle ensues, in which the French are defeated, many of the Nobles killed, and the King himself taken Prisoner.

A, D.

1522.



HOUGH the late Victory over the French had composed the Affairs of Lombardy, it had not however lessened the Jealousy that the King of France, having his Kingdom entire, and at Peace, and the Generals and Men at Arms that he had sent into Italy returned in Safety, would, before it was long, make a fresh Attack on the Dutchy of Milan, especially considering that the Swiss were as ready as before to enter into his Pay, and the Venetian Senate persevered in their antient Confederacy with him. The Consideration of this Danger engaged the Cæsarian Generals to maintain and keep in Pay the Army, which was very difficult for them to do, because

Italy under Fear of a new French Invasion.



## THE WARS IN ITALY.

§

cause they received no Money from *Cæ-* A. D.  
*far* nor from the Kingdom of *Naples*, 1522.  
 and the State of *Milan* was so far ex-  
 hausted as to be insufficient of itself a-  
 lone to quarter such Numbers of Sol-  
 diers, and support such great Expences.  
 Wherefore, without paying any Regard  
 to the Cries of the People, or the Re-  
 monstrances of the College of Cardinals,  
 they had sent the greater Part of the Troops  
 to take up their Quarters in the eccle-  
 siastic State: And Don *Carlo di Lanaja*,  
 newly appointed Viceroy of *Naples* in  
 room of *Raimondo di Cardona* deceased, in  
 his Passage through *Rome*, settled, in a  
 Conference with Don *Giovanni Ma-*  
*nuel*, the Contributions, determining that  
 for the Three next Months the State  
 of *Milan* should pay every Month  
 Twenty Thousand Ducats, the *Floren-*  
*tines* Fifteen Thousand, the *Genoeses* Eight  
 Thousand, *Siena* Five Thousand, and  
*Lucca* Four Thousand. Though eve-  
 ry Body exclaimed against this Tax,  
 yet such was their Dread of the vic-  
 torious Army that they were under a  
 Necessity of submitting to it. The Im-

*A. D.*  
1522. } posers assuring them that it was indispensablely necessary, because on the Preservation of those Forces depended the Defence of *Italy*; and, at the End of the Term the Imposition was renewed, but in much easier Sums.

IN this melancholy Situation of Affairs in *Italy* oppressed with a Train of Evils, and under Apprehensions of greater to come, the Arrival of the Pope was impatiently expected as a seasonable Help, by Means of the pontifical Authority, for composing a Multitude of Differences and providing against manifold Disorders: The Pontiff was earnestly intreated by *Cæsar*, who was at that Time on his Voyage by Sea to *Spain*, and had by the Way a Conference with the King of *England*, to wait for him at *Barcelona*, whither he would come in Person, and acknowledge and adore him for Pope. But he refused to wait his Coming, either on account of the Distance of *Cæsar*, who was as yet in the farthest Parts of *Spain*, which would not suffer him to lose

so much Time as to force him afterwards to sail in an unfavourable Season, or from a Suspicion that *Cæsar* sought to make him defer his Passage to *Italy*; or, as many would have it, because he would not give too much Ground for the Opinion which had been entertained of him from the Beginning, that he could not help being too much devoted to *Cæsar*, which would obstruct the Negotiation of an universal Peace among Christians, which he had resolved to take upon him. He passed then by Sea to *Rome*, where he made his Entry on the Twenty Ninth of *August*, amidst a vast Concourse of People, by whom tho' his Coming was desired with the utmost Impatience, because *Rome*, without the Presence of Pontiffs, is more like a Desert than a City, yet the Sight created a Sort of Uneasiness in the Minds of all who considered that they had got a Pope of a barbarous Nation, quite unexperienced in the Affairs of *Italy*, of the Court, and even of those Nations which by long Intercourse were grown familiar

A. D.  
1522.

Pope  
*Adrian*  
enters  
*Rome.*

# 8 THE HISTORY OF

A. D. 1522. to *Italy*. The Sadness of these Reflexions was heightened by a Plague, which breaking out at *Rome* at his Arrival was interpreted as a very bad Omen of his Pontificate, and made great Devastation during the whole Autumn.

THE first Resolution of this Pope was to use his Endeavours for the Recovery of *Rimini*, and to accommodate the Differences which had subsisted between the Duke of *Ferrara* and his two last Predecessors. For these Purposes he ordered into *Romagna* Fifteen Hundred *Spanish* Foot which he had brought with him as a Convoy to secure his Passage by Sea. While he was intent on these Things, it appearing to *Cæsar* that it was of great Importance for the Settlement of the Affairs of *Italy* to detach the *Venetians* from the King of *France*, in Hopes that the Senate, from the Diminution of the *French* Power and Interest, were disposed to embrace a Peace, and not for the Interests of others to run the Hazard of transferring the War into their own Dominions; he communicated his Purpose to the King  
of



## THE WARS IN ITALY.

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of *England*, who had before privately A. D. 1522.  
 lent him Money to help him against the King of *France*, but afterwards laid aside his Dissimulation, and now openly espoused the Cause: They both sent Ambassadors to *Venice* to solicit the Senate to enter into a Confederacy with *Cæsar* for the Defence of *Italy*. The Ambassador for *Cæsar* was *Girolamo Adorno*, and for the King of *England* *Richard Pacey*, and there was an Ambassador expected from *Ferdinand*, Brother to *Cæsar* and Archduke of *Austria*, whose Interest was necessary, whatever Peace should be made, on account of the many Differences between him and the *Venetians*. The King of *England* sent also an Herald to denounce War to the King of *France*, if he would not make a general Truce with *Cæsar* for Three Years in all Parts of the World, in which should be included the Church, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*, complaining also that he had ceased to pay him the Fifty Thousand Ducats which he was obliged to pay every Year. The King refused to consent to a Truce, and roundly answered that it was not proper to pay Money to one who as-  
 sisted

A. D. 1522. sifted his Enemies with Money : By this Means the Animosities between them being exasperated, the Ambassadors at each Court were dismissed.

THIS Year Don *Giovanni Manuel*, who had been *Cæsar's* Plenipotentiary at *Rome*, departed out of *Italy*. At his Departure he delivered to the *Florentines* a Schedule of his own Hand-writing, in which it was related how *Cæsar* by a Schedule written in *September* 1520 promised Pope *Leo* to confirm and grant anew to the *Florentines* the Privileges of the State, the Authority, and the Lands which they possessed, within Six Months after the first Diet held since the Coronation which was celebrated at *Aix la Chapelle*; for he had first promised them to make this Concession within Four Months from his Election, but said he had not been able, for just Reasons, to expedite it to them at that Time; but Don *Giovanni* in the Name of *Cæsar* promised to make good the Contents of the Schedule, which was ratified by *Cæsar* in *March* 1523; and expedited by a Deed in a very ample Manner.

THIS

# THE WARS IN ITALY.

11

A. D.

1522.

THIS Year *Cæsar*, as was said before, passed into *Spain*, where, on his Arrival, he proceeded with Severity against many who had been Authors of the Sedition, and discharged all the rest without inflicting any Punishment: And to accompany his Justice and Clemency with Examples of Rewards, on taking into Consideration that *Ferdinando* Duke of *Calabria*, refused to be Leader of the seditious Multitude, and chose rather not to leave his Confinement in the Castle of *Sciatine*, he sent for him with great Honour to his Court, and not long after gave him in Marriage *Germana*, Widow of the late Catholic King, and rich, but barren, with a View that in him, who was the last Descendant from old *Alfonso*, King of *Aragon*, that Family might become extinct, for his two younger Brothers were both dead before, one in *France*, and the other in *Italy*.

BUT what rendered this an unfortunate Year, with very great Reproaches to the Island of *Rhodes* conquered by *Solyman* the Turk.

*A. D.* to the Christian Princes was that, to-  
 1522.  
 wards the End of it *Solyman* the *Otto-*  
*man* took the Island of *Rhodes*, under  
 the Government of the Knights of  
*Rhodes*, before called Knights of *Jeru-*  
*salem*, who taking up their Residence  
 in that Island, after they had been chased  
 from *Jerusalem*, had for a very long  
 Time, with vast Honour to their Order,  
 preserved it tho' situated in the Midst  
 between the *Turk* and the *Soldan*, Princes  
 of such mighty Power, and made it  
 considered as the Bulwark of Christen-  
 dom in those Seas, tho' the Knights had  
 it laid to their Charge that, amidst their  
 daily Cruises on the Ships of the Infid-  
 els, they sometimes took the Liberty  
 to make Prizes of Vessels belonging to  
 Christians. This Island was, for ma-  
 ny Months, besieged by a very power-  
 ful Army, with the great *Turk* in Per-  
 son, who lost not the least Time for  
 harrassing the Defendants, sometimes by  
 very furious Assaults, sometimes by  
 working of Mines and Trenches, and  
 sometimes by raising very large Cava-  
 liers



liers of Earth and Timber, which over-<sup>A. D.</sup>  
topped the Walls of the Town, by <sup>1522.</sup>  
which Works tho' carried on with great  
Slaughter of his Men, the Number of  
the Garrison was considerably dimi-  
nished; so that at length being spent  
with the continual Fatigues, and their  
Powder falling short, they were no long-  
er in a Condition to resist such a Mul-  
titude of Distresses and Inconveniencies,  
the Mines having penetrated into many  
Places of the Town, in which the Be-  
sieged, being forced to abandon one af-  
ter another the advanced Posts, were  
more and more straitened, till at length  
reduced to the utmost Necessity they  
capitulated with the *Turk*, and it was  
agreed that the Grand Master should  
surrender to him the Town, with Liber-  
ty for himself and all the Knights and  
*Rhodians* to depart thence in Safety,  
and to take with them as many of  
their Effects as they could carry, and for  
their Security in so doing the *Turkish*  
Fleet was to have Orders to quit those  
Seas, and the Army to draw off to the  
Distance

A. D. Distance of Five Miles from the Town  
 1522. of *Rhodes*. By Virtue of this Capitulation, which was faithfully observed, the *Turks* took Possession of *Rhodes*, and the Christians passed over to *Sicily*, and afterwards into *Italy*, having found in *Sicily* a Fleet of Ships fitted out tho' but slowly, thro' the Fault of the Pontiff, for throwing into *Rhodes*, as soon as the Wind should serve, a Supply of Provisions and warlike Stores. After the City was evacuated *Solyman*, for the greater Disparagement of the Christian Religion, made his Entry into the Place on the Day of the Nativity of the SON of GOD, and on that Day, solemnised with an Infinity of Hymns and Music in Christian Churches, he caused all the Churches in *Rhodes* that were dedicated to the Worship of CHRIST to be converted into Mosques, which according to the Custom of the *Turks*, the Christian Rites being totally abolished, were dedicated to the Worship of *Mahomet*. Thus ended the Year 1522, with so much Ignominy to the Christian Name, and  
 such

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 15

such was the Fruits of the Disorders of A. D. 1522.  
our Princes, tolerable however if the  
Example of past Losses had given In-  
structions for the Time to come, but the  
Continuation of the Divisions among  
the Princes occasioned as great Calami-  
ties in 1523.

IN the Beginning of this Year the 1523.  
*Malatesti* knowing themselves too weak  
to resist the Forces of the Pope, by the  
Interposition of the Duke of *Urbino*,  
were content to yield up *Rimini* and its  
Castle, with a View, tho' uncertain, of  
obtaining a Maintenance for *Pandolfo* dur-  
ing his Life, which did not take Effect.  
The Duke of *Urbino* afterwards waited  
on the Pontiff, and the glorious Memory  
of Pope *Julius* pleading in his Favour  
with his Holiness, and with the greater  
Part of the Court, he obtained Absoluti-  
on from Censures, and to be re-invested  
with the Dutchy of *Urbino*, but with Pope re-  
ceives into  
Favour the  
Duke of  
*Urbino*.  
the Clause, *without Prejudice to Rights*,  
with a View of not prejudicing the As-  
signment which had been made of *Mon-  
teseltro*,

*A. D.* 1523. *teseltro* to the *Florentines*, who affirmed that they had lent Pope *Leo* for the Defence of that Dutchy Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Ducats, and that they had expended about Sixty Thousand Ducats more since his Death, in several Places for the Preservation of the State of the Church.

And the  
Duke of  
*Ferrara*.

THE Pope also received into Favour the Duke of *Ferrara*, reinvesting him not only with *Ferrara*, and all the Lands which, before the War made by *Leo* against the *French*, he possessed belonging to the Church, but, highly to his Disgrace, or that of his Ministers, who imposed upon his Ignorance in those Affairs, left him also in Possession of the Castles of *San Felice* and *Finale*, which being acquired by him when he entered into a War with *Leo*, and afterwards lost before his Death, he had taken the Opportunity of the Vacancy of the See to possess himself of anew. The Duke of *Ferrara* obliged himself to assist the Church with a certain Number of  
Troops,



Troops when they should be wanted for the Defence of its State; and bound himself under most grievous Penalties, subjecting himself also to the Disannulling of his Investiture, and the Forfeiture of all his Rights in case he should for the future offend any more the Apostolic See. The Pope gave him good Hopes of his Intentions to restore him to the Possession of *Modena* and *Reggio*; but as to this Point, on a Representation to his Holiness of the Importance of the Affair, and from the Example of his Predecessors, what an Infamy such a Step would cast upon his Name, he became more and more averse to restore those Cities.

AT this Time the Castle of *Milan* Castle of Milan labouring under a Scarcity of every Thing surrendered to excepting Bread, and the Garrison being Cæsar. very sickly, capitulated to surrender on Condition of Safety to Persons and Effects, if it were not relieved by the 14th Day of *April*, at which Term the Capitulation being observed, most of the People in the Place were found to be dead. *Cæsar*  
 VOL. VIII. B con-

A. D.

1523.

consented that the Castle should be resigned into the Hands of *Francesco Sforza*, the Duke, for which he was highly commended by the *Italians*. And now the *French* had nothing left in their Possession in *Italy* but the Castle of *Cremona*, which was still abundantly provided with Necessaries. These Successes however were no Relief to the Miseries of the Inhabitants of the *Milanesè*, who were extremely aggravated by the *Cæsarian* Army, because they did not receive their Pay. For the same Reason, when they were on their March to take up their Quarters in *Asti* and in its Territory, they mutinied, and plundered all the Country as far as *Vigevano* ; so that the *Milanesè*, to put a Stop to these Devestations, and to save the Country from being entirely ruined, were constrained to promise them their Pay at certain Terms, which amounted to about One Hundred Thousand Ducats. These Hardships, however, did not in the least mitigate the Hatred of the People towards the *French*, being kept steady, partly by Fear, remembering the Injuries they

## THE WARS IN ITALY.

19

they had received from that Nation, <sup>A. D. 1523:</sup> and partly by Hopes that whenever the Danger of a fresh Attack from the King of *France* upon that State was ceased, they should be eased of so great a Burden, because there would be no Necessity for *Cæsar* to keep any standing Forces in the *Milaneſe*.

AT this ſame Time was under continual Negotiation an Agreement between *Cæſar* and the *Venetians*, which on account of the many Difficulties that aroſe, and the various Delays interpoſed by them, kept the Friends of both Parties in Suſpenſe concerning the Iſſue. This Tediouſneſs, and perhaps alſo the Difficulty of the Negotiation were increaſed by the Death of *Girolamo Adorno*, who being a Perſon of a great Spirit and Experience, tho' a young Man, managed the Treaty with Authority, and with ſingular Dexterity. In his Room was ſent from *Milan*, with a Commiſſion from *Cæſar*, *Marino Carracciolo*, the Apoſtolic Prothonotary, who many Years after was by Pope

Peace negotiated between *Cæſar* and the *Venetians*.

*A. D.* *Paul* III. advanced to the Dignity of  
1523. the Cardinalship. This Treaty, which was

carried on at *Venice*, was under Debate many Months, because on the other Side the King of *France* by his Ambassadors, laboured with the greatest Diligence and Affiduity in opposing it, sometimes promising by Letters, sometimes by trusty Agents, to pass into *Italy* with a very potent Army. On this Occasion there was great Variety of Opinions among the Senators, and continual Disputes; for many advised not to abandon the Confederacy with the King, in Confidence that he would soon send an Army into *Italy*. This Hope the King endeavouring with the utmost Industry to cherish, had, besides many others, lately sent to *Venice Renzo da Ceri*, to make the same Promise, and to signify that the Preparations were in Readiness. Others from Experience of past Events, considering that King's Negligence in executing his Projects, could not persuade themselves that his Passage could take Effect; and they were confirmed in this Opinion by the Letters of  
*Giovanni*



*Giovanni Badoaro*, their Ambassador in *A. D.*  
*France*, who giving Credit to what had <sup>1523.</sup>  
 been reported to him of the Duke of  
*Bourbon*, (who had already very secretly  
 conspired against the King, and wished  
 that the *Venetians* would join with *Cæ-*  
*sar*) assured them that the King of *France*  
 would neither pass in Person, nor send an  
 Army this Year into *Italy*. Others were  
 intimidated by the ill Success of the  
 King, and by the good Fortune of *Cæ-*  
*sar*, and with the Consideration that  
 the Duke of *Milan*, the *Genoese* and the  
*Florentines*, with all *Tuscany* espoused the  
 Party of *Cæsar*, and it was believed that  
 the Pope would do the same: And out  
 of *Italy*, *Cæsar* was in close Alliance with  
 the Archduke of *Austria* his Brother,  
 a Neighbour to the *Venetian* State, and  
 with the King of *England*, who was con-  
 tinually making War in *Picardy*. In this  
 Variety of Opinions among the principal  
 Members of the Senate as well as others,  
 the Maturity of Affairs, and the most pres-  
 sing Instances of the Ambassadors of *Cæsar*  
 not admitting of any further Delay in  
 coming to a Resolution, the Council of

*A. D.* 1523. the *Pregadi* was at last convoked in order to determine their Choice. Here *Andrea Gritti*, a Person of the highest Authority in that Republic for his Administration of the most important Affairs, and his many remarkable Exploits, and whose Name was very famous over all *Italy* and in the Courts of foreign Princes, made a Speech, as it is said, in Substance as follows.

Speech of  
*Andrea*  
*Gritti.*

“ Though I am sensible, most excellent Senators, there is cause to fear that if I should give my Advice not to separate ourselves from our Confederacy with the King of *France*, some may understand by it that I am more influenced with respect to the long Conversation I have had with the *French* than by a regard to the Commonwealth, I shall not however forbear on that account to express my Mind freely as it is the Right and Duty of a good Citizen ; nay, that Citizen and Senator is of no Service who, for any Reason whatsoever, shews himself backward in persuading others to what he thinks in his own Mind to be for the Benefit

## THE WARS IN ITALY.

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Benefit of the Republic. I persuade myself however that this Interpretation will not take Place with Men of Prudence, because they will consider not only what have been my Manners and Actions at all Times, but also that I have never treated with the King of *France*, or with his Ministers, but as your Minister, and by your Commission and Orders. But besides this I shall be justified, if I deceive not myself by the Probability of the Reasons which induce me to embrace this Opinion. We are debating whether we ought to make a new Confederacy with *Cæsar*, contrary to the Faith we have given, and to the Obligations of the Confederacy in which we are engaged with the King of *France*; a Point which, in my Opinion, means no other than to establish the Power of *Cæsar*, already formidable to every one, in such a Manner as that it being impossible for us to find any further Remedy for moderating or repressing it, we shall see it continually increasing to our manifest Prejudice. We have no Reason that can justify this Resolution, for the King

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has always observed our Confederacy, and if the Effects have not answered in being so ready as we could wish to renew the War in *Italy*, it is very well known that, since he was stimulated to do it, by his own Interest, there can be no other Cause for his Backwardness than the Impediments which he has met with, and still finds in the Kingdom of *France*, which indeed have been sufficient to make him defer his Designs, but will never be able wholly to crush them. For so ardent is his Desire to recover the State of *Milan*, so great is his Power, that as soon as he has repelled the first Efforts of his Enemies, which he will easily sustain, nothing will retard him from sending afresh a very great Force on this Side the Mountains. We have before our Eyes in both these respects the repeated Example of King *Lewis*, who, when *France* was attacked by Armies much more potent than those which at present molest it, almost the whole World having conspired against him, by the Greatness of his Force, the Strength of the Places on his Frontiers, and the Fidelity of his People, easily defended



fended himself, and when all Men were *A. D.*  
of Opinion that the Fatigues of the War <sup>1523.</sup>  
must have laid him under a Necessity of  
taking some Time for Rest, on a sud-  
den he descended into *Italy* with power-  
ful Armies. Did not the present King  
do the same in the Beginning of his Reign,  
when every one believed that because he  
was newly come to the Crown, and found  
the royal Treasury exhausted by the infinite  
Expences of his Predecessor, he must have  
been under a Necessity of deferring the  
War to another Year? We ought not  
therefore to be intimidated by this Slow-  
ness, nor would it be a sufficient Ex-  
cuse for our Variations, since our Con-  
federate is not retarded by his Will but  
by the Impediments that have inter-  
vened, not from any just Cause that we  
have to complain of his Conjunction, nor  
from any decent Pretence afforded us to  
separate ourselves from his Alliance. This  
Resolution demands of us a Regard to  
Decency, a Regard to the Dignity of  
the *Venetian* Senate; but it requires no  
less a Regard to our Utility, or rather to  
our Safety. For who is so ignorant as not  
to

*A. D.* 1523. to know of what great Benefit it may be to us, and from how many Dangers it may free us, if the King of *France* recovers the State of *Milan*, and what a peaceful Situation for many Years it may produce in our Affairs? This we may learn from the Example of what happened but a few Years ago, when the Recovery of the *Milanese* by that King was the Cause that we, who before at a vast Expence and Hazard attended to the Defence of *Padoua* and *Trevigi*, recovered *Brescia* and *Verona*; was the Cause that, while he kept quiet Possession of that Dutchy, we enjoyed absolute Peace and Security in all our Dominions. These are Examples that ought to have much greater Weight with us than the antient Memory of the League of *Cambray*, for the Kings of *France* have learned by Experience, what they had not comprehended by Reason, the great Damage they would receive by being seperated from our Alliance; a Point of which they will without comparison be more sensible at the present Juncture, in which that King has for a Rival an Emperor, Sovereign of so many Kingdoms,

doms, and of such Greatness, whose <sup>A. D.</sup> Power will necessitate him to desire and <sup>1523.</sup> to set the highest Value upon our Confederacy. But on the contrary who is he that sees not, and knows not in what a dangerous Situation our Affairs will remain as soon as the King of *France* shall be totally excluded from making any Attempt upon *Italy*? Who can hinder *Cæsar* from appropriating to himself or to his Brother the Dutchy of *Milan*, of which he has not to this Day ever granted the Investiture to *Francesco Sforza*? And if, as it is very plain, he will have the Power to do it, what Security can be given of his Will? Who is he that can promise that, since the Dutchy of *Milan* serves as Stairs for ascending to the Empire of all *Italy*, *Cæsar* will be more influenced by a Regard to Justice and Honour, than by Ambition, and a Covetousness proper and natural to all great Princes? Shall we perhaps be secured by the Moderation and Temperance of his Ministers in *Italy*, who are almost all *Spaniards*, a deceitful and most rapacious Nation, and insatiable above all others? If *Cæsar* then or *Ferdinando*

A. D. *dinando* his Brother should appropriate

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*Milan*, what will be the Condition of our State, when surrounded by them on the Side of *Italy*, and of *Germany*? What Remedy can we expect for our Dangers, the Kingdom of *Naples* being in his Hands, the Pope and the other States of *Italy* his Dependants, and every one of our Friends so exhausted of Money, and bare of Troops, that no Assistance can be hoped from them? But if the King of *France* should get Possession of the Dutchy of *Milan*, Affairs resting in a Balance between two such Princes, whoever should have Reason to be apprehensive of the Power of one would be regarded and Supported by that of the other: And even the Fear alone of his Coming secures all others, since it constrains the Imperialists to lie still, and not to employ themselves in any Enterprize. Wherefore it seems to me that we are rather to laugh than to be terrified at the Vanity of those who threatens that, if we confederate not with *Cæsar*, they will turn their Arms against us, as if to engage in a War with the *Venetian* Senate were an easy Undertaking, and the



there was Reason to hope for a speedy <sup>A. D.</sup> Victory, and as if it were a Means for <sup>1523.</sup> preventing the Passage of the King of *France*, and not rather a Cause of the contrary : For who doubts that, when they have provoked us, we shall be obliged to propose such Conditions to the King as would induce him to pass, even tho' he were of himself averse to it. Was not this the very Case in the Time of King *Lewis*, when their Injuries and treacherous Dealings induced us to stimulate that King, when I from his Prisoner became your Ambassador, that at a Juncture when he was not apprehensive of being very powerfully attacked in *France*, he sent his Army, tho' with ill Fortune, into *Italy*? Can you imagine that if the Imperialists had thought that the Way to procure them our Friendship, or to keep the King of *France* out of *Italy*, was to fall upon us, they would have hitherto delayed to begin Hostilities, because perhaps their Generals had no covetous Desires to enrich themselves with Plunder and the Gains of War, or else perhaps were under no Necessity of easing the  
Country



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Country of their Friends of its Burden of quartering Troops, of getting Money for disburthening it, and to maintain the Army upon free Quarters in the Territories of others? But they have found by Experience that our Power renders it too difficult to force us to this Inconvenience, and they know it is not for their Interest, who are every Day apprehensive of a War with the King of *France*, to involve themselves in another War, and to give Occasion to a State powerful in Forces and Money, from the Greatness of their Injuries, to stimulate a *French* Invasion. While they remain in these Doubts and Jealousies they will not seize on the Dutchy of *Milan* for themselves, nor ever after affront us but with vain Menaces. If we secure them from these Apprehensions it will lie in their Power to accomplish either, and if they should put their Scheme in Execution, as probably they will, of whom can we chiefly complain but of ourselves and of our excessive Timidity, and immoderate Desire of Peace? Peace indeed is desirable, and a Blessing, when it is secure from Jealousies, when it

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increases not the Danger, and when it induces Men to think themselves at Liberty to enjoy Rest, and to free themselves from Expences. But when it produces contrary Effects, it is, under the insidious Name of Peace, a pernicious War, and under the Name of a wholesome Medicine, a destructive Poison. Wherefore if our joining in Confederacy with *Cæsar* excludes the King of *France* from making an Attempt upon *Italy*, we give *Cæsar* the Liberty of seizing at his Pleasure on the Dutchy of *Milan*, and when he is once possessed of that State to study our Destruction. Hence it will follow that, with the greatest Reproach to our Name, and with the Violation of the Faith of this Republic, we purchase the Aggrandisement of a Prince who has extended his Ambition no less than his Power, and who pretends with his Brother that all we possess on the *Terra Firma* belongs to them; and that we exclude from *Italy* a Prince whose Greatness is a Security to all others, and who would be necessitated to continue in the strictest Union with us. Now a Person who proposes such evident  
and

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A. D. 1523. and palpable Reasons cannot be charged as under the Influence of a new Affection rather than of Truth, or of private Interest, rather than of Love to the Republic, of whose Safety we have no Reason to doubt if it shall please God to grant so much Success to your Resolutions as he has bestowed Wisdom on this most excellent Senate."

BUT *Giorgio Cornaro*, a Citizen of equal Authority, and of as high a Reputation for Wisdom, as any Member of that Senate, made the following Speech in Opposition to this Advice.

"THE present Debate most illustrious Senators, is certainly of great great Importance, and very difficult. And yet when I consider the Ambition and Faithlessness of the Princes of our Times, and the Incongruity of their Nature with the Nature of Republics, which not being governed by the Will of a single Person, but by the Consent of many, proceed with more Moderation, and with greater Respects, nor ever arbitrarily depart, as is frequent

frequent with Princes, from what has <sup>A. D.</sup> some Appearance of Justice and Honour, <sup>1523.</sup> I cannot but conclude with myself that it must be very pernicious to us that the Dutchy of *Milan* should be under a Prince more powerful than ourselves. For such a Vacancy will of Necessity keep us under continual Jealousies and Uneasiness, and tho' we may be at Peace, it will be proper for us to be almost perpetually plotting on War, notwithstanding any Confederacy or Convention that may subsist between us. Of this we find infinite Examples in antient Historians, and some in our own Writers ; but what greater and more illustrious Examples can there be than those, the bitter Memory of which are engraven in all our Hearts? This Senate introduced *Lewis* King of *France* into the Dutchy of *Milan*, at which unfortunate Resolution many of us were present. We religiously observed the Articles of our Confederacy with him, tho' we were invited by the *Spaniards* and *Germans* with great Rewards, and on different Occasions, to detach ourselves from him, and were assured that he was of-



*A. D.* 1523. ten plotting our Destruction. Not the Benefit received, nor the Faith given, nor the perpetual Train of our good Offices for cultivating his Friendship, were capable of mollifying his Spirit, which was entirely bent on our Ruin, for which Purpose he at last reconciled himself with his antient and most bitter Enemies, and joined with them against us in the most pernicious League of *Cambray*. To avoid therefore the Dangers which will be continually hanging over our Heads from the insidious and deceitful Neighbourhood of great Princes, it will be necessary for us, if I mistake not, to direct all our Resolutions with a View that the Dutchy of *Milan* might not fall into the Hands of the King of *France* nor of the Emperor, but may come into the Possession of *Francesco Sforza*, or of some other who is not formidable for his Kingdoms or great Dominions. On this Resolution depends the present, and, if the Condition of the Times should alter, the future Augmentation and Aggrandisement of our State. We are not to consult whether we ought to continue in Friendship with the King of *France*,

or



or join in Confederacy with *Cæsar* : One A. D.  
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of these two Resolutions totally excludes *Francesco Sforza* from the Dutchy of *Milan*, and gives Admittance to the King of *France*, a Prince so much more potent than ourselves ; the other tends to confirm and secure *Sforza* in the Possession of that Dutchy, which *Cæsar* proposes to include as the principal Article of our Confederacy, and has promised the King of *England* to observe it. Wherefore if he should attempt to deprive him of that State, he would not only offend us, and the other *Italian* States, to whom he would give Occasion to have recourse once more to the *French*, but disoblige the King of *England*, for whom, all the World knows, he ought to have the greatest Respect, and would besides provoke the People of the *Milanese*, who are perfectly devoted to *Francesco Sforza*. By such a Step he would involve himself into a Multitude of Difficulties and Dangers, and highly to his Dishonour, be guilty of a Breach of Faith, which he has hitherto, for ought that appears, preserved inviolable, which cannot be said of the *French* ;

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nay,

*A. D.* 1523. nay, what is more, his restoring to *Francesco Sforza*, after the Death of Pope *Leo*, the State of *Milan*, resigning into his Hands the Fortresses successively as he acquired them, and at last, contrary to what many expected, putting him in Possession of the Castle of *Milan*, must be taken as manifest Signs, that he intends to fulfil his Engagement. Why then should we hesitate in preferring a Resolution which gives us great Hopes of answering our Intentions before one that manifestly tends to an End repugnant to our Views? In Opposition to this we are told it would be more dangerous to this Republic for the Dutchy of *Milan* to be under the Dominion of the Emperor than of the King of *France*, because that King, by the Greatness of *Cæsar*, and the Emulation between them, would be in a manner necessitated to persevere in strict Alliance with us; but from *Cæsar* we may expect quite the contrary, both on account of his Power and of the Claims which he and his Brother pretend to have on our State. I believe that whoever has such an Opinion

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on of *Cæsar* is not deceived, considering the Nature and Manners of such great Princes ; and I heartily wish he may not deceive himself who has not the same Opinion of the King of *France*. Many of the same Reasons were in Force under his Predecessor, who was however more swayed by Covetousness and Ambition than by a Sense of Honour, or of his own Profit. Besides the Reasons which might oblige him to continue united with us are not perpetual, but vary from Time to Time, according to the Nature of human Affairs. *Cæsar* is subject to the common Lot of Mortals, and, like other Princes greater than himself, liable to infinite Accidents of Fortune; and how long ago is it that, when all *Spain* was in an Insurrection against him he appeared more worthy of Commiseration than Envy ? And at least there is not so much Difference between one Danger and another as there is between a Resolution that certainly excludes us from obtaining our End and one that probably will lead us to its Accomplishment. Moreover the Reasons alledged by the worthy Sena-

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tor have a Respect only to future and distant Dangers; but if we consider the present State of Affairs it is not to be doubted that if we refuse an Alliance with *Cæsar* we shall immediately expose ourselves to greater Distresses and Dangers. For if we break off our Confederacy with the King of *France* it is very probable that he will defer his military Operations till a more convenient Time and Opportunity; but if we are in Conjunction with him, he may perhaps think fit immediately to enter upon Action, which will of Necessity create us Trouble and Expence. But in what Case is the War with the King likely to be attended with the greatest Danger to our State? If we join with *Cæsar* we may almost conclude for certain that the Victory will fall on our Side: An Event which we cannot so well promise ourselves by an Union with the King of *France*. And by confederating with *Cæsar* even the Victory of the King would not prove of such dangerous Consequence as would result from a contrary Resolution; for in such a Case the whole Force  
of



of the victorious Arms will be turned a-<sup>A. D</sup>gainst us, and *Cæsar* would not only find <sup>1523.</sup>himself under less Restraint, and fewer Impediments, but prompted in a manner by Necessity, to seize on the Dutchy of *Milan*. To what is urged concerning our Tie of Confederacy the Answer is easy; for we promised the King of *France* to defend the States which he possessed in *Italy*, not to recover them after he had lost them; there is nothing to that Purpose in the Instrument of our Articles, nor do these Reasons at all affect us. We fulfilled our Obligation when at the Loss of *Milan*, occasioned by their Want of Provisions for its Defence, our Troops suffered more than the *French*: We fulfilled them when we sent our Forces to the the Assistance of *Lautrech* on his Return with the *Swiss*. We went beyond our Obligations when we suffered ourselves to be induced by them with vain Hopes and Promises to wait for so many Months together the Coming of his Army. If Will detained him, why should we seek to bear the Punishment of his Faults? If Necessity, is not that same



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Reason sufficient to justify us to him, even tho' we were under any Obligations?

I know not for what we should be any longer bound to the King of *France*, since we have first been abandoned by him. I know not what farther is required of one Confederate from another, or how our Dangers can do him any Service. I affirm not that the imperial Generals have at present any Thoughts of going to War with us, nor will I presume to assert the contrary, considering the Necessity they lie under of subsisting the Army on the States of their Neighbours, and the Hopes they may have of drawing us by that Means into an Alliance with them, especially if the King of *France* should not pass, of which if any one doubts, he has, in my Opinion sufficient Reason for his doubting from the Negligence of the *French*, and their Want of Money of which they have been exhausted by the Wars, in which they are engaged beyond the Mountains, with two such Princes. Nor can he be justly blamed who believes this to be true on the Credit of your Ambassadors, for Ambassadors

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bassadors are the Eyes and Ears of *A. D.*  
States. In short I repeat it again as <sup>1523.</sup>  
my Opinion that we ought to use our  
utmost Endeavours, and be most solli-  
citous that the Dutchy of *Milan* may  
be settled on *Francesco Sforza*, whence  
it will follow that a Resolution which  
conducts to this End is more for our  
Utility than one that totally excludes us  
from it."

THE Authority of two such Per-  
sonages, and the Efficacy of their Rea-  
sons, rather more perplexed than deter-  
mined the Minds of the Senators, whence  
the Senate prolonged as much as possible,  
their coming to a Resolution, induced to  
this Delay by their own Nature, the  
Weightiness of the Affair, and a Desire  
to see first some further Progress of the  
King of *France*; many Difficulties also  
were thrown in their Way arising from  
a Necessity of their coming to an Agree-  
ment with the Archduke. The King  
of *France* increased their Doubts and  
Suspension of Mind by his present care-  
ful Attention to the Preparations of War,  
and

*A. D.* and his sending the Bishop of *Bayeux*,  
 1523. to intreat them to delay their Resolution for the Whole next ensuing Month, declaring that before the End of that Term he would pass into *Italy* with a greater Army than had ever been seen in that Country within the Memory of Man. While they remained under this Ambiguity, the Doge *Antonio Grimano* happened to die, and *Andrea Gritti* was elected in his Room, which was rather a Disservice to the *French* Interest than otherwise; for *Gritti* seated in that high Dignity left the Resolution entirely to the Senate, and would never from that Time, either by Words or Actions, shew himself inclined to either Party. At last the King continually sending to the Senate new Agents with very large Offers, and it being assured that *Anne de Montmorency*, afterwards Grand Constable of *France*, and *Federigo de Bozzole* were coming to *Venice* on the same Business, the Imperial and *English* Ambassadors, who were very jealous of this Delay, protested to the Senate that they would depart at the End of three Days, and leave the

*Andrea  
 Gritti  
 Doge of  
 Venice.*

the whole Affair unfinished. The Senate therefore being under a Necessity <sup>A. D. 1523.</sup> of coming to a Resolution, and putting no Faith in the Promises of the King of *France*, whose Credit was diminished by his having amused them for so many Months together, with vain Hopes, but much more by the Intelligence they received from their Ambassador residing at his Court in contradiction to the Agents Promises, determined to embrace the Friendship of *Cæsar*, with whom they made a Convention on the following Conditions.

THAT between *Cæsar*, *Ferdinando* <sup>Articles of a Treaty between</sup> Archduke of *Austria*, *Francesco Sforza* <sup>*Cæsar* and the *Venetians*.</sup> Duke of *Milan*, on one Part, and the *Venetian* Senate on the other, should be a perpetual Peace and Confederacy: That the Senate should be obliged to send, whenever there should be Occasion, for the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, Six Hundred Men at Arms, Six Hundred Light Horse, and Six Thousand Foot; and the same Force for the Defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*; in  
Case



A. D. Case it should be molested by any Chri-

1523.

stian Power; which Limitation was inserted because the *Venetians* refused to oblige themselves in general to defend that Country, that they might not provoke a War with the *Turks*. *Cæsar* entered into the same Obligation to defend whatever was in the Possession of the *Venetians* in *Italy*: And the *Venetians* were to pay the Archduke, on account of old Differences, and of the Agreement made at *Worms*, in the Space of Eight Years, Two Hundred Thousand Ducats. As soon as this Convention was made the *Venetians* dismissed from their Service *Teodoro da Trivulzio*, and elected for Governor General of their Forces, on the same Conditions, *Francesco Maria* Duke of *Urbino*.

Duke of  
*Urbino*  
made General of  
the *Vene-*  
*tians*.

It was generally thought all over *Italy* that the King of *France*, on hearing that those from whom he expected Assistance were become his Enemies, would lay aside for this Year all Thoughts of invading the Dutchy of *Milan*; but when it was known



known that he not only continued his Preparations but had began to put his Army in Motion ; those who dreaded the Consequences of his Victory, entered into a new Confederacy against him, and prevailed on the Pope to be at the Head of the League.

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ADRIAN desirous of a general Peace on his first coming into *Italy*, had intreated *Cæsar* and the Kings of *France* and *England* to lay down their Arms, so pernicious to the Christian Commonwealth, and especially at a Time when the *Turks* were in such a Career of Success ; and that they would send to *Rome* their respective Ambassadors with full Powers. They all apparently complied at once with his Request, but no sooner began to treat than they found it would be all Labour lost ; for a Peace was obstructed by infinite Difficulties, and a short Truce was not pleasing to *Cæsar* because it procured him no Advantage, and to a long one the King of *France* would not

A. D. 1523. not consent. The Pope therefore influenced either by his antient Benevolence towards *Cæsar*, or persuaded that the King of *France* had no real Thought of coming to an Agreement, began more than usual to give Ear to those who persuaded him not to permit the King to get Possession anew of the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Cardinal  
de' Medici  
in Favour  
at Rome.

THE Cardinal de *Medici*, who till now had kept himself retired at *Florence* for fear of a Persecution from his many Adversaries, and especially from the Cardinal of *Volterra* who seemed to have had a great Sway with the Pope, taking Courage at this Change of Measures, came to *Rome*, and was received with particular Marks of Respect by the greatest Part of the Court. He began immediately to confer with the Duke of *Sessa*, the Imperial Minister, and the *English* Ambassadors, and all jointly solicited his Holiness to favour the Cause of *Cæsar*. *Volterra's* bad Fortune at this Time, getting as usual the better of his Prudence and of all his Artifices, greatly injured his Affairs, put his Person in Danger, and at the same

same Time gave an Opportunity to Cardinal *de' Medici* to increase his Favour and Authority with his Holiness, who had hitherto shewn a great Partiality for *Volterra*, because with great Dexterity, solid Reasons and fine Speeches, he had him believe he had greatly at Heart the Peace amongst Christian Princes.

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BUT when *Francesco Imperiali* after his Banishment on his Way to *France*, by means of the Duke of *Sessa*, was stopped at *Castelnuovo*, in the Neighbourhood of *Rome*, in searching his Papers some Letters were found written by *Volterra* to the Bishop of *Sens* his Nephew, exhorting him to press the King of *France* to invade *Sicily* with a Fleet; which obliging *Cæsar* to attend to its Defence, would render more easy the Recovery of the Dutchy of *Milan*. The Pope was amazed at this Discovery, and thinking he had been grossly deceived, and at the same Time being vehemently solicited by the Duke of *Sessa*, and Cardinal *de' Medici*, he sent for *Volterra*, confined him in *Castel Sant' Angelo*, and gave Orders to have

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have him tried as a Delinquent against the Pontifical Majesty, for inviting the King of *France* to forcibly attack *Sicily*, a Fief of the Holy See. The Process however was carried on but slowly, and after he had been examined, was allowed Council to plead : But the same Moderation was not practised in regard to his Effects, for the Day he was arrested *Adrian* seized on all the Goods and Money in his House. By means of the Cardinal's Imprisonment a Plot also was discovered of some *Sicilians* in favour of *France*, for which Count *Camerata*, *Maestro Portulano*, and the Treasurer of the Island were quartered.

THIS Proceeding had greatly incensed *Adrian* against the King, and after consulting for several Days the Cardinal *de' Medici*, at last the Rumour continually increasing of his Majesty's Designs, he came to a Resolution of opposing him, and in a Consistory, after expatiating on the imminent Danger of Christendom from the Grand *Turk*, on account of the King of *France's* Obstinacy in refusing to come  
into



into the Truce in Agitation, which would <sup>A D.</sup> have removed all Apprehensions. It was, he <sup>1523.</sup> said, the Business of the Vicars of CHRIST, Successors of the Prince of the Apostles, to be anxious for the Preservation of the Peace amongst the Faithful, and therefore his Zeal for the public Welfare, obliged him to join those who laboured to prevent Disturbances in *Italy*; because on that depended the Peace of the whole World. Conformable to the Intent of this Harangue, on the Third Day of *August*, the Vice King of *Naples* being come to *Rome* for that Purpose, a League and Confederacy was signed between the Pope, <sup>A League between</sup> the Emperor, the King of *England*, the <sup>Adrian</sup> Archduke, the Duke of *Milan*, the Car- <sup>and other</sup> dinal *de' Medici* for the *Florentine* State, <sup>Powers</sup> and the *Genoesse*, for the Defence of *Italy*, <sup>against</sup> to last during the Life of the Confederates, <sup>France.</sup> and a Year after any one of their Deaths, and Room was left for any Prince to accede, provided it were with the Approbation of the Pope, *Cæsar*, the King of *England*, and the Archduke, and should give Security that he would prosecute his Pretensions by the Way



A. D. of Justice and not by Force of Arms.

1523.

That for the Defence of any of the Confederates who might be attacked in *Italy* an Army should be raised ; that the Pope should furnish Two Hundred Men at Arms, *Cæsar* Eight Hundred, the *Florentines* Two Hundred, the Duke of *Milan* Two Hundred, and also Two Hundred Light Horse. That the Pope, *Cæsar*, and the Duke of *Milan* should provide the Artillery and Ammunition, and be at all the Charges attending them. That for the Maintainance of the Foot and other Expences of the Army, the Pope, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines* should contribute each Twenty Thousand Ducats *per* Month, the Emperor Thirty Thousand, the States of *Genoa*, *Siena*, and *Lucca* Ten Thousand between them. The *Genoese* besides were to pay the Cost of their Marine, and for what Troops were necessary to defend their own Dominions. That every one's Quota should be paid for Three Months certain, and as long after as the Pope, jointly with the Emperor and the King of *England*, should declare it necessary. That the

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 51

the Pope and *Cæſar* ſhould have the Nomination of a Captain General; and the Vice King of *Naples* was expected to be the Man, eſpecially as he was propoſed by the Cardinal *de' Medici*, who was in great Repute with the Emperor, and bore a great Malice againſt *Proſpero Colonna*. The Marquis of *Mantoua* was but indirectly admitted into this Confederacy, becauſe the Pope and *Florentines*, had conſtituted him their General at their own Charge.

BUT neither the League which the *Venetians* had made with the Emperor, nor the Union of ſo many Potentates contracted with ſuch vaſt Proviſions were able to cool the Ardor of the King of *France*, who, lately arrived at *Lions*, was bent on paſſing into *Italy* with a numerous Army, where the very Rumour of his Coming had begun to excite new Tumults. *Lione*, Brother to *Alberto Pio*, recovered by Surpriſe the Town of *Carpi*, which *Lione* takes *Carpi*, was negligently guarded by *Giovanni Coſcia*, who had been placed there by *Proſpero Colonna*, to whom the Empe-  
D 2
ror

A. D. 1523. ror had given that Town, after declaring *Alberto* a Rebel of the Empire.

*Bonifacio Visconti* BUT a greater Accident had like to have happened in the Dutchy of *Milan*; for as *Francesco Sforza* was riding on a Mule from *Monza* to *Milan*, his Horse-guards following at a Distance that he might be less annoyed with the Dust raised by the Horses, which is very troublesome in the Plains of *Lombardy* during the Summer; *Bonifacio Visconti*, a young Man more regarded for the Name of his Family than for his Riches, Honours, or other good Qualities, being near him mounted on a mettlesome *Turkish* Horse, when he came to a Place where Four Roads meet, giving his Horse a sudden Jerk struck at the Duke's Head with a Dagger: But not being able to keep his fiery Horse steady, and the Mule starting at the same Time he missed of his Aim, and *Bonifacio* being much the taller and on a larger Beast, the Dagger directed to the Head grazed on the Back. *Bonifacio* then drawing his Sword made another Stroke

Stroke, but that also grazing only with the Edge of the Blade on his Side he received no Hurt. By this Time the Duke's Retinue coming up, *Visconti* rode away, and tho' pursued by the Guards, by the Goodness of his Steed got safe into *Piedmont*. What induced him to perpetrate so wicked a Fact, was that a few Months before *Monsignorino Visconti* was assassinated in *Milan* by *Girolamo Morone*, and, as was said, at the Duke's Instigation. If Fortune had rewarded this cunning and bold Attempt, we must have beheld an Example which has very rarely or never before happened, that on the public Road at noon Day, so great a Prince, attended by so numerous and armed a Guard, in the Midst of his Dominions, should fall by the Hands of a single Man and that the Assassin should make his Escape. \* The Duke thus wound-

D 3 ed

\* *Visconti* owed the Duke a Grudge for being broke at the Siege of the Castle of *Milan*, and afterwards for being refused the Government of a Town; and lastly for the Death of *Astorre Visconti* here called *Monsignorino*, who was his Uncle.



A. D. 1523. ed returned to *Monza*, being fully persuaded that there was some Plot carrying on against him at *Milan*; *Prospero*, and *Morone* entertained the same Suspicion, and instantly sent to apprehend *Visconti's* Brother the Bishop of *Alessandria*, who, without any Resistance, trusting to *Prospero's* Honour, delivered himself up to him, and after Examination was committed to the Castle of *Cremona*. But the Opinions of the Public was various as to his being conscious or not of the Fact.

Bishop of  
*Alessan-*  
*dria* im-  
prisoned.

*Valenza*  
taken by  
*Birago*.

ABOUT this very Time *Galeazzo Birago* with other *Milanese* Exiles, assisted by some *French* Soldiers that were in *Piedmont*, was admitted into *Valenza*, through the Treachery of the Governor, a *Savoyard*, but *Antonio da Leva*, taking with him some light Horse and the *Spanish* Foot that were in *Asti*, instantly laid Siege to the Town, which being in a weak Condition, and the Enemy not having had Time to fortify it, after planting the Artillery he reduced in two Days, and had the same Success with the Castle, having killed

and retaken  
by *Le-*  
*va*.

killed in the Two Assaults above Four <sup>A. D.</sup>  
 Hundred Men, and taken many Pri- <sup>1523.</sup>  
 soners, amongst the rest *Birago* the Au-  
 thor of these Disturbances.

THE *French* Army all this While <sup>Bourbon's</sup>  
 was passing the *Alps*, and was to be <sup>Plot.</sup>  
 followed by the King, who was pre-  
 vented by the Discovery of a Plot formed  
 by the Duke of *Bourbon*, who for his  
 Nobility, being of the Blood Royal, for  
 his vast Estate, for the Dignity of his  
 Office of Great Constable, and for the  
 universal Fame of his Valour, was the  
 first and most regarded Personage in the  
 Kingdom of *France*: He had been out  
 of the Royal Favour for some Years,  
 and on that account was not let into  
 the Secrets of the Cabinet, nor trusted  
 in those Posts to which his Dignity  
 seemed to intitle him. To this was  
 added, that the King's Mother, on some  
 old Claims, solicited the Parliament of  
*Paris* to decree away his Estate in her  
 Favour. The Duke finding he could  
 obtain no Redress from the King, full  
 of Resentment, by the Means of *Bu-*  
 D 4 ren

A. D. 1523. *ren* the Emperor's Confident, and Great Chamberlain, had entered very secretly into a Confederacy, a few Months before, with *Cæsar* and the King of *England*, and to consolidate this Alliance *Cæsar* agreed to give him in Matrimony, his Sister *Eleonora*, the Widow of *Emanuel* King of *Portugal*. The Execution of the Plot depended on the King's going in Person to the War, which was artfully promoted by the King of *England*, who made him believe that he might rest secure of his not molesting the Kingdom of *France* that Year; as soon as *Francis* had passed the Mountains *Bourbon* was to enter *Burgundy* with Twelve Thousand Foot, who, with *German* and *English* Money, were already secretly inlisting. *Bourbon* was confident that, when once the King was absent from the Kingdom, he should accomplish his Ends. Of the Conquests that he should make in *France*, he was to keep for himself, *Provence*, which he claimed thro' the Rights of the *Anjouins*, and it was to be created into a Kingdom in his Favour; all the rest of the conquered

quered Places were to remain to the King of *England*. A. D.  
1523.

THE Duke in order to excuse his not attending his Majesty into *Italy*, stopped at *Moulins*, where, he feigned himself sick; the King, in passing thro' that Town in his Way to *Lions*, having received some blind Intimation of this Plot, frankly told the Duke, that some People had endeavoured to render his Conduct suspicious, but that he could rest secure on his experienced Virtues and Loyalty. The Duke returned most humble Thanks to his Majesty for treating him with so much Freedom and Confidence, then thanking God for giving him a King incapable of being prepossessed by idle Stories and false Calumnies, promised that as soon as his Health would permit, which, from the Slightness of the Indisposition he had Reason to think might be in a few Days, he should follow him to *Lions*, and accompany him wherever he went.

BUT



A. D.

1523.

The Plot  
discoveredSan Vale-  
rio and o-  
thers im-  
prisoned.

BUT the King was no sooner arrived at *Lions*, than he received Intelligence that, on the Frontiers of *Burgundy*, there were assembling a Number of *German* Foot, which, adding to his former Suspicions, and some intercepted Letters making a clearer Discovery, he ordered *San Valerio*, *Boiss*, the Brothers of *Palisse*, the Master of the Posts, and the Bishop of *Autun* to be apprehended as Accomplices, and the Grand Master was sent with Four Hundred Horse and Four Thousand Foot to *Moulins* to secure the Duke of *Bourbon*, but was too late, for *Bourbon* suspecting a Discovery, and fearing the Passes might be guarded, had, in a disguised Habit, got into *Franche Compté*.

Bonivette  
goes into  
*Italy* with  
the Army.

THIS important Discovery put off the King's Journey into *Italy*, but did not however prevent him, after retaining part of the Forces designed for the new War, from sending thither *Bonivette* the Admiral of *France*, at the Head of Eighteen Hundred Lances, Six Thousand  
Swiss,

*Swiss*, Two Thousand *Gascons*, Two <sup>A. D.</sup> Thousand *Vallesse*, Six Thousand *Ger-* <sup>1523.</sup>  
*mans*, Twelve Thousand *French*, and  
 Three Thousand *Italians*, who passing  
 the Mountains with this Army, after  
 approaching the State of *Milan*, made  
 a Feint as if he intended to march to  
*Novara*, and as that City was unprovided  
 with Men, and had no Out-works, the  
 Duke of *Milan* sent Orders to surren- <sup>*Novara*</sup>  
 der the Town, but not the Castle. *Vi-* <sup>surrenders</sup>  
*gevano* for the same Reason acted in the <sup>and *Vige-*</sup>  
 same manner, so that all the Country be- <sup>*vano*.</sup>  
 yond the *Tesino* came into the Possession  
 of the *French*.

PROSPERO COLONNA, who was labour-  
 ing under a tedious Infirmary, did not  
 imagine that, after the *Venetians* had en-  
 tered into a Confederacy against the King  
 of *France*, and *Bourbon's* Plot had been  
 discovered, *Francis* would persist in his  
 Resolution of assaulting the Dutchy of  
*Milan* this Year; and on this Supposi-  
 tion he had not proceeded with proper  
 Diligence in getting together his Men  
 who were dispersed in several Places, nor  
 had

A. D. <sup>1523</sup> had he made any other necessary Preparations against such an Invasion. But now on the Approach of the Enemy he earnestly attended to assemble his Troops in order to dispute the Passage of the *Tesino*, forgetful of what had happened to himself, when on a like Occasion he had endeavoured to prevent *Lautrech* from crossing the *Adda*; and thought he was so sure of Success, that he took no Care to repair the Bastions and Fences of the Suburbs of *Milan*, which having been totally neglected were in a ruinous Condition. He drew together his whole Force on the Ground which lies between the River *Biagrasa*, *Bufaloro*, and *Turbico*, a Situation convenient for the Defence of *Pavia* and *Milan*. But the *French* who were at *Vigevano* found the Waters much lower than *Prospero* expected, and at Four Miles Distance began to pass the River, part of them waded, whilst others crossed in small Boats; they laid also a Bridge for the Conveniency of the Artillery, at a Place where they met with no Guard nor Obstacle. On this unforeseen Accident *Prospero* being obliged  
to

to alter his whole System, sent immediately *Antonio da Leva* with One Hundred Men at Arms, and Three Thousand Foot to defend *Pavia*, and with the Remainder of the Army retired himself to *Milan*, where in a Council of War it was unanimously allowed that *Milan* was not tenable if the *French* without Delay directed thither their March, because the Bastions and Fortifications of the Suburbs, having been neglected ever since the last War, lay mostly in ruins. That the Confidence with which *Prospero* had undertaken to defend the Passage of the *Tesino*, had been the Occasion that the necessary Reparations had been neglected, and that it would take up Three Days Time to put the Fortifications in a State of Defence. That they ought to take this whole Affair into their Consideration and then immediately set about the Reparations, but at the same Time, least the *French* should come upon them the First, Second, or Third Day, be prepared to retire to *Como*, if they marched by the Way of *Pavia*, or to *Pavia* if they came by *Como*.

A. D.  
1523.  
*Antonio de Leva* at  
*Pavia*.  
*Prospero*  
retires to  
*Milan*.

BUT



A. D.

1523.

The  
French  
lose the  
Opportunity of  
taking  
*Milan*.

BUT the evil Genius of the *French*, darkning as usual their Intelects, would not permit them the Profit of so fine an Opportunity; for either out of Negligence, or waiting till the whole Army was assembled (for a great Part was not yet come up) they continued Three Days on the *Tesino*, and then joining together all their Forces between *Milan*, *Pavia* and *Binasco*, marched to *San Cristofaro* a Place situated but a Mile from *Milan*, between the *Roman* and *Tesin* Gates. The Pioneers having cleared the Way they planted the Artillery in their Front, making believe they were moving to assault *Milan*, but without making any further Attempt; they pitched their Camp in that Place, and after a few Days removed it to the Abbey of *Chiaravalle*, where they destroyed the Mills, and cut the Pipes that supplied *Milan* with Water, proposing to themselves a Siege rather than an Assault; for besides the vast Number of People who had taken up Arms with a settled Aversion to the Name of the King of *France*, there were in *Milan* Eight Hundred Men at Arms,

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 63

Arms, Eight Hundred Light Horse, Four <sup>A. D.</sup> Thousand - *Spanish* Foot, Six Thousand <sup>1523.</sup> Five Hundred *Germans*, and Three Thousand *Italians*.

IN the Midst of these Broils died Pope <sup>Death of</sup> *Adrian* on the 14th Day of *September*, to <sup>*Adrian*.</sup> the no small Detriment of the Confederates, who were deprived not only of the Pontifical Authority, but also of the Subsidies for which, by the Articles of the Treaty, he was engaged. He left behind him no great Esteem of his Abilities, either because his Reign was short, or that he had little Experience in Affairs ; his Death was no way displeasing to the Courtiers, who wished to see the Papal Chair filled with an *Italian*, at least with a Person educated in their Country. *Adrian's* Death caused some Disturbances in the ecclesiastic State, where, during his Life, some Sparks were discovered which prognosticated a future Combustion, and would then have dilated themselves if, partly by Accident and partly by Care, they had not been prevented.

A. D.

1523.

*Alberto Pio* Governor of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*.


THE College of Cardinals before the Pope's Arrival into *Italy*, had committed the Care of *Reggio* and *Rubiera* to *Alberto Pio*, who under divers Pretences and Excuses continued to keep Possession of their Castles, having taking Occasion of *Adrian's* little Experience, to despise his Orders. He had also agreed that, as soon as War broke out, *Renzo da Ceri* with a Party of Horse and a good Body of Foot should quarter at *Rubiera*, and from thence make Excursions, when Opportunity offered, on the *Roman* Road between *Modena* and *Reggio* in order to intercept the Money and Dispatches which should be transmitted to *Milan* from *Naples*, *Rome*, and *Florence*, and be at Hand for undertaking any Thing of importance when Occasion offered. But *Francesco Guicciardini* the Governor of those Towns, having in Time dived into the Design, had made *Adrian* sensible of the End for which *Alberto* accompanied his Requests with such smooth Speeches, and of the Dangers to which the ecclesiastic State on that Side would be exposed

The Historian Governor of *Modena* and *Reggio*

posed, obtained that the Pope, enraged at *Alberto's* Proceedings, by Threats of using Force obliged him to restore the Castles, for the Affairs of the *French* were not in such Forwardness as to enable him to make a Resistance. But those of the Family of the *Pii* having afterwards got Possession of *Corfica*, *Prospero Colonna* in order to recover it, was the Cause that *Guido Rangone* was taken into the Pay of the Confederates with One Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horse, and One Thousand Foot, and that the Duke of *Seffa*, who had enlisted One Thousand *Spaniards* at *Rome*, which were to join the rest at *Milan*, was ordered to stop with them at *Modena*.

IN the mean Time *Renzo da Ceri*, whose Fame together with Hopes of Plunder had drawn about him great Numbers of Horse and Foot, began to make Excursions, and infest the whole Country and unexpectedly one Night, after the Pope's Death, attempted with Two Thousand Men to take *Rubiera*, but the Gar-



A. D. 1523.  Prisoner behaving gallantly, he found that Place was not to be easily taken by Storm; *Trislano*, a *Corfican*, one of his Captains of Foot, was made a Prisoner in the Assault. *Renzo's* Troops assembled afterwards on several Occasions in these Parts, and were the Cause of Undertakings of greater Moment, for after the Pope's Death the Duke of *Ferrara*, tired with vain Promises, so often made him of the Restoration of his Towns, and finding that by the Absolution he had procured from *Adrian*, it was less difficult to obtain a Pardon for what he had forcibly taken, than a Restoration of what he had lost, and having fully persuaded himself of what was the universal Belief, that on account of the Dissentions which since *Leo's* Death had been ever encreased among the Cardinals, the Election of a new Pope would be carried to a great Length, he determined to attend to the Recovery of *Reggio* and *Modena*. Amongst the many Opportunities for accomplishing his Scheme, was offered that of conveniently joining with *Renzo da Ceri*, who had already

already got together Two Hundred Horse, and above Two Thousand Foot, he therefore enlisted Three Thousand Men, and after sending Ten Thousand Ducats to *Renzo*, marched towards *Modena*, which had no other Garrison than Count *Gajazzo* and his Troops, which had been hired by the Confederates. Tho' the Inhabitants of *Modena* detested the Government of the Family *d' Este*, yet as the Walls were weak, and built after the old Fashion without Bastions, the Ditches filled up, and no Sort of Reparations had been made for a long time, there seemed a Necessity for a larger Garrison, wherefore the Governor and the Count, after composing the Differences which had for some Time subsisted between them, unanimously persuaded the *Spanish* Foot (which after entering *Tuscany*, came on but slowly, and had hitherto given them various and ambiguous Answers whether they would stop at *Modena* or proceed forwards) and at last after many Entreaties prevailed on them to enter the Town. The Duke of *Ferrara*, who was arrived at *Finale* with Two Hundred Men at Arms, Four

A. D.  
1523.

A. D.

1523.

Four Hundred Light Horse and Three Thousand Foot, being apprised of the Introduction of the *Spaniards*, was inclined to proceed no farther, but as he had no Certainty of the Fact, and hoping at least that he might by his Conjunction with *Renzo* obtain *Reggio*, and not despairing also but that some Disorder might arise amongst the Enemies Infantry on account of their Arrears, he resolved to advance. Nor did he entertain such Hopes on light Grounds, for the College of Cardinals, who by the Governor had been apprised of his imminent Danger, made no Sort of Provision, nor indeed returned any Answer to his Letters and Expresses, and it was not in his Power to content the Soldiers with the public Money, for the Day was come in which the second Month's Pay was due to the *Spaniards*, and had he been able to raise the Money he could have no Hopes of enlisting more Men, and by dividing the Soldiers between *Modena* and *Reggio* neither of these Towns would be safe, for *Reggio* had no Garrison, and the Dispo-

Disposition of the People was quite different from that of the *Modenese* A. D. 1523.

IN this Perplexity the Governor and Count *Guido*, after judging it was more prudent to preserve *Modena* as a Town of greater Importance for its Vicinity to *Bologna*, more united to the ecclesiastic State, and which lay more convenient for receiving Succours and Provisions, sent Five Hundred Men to *Reggio* under *Vincenzo Maiatto* of *Bologna*, an Officer of Count *Guido*, with Orders to retire into the Citadel if the Town could not be preserved, as they had some Hopes it might, at least for some Days; they sent also some Money to the Governor *Giovan Battista Smeraldo*, of *Parma*, to enable him to get together Three Hundred Men, and they tried but in vain to prevail on the Community of *Reggio* to contribute a Sum for raising more Men, as they were necessary not only for the Defence of the ecclesiastic State but also for their own Security.



A. D.

1523.

Guicciar-  
dini's  
Speech to  
the *Mode-  
nese*.

WHEN the Governor of *Modena* found that without Money he could not well preserve the Town, he assembled a good Number of the Citizens and acquainted them, that Affairs were reduced to such a Crisis, that since for want of Money the *Spanish* Foot could not be paid, nor other Necessaries provided, the Town must of course come into the Hands of the Duke of *Ferrara* which otherwise might defend itself. That there was no Method of guarding against this Calamity, if they themselves did not take upon them to prevent the present Danger, for he was well assured, that the new Pope, or the College of Cardinals would for the future effectually provide for their Defence. He said there was not one present who had not experienced both the Government of the Duke and that of the Church, and therefore it would be Time lost to make use of Arguments and Reasonings to convince them of what they allowed. He only begged they would not make any Difficulty of lending him the Sum  
he

he now required, which was but a A. D.  
1523.  
trifle both to each Particular, and to the  
Public, in comparifon to the Change of a  
Government under which they were happy.

THIS Speech being agreeable to the  
Audience, who were of the fame Sentiments,  
they raifed that very Day Five  
Hundred Ducats by a Tax laid on  
themselves, with which the *Spaniards*  
being paid, and other Neceffaries pro-  
cured, they were in no farther Danger  
from the Duke of *Ferrara*, who not lay-  
ing a greater Stress on his Forces than  
they deferved, leaving *Modena* on his left,  
and joining *Renzo* in his Way, proceeded  
to *Reggio*, where he was received without  
Difficulty, and the next Day the Governor  
of the Citadel furrendered a little after  
the Cannon had began firing, alledging for  
his Excufe that *Majatto* whom he had  
fent for had refufed to come to his Af-  
fiftance, and that the Money fent him by  
the Governor of *Modena*, had been feized  
near *Parma* where he was recruiting.

A. D.

1523.

As soon as the Duke had got Possession of *Reggio*, the Admiral recalled *Renzo da Ceri* which greatly lessened the Duke's Forces, who however after laying some Days along the *Secchia* undertook the Siege of *Rubiera*, where the Count had placed old *Guido da Coviano* with Two Hundred Foot. The Duke had small Hopes of Success, for the Place tho', small had strong Fortifications, the Ditches being deep and wide, and the Walls were surrounded by Ramparts of Earth, yet the next Day, as soon as the Artillery began to play against a Part of the Wall contiguous to the Gate, the Governor, either because he had so secretly agreed, or else intimidated because his Men began to be tumultuous, jumped down from the Walls and presented himself to the Duke, to whom he made a tender of himself and of the Town. The Duke entered the Place, and had no sooner planted the Cannon against the Castle than the Commander whose Name was *Tito Tagliaferro*, a *Parmesan*, was so terrified, that notwithstanding it was sufficiently

sufficiently provided with Men, Artillery and all Necessaries, he surrendered without standing a single Shot. The Duke then put his Army into Quarters in Hopes that, on account of a long Vacancy of the *Roman See*, the Troops in *Modena* would disband, as also because he had farther Expectations as will be after related.

A. D.


1523.

IN the mean Time *Bonivette*, who was encamped at *San Cristofano* in a Place surrounded by Waters and Ditches between the *Tesin* and *Roman* Gates, despairing of making himself Master of *Milan*, after taking of *Monza* had sent *Monf. Bayarde* and *Federigo da Bozzole* with Three Hundred Lances and Eight Thousand Foot to *Lodi*, where the Marquis of *Mantoua*, General of the Ecclesiastic and *Florentine* Forces, commanded, with Five Hundred Horse and the same Number of Foot; but the Marquis fearing his Person was in Danger, retired to *Ponte Vico*, and *Lodi* thus abandoned received the *French*. *Federigo* then laid a Bridge on the *Adda*, and crossing



A. D.

1523.



*Cremona*  
besieged.

crossing with the same Forces, he went in Succour of the Castle of *Cremona*, where the famished Garrison not having any Knowledge of the Arrival of a *French* Army in *Italy*, the very same Day the Admiral was approaching *Milan*, had agreed to surrender, if not relieved by the 26th Day of *September*. *Federigo* advanced to the Castle without Opposition, and after supplying it with Victuals and all Necessaries resolved to lay Siege to the Town, to which he was encouraged by the smallness of the Garrison left there by *Prospero*; but the Marquis of *Mantoua* out of Fear of what might happen, had sent thither One Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horse, and Four Hundred Foot. *Federigo* finding he could not enter *Cremona* on the Side of the Castle on account of the strong Fortifications erected between the Castle and the Town, turned to the Right, in order to make an attack where the Wall was weakest. After opening a Breach he gave the Assault but was repulsed; then widening the Breach he entered on a second Attack, but meeting

ing

ing with the same ill Success, he retired to *San Martino* in order to wait for *Renzo da Ceri*, who was moved from the *Reggian* with Two Hundred Horse and Two Thousand Foot. On his Arrival they returned to the Walls which were battered with as great Success as could be wished, but being afterwards incommoded with vast Rains, and finding they could not, without great Hazard, obtain their Intent, they made no farther Attempt. *Mercurio* at the same Time, with the light Horse of the *Venetians*, whose Troops were assembling at *Ponte Vico*, passing the *Oglio*, made Excursions up to their very Entrenchments. After these vain Attempts finding themselves straightened in Provisions, and *Renzo's* Men deserting, because they had received no other Money than what had been sent their Leader, quitting *Cremona*, they went and laid Siege to *Sonzino*, but with the same ill Success. They afterwards plundered *Carravaggio*, where they rested some Days; which furnished a Cause or Pretence to the *Venetians* for not sending to

A. D.

1523.

*Carravaggio*  
put to the  
Sack.

*A. D.* 1523. to *Milan* their Supplies according to Engage-  
ment, for they gave in Excuse for their Slowness in collecting their Army, the Notion which prevailed amongst the *German* Officers, that on account of their Separation from *France*, the *French* would not pass that Year into *Italy*, and that they had promised to be in Readiness only when the Troops in the *Cremonese* should have repassed the River *Adda*.

WHILST Affairs continued in this Situation each party mistrusting its Ability of putting a speedy End to the War, neither would venture on any Enterprize that might endanger the whole. The Admiral gave himself little concern in carrying on the Siege of *Milan*, being persuaded that the Enemy would either disband for want of Money, or quit *Milan* for want of Victuals, for tho' that City was supplied with a great Quantity of Wheat, yet in so populous a Town the Mouths were innumerable, and as the Admiral had cut off the Waters to prevent the working of the Mills, they found great Difficulties

ficulties in grinding their Corn\*. On <sup>A. D.</sup> <sup>1523.</sup> these Considerations he recalled the Troops in the *Ghiaradadda*, and posted them between *Modena* and *Milan*, so as to prevent any Provisions coming by the Way of the Mountain of *Brionza*, having already taken Care to prevent their Access by the usual Way of *Lodi* and *Pavia*. But all this, as will appear, was not sufficient for his obtaining the desired Effect.

PROSPERO COLONNA labouring under a grievous Infirmary, was no less uneasy in his Mind, under Expectation of the Vice-king, not brooking to be the Second in Command, wherefore desirous of exerting himself, he ordered that all Diligence might be used to cut off the Convoys of Provisions which came to the Enemy from the other Side of the *Tesino*, since by the Strength of their Entrenchments, it was not practicable to drive them away by Force of Arms: And

\* The Want of Bread was so great that One Hundred Thousand of the Inhabitants had not a Morsel of Bread for Eight Days, whilst the new Mills were building.



A. D.

1523.

And for this Purpose he propos'd that the Marquis of *Mantona* should enter *Pavia*; which rendering the Bridge of the *French* unsecure, they laid another at *Torligo* Twenty-five Miles distant from *Pavia*. *Vitelli* also earnestly solicited that his Regiment of *Florentine* Men at Arms which, at the Commencement of the War, had been sent to *Genoa*, and afterwards in Conjunction with Three Thousand Troops in the Pay of the *Genoese* had reduced; excepting *Alessandria*, all the Country on the other Side the *Po*, might pass the River, and intercept those Provisions which came to the *French* Camp by Way of the *Lomellina*. But the Doge of *Genoa* would not consent, because he was himself in Fear of the Stratagems of *Fregoso* who was in *Alessandria*, and because the *Venetians*, whose Troops had passed the *Adda*, refused to cross the *Oglio* whilst that Body of *French* that had quitted *Caravaggio* continued near *Monza* for fear of endangering *Bergamo*. At *Prospero's* Desire, Four Hundred Light Horse and Five Hundred Foot were sent to *Trezzo*,  
in

in order to oblige the *French* to quit that *A. D.*  
Neighbourhood, by cutting off their Pro-  
visions. 1523.

WHILST both Parties were thus employed no other military Actions were performed than light Skirmishes, Plunderings, and Excursions, mostly to the Disadvantage, and sometimes to the considerable Loss of the *French*, as for Instance, when *Gio. de' Medici* went out to escort the Provisions which were coming from *Frezza* to *Milan*, with Two Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horse, and One Thousand Foot, meeting with Eighty *French* Men at Arms, mostly belonging to *Bernardo Visconti*, first seemed to pursue them, then artfully retiring drew them into an Ambush where he had placed Five Hundred Men with Fire Arms, who without much difficulty routed them, and killed or took the greatest Part. In another Encounter likewise *Zuccherò Borgognone* broke Sixty Men at Arms of the Grand Ecuyer's Regiment. The *Spaniards* also often attacked and destroyed a good Number of the *French*

*Giov. de' Medici*  
routs *Bernardo Visconti*.

*A. D.* *French* who guarded the Trenches where  
 1523. the Pioneers were at Work in cutting  
 Trenches under Cover of the Ramparts,  
 and *Pagolo Luzasa* who was in *Pizzichitone* with Fifty Horse, making Excur-  
 sions all over the Country, greatly an-  
 noyed those who were in *Cremona*.

NEITHER had the Admiral any bet-  
 ter Success in his secret Negotiations ;  
 He had privately agreed with one  
*Morgante* of *Parma*, a chief Officer of  
*Giovanni de' Medici's* Regiment, *Giani-*  
*colo de Lanci* and Four others, only he  
 let into the Secret, that when he should  
 be appointed to guard the Bastion which  
 had a Wicket beyond the Out-works,  
 he should introduce the *French*. On  
 the Night the Plot was to be executed,  
*Morgante* imagining he had Occasion  
 for more Confederates, discovered it to  
 another of his Acquaintance, who seem-  
 ing to approve of the Scheme, advised  
 him to go and in *Prospero's* Name or-  
 der the Centinels not to stir if they  
 should hear any Noise, that they might  
 not

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be prevented from molesting the Person whom he should send to the Enemy's Camp to inform them of his being in Readiness for their Reception. The Admiral had ordered One Thousand Foot that very Night to approach the Bastion, that they might be prepared to advance as soon as the Signal was given and the whole Army to be under Arms. But whilst *Morgante* was gone to give his Order, the other flew to *Giovanni de' Medici*, and discovered the whole Affair, and then seized on the Conspirators who, according to military Justice, were executed, by passing thro' the Pikes.

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BUT the Affairs of the *French* now in all Parts, seemed to decline, for the Fertility of the Country about *Milan*, together with the new Mills which the Besieged had erected within, lessened every Day, their Hopes of reducing the Town by Famine, and it was computed that in the many Skirmishes in the Neighbourhood of *Milan*, what with killed and disabled they had lost Fifteen Hun-



*A. D.* 1523. dred Horse, and were become so fearful, that they durst not stir out of their Entrenchments, unless when they were under a Necessity to send Escorts or procure Forage ; and then they issued forth in great Bodies, but the Admiral made a Merit of this Disgrace, and was heard to say that he did not conduct the War like the hot-headed *French* Commanders, but had learned from the *Italians* how to act with Maturity and Moderation, yet whenever his Horse or Foot met the Enemy they shewed a greater Propensity to run away than to fight.

THE Imperial Officers being thus freed from the Fear of the Enemy, and of starving, and on the contrary in Hopes of rendering difficult the Provisions of the *French*, were now under no other Uneasinesses than that of the Want of Money, without which they could hardly provide for the Sustenance of those in *Milan*, and it would be almost impossible to escort them out of the Town, if the Occasions of the War required

required it. To obviate this Difficulty *A. D.*  
amongst other Ways and Means, *Pro-* <sup>1523.</sup>  
*spero*, with the secret Consent of the *Prospero's*  
Vice-king and Duke of *Sessa*, had soon *Negotia-*  
after the Pope's Death began to treat the Duke  
with the Duke of *Ferrara*, (who had *of Ferr-*  
often refused the Offers made him by  
the Admiral for marching his Troops  
to assist the Siege of *Cremona* after he  
had taken *Reggio*) and he agreed with  
*Prospero* that as soon as he should be  
put in Possession of *Modena* through his  
Means, to pay him immediately Thirty  
Thousand Ducats, and Twenty Thou-  
sand more in Two Months. The Af-  
fair seemed easy, for as soon as *Prospero*  
should send his Orders to Count *Guido*  
*Rangoni* who was in the Service of the  
League, and to the *Spanish* Foot to quit  
*Modena*, the Inhabitants thus abandoned  
would submit to the Duke. *Prospero* was  
induced to take this bold Resolution not  
only with View to the public Good, but  
to gratify also his private Friendship with  
*Alfonso d'Este*, and weaken the papal Gran-  
deur, which was a common Desire of all  
the *Roman* Barons, that when *Modena* and

*A. D. Reggio* were separated from the Church  
 1523. the Duke of *Milan* might, with greater  
 Ease, get Possession of *Parma* and *Pia-*  
*cenza*.

Disco-  
 vered to  
*Guicciar-*  
*dini*.

THIS Negotiation, tho' carried on with great Secrecy, came to the Knowledge of Count *Rangóni* who communicated it to *Guicciardini*. He saw immediately that the only Way to save the Town was to persuade the *Spanish* Commanders who having been used well, and receiving a large Salary, were content with their Station, to pretend that they were not under *Prospero's* Authority till they had joined his Army, and therefore would not depart from *Modena*, till they received an express Order from the Duke of *Sessa*, who had sent them thither. The Governor was very sensible that this Treaty had not been carried on without the Knowledge of *Sessa*, yet as that Duke was the Imperial Ambassador at *Rome*, he thought that when the College of Cardinals made their Remonstrances he would not only be ashamed to give such Orders, but at their Requests would act quite the contrary.

The

The Governor's Project took Effect, <sup>A. D.</sup> and Things succeeded according to his <sup>1523.</sup> Wishes, for Count *Guido* and the *Spaniards* on receiving *Prospero's* Orders to come to *Milan*, where their Presence was necessary, the Count gave several Reasons for not coming, as that he was neither a Subject of the Church nor a *Modenese*, and the *Spaniards* instructed by him and the Governor, made Answer, that they could not stir till they were commanded by the Duke of *Sessa*. After the Governor had informed the Cardinals of what had passed they sent for the Duke of *Sessa* to appear in the Conclave, where, not being willing to render himself, and consequently *Cæsar* suspected, he would not deny but that he had sent his Orders to the *Spanish* Officers not to depart from *Modena*. This Discovery, as it often happens in human Affairs, produced Effects quite contrary to what had been imagined, for when certain Letters of *Prospero*, intercepted by the Governor, were produced in the College, by which the Progress of the whole Treaty was discovered, the Cardinals Adherents to *France*, by whose Opposition the

The Gar-  
rison of  
*Modena*  
refuse to  
obey *Pro-  
spero's* Or-  
ders.



*A. D.* Continuation of the Supplies of Money  
 1523. which by Means of the Cardinal *de' Medicis* had been begun to be sent to *Modena* was obstructed, now being of Opinion that the Success of the Plot would have been contrary to the Interest of their King, solicited themselves to have the Money sent to that City ; as did also Cardinal *Colonna*, that it might be thought he preferred the Advantage of the Apostolic See to any other Interest. These Measures deferred the Execution of *Alfonso d'Este's* Designs, but did not prevent the Continuation of *French* Negotiations. They imagined it might be so managed, that the Vice-king who, with slow Marches, was coming from *Naples* to *Milan*, with Four Hundred Lances, and Two Thousand Foot, in his Passage thro' *Modena*, might carry off the *Spaniards*.

By this Time in *Milan* there was no Want of Food, for the Admiral fearing the *Germans* in *Pavia* might destroy his Bridge on the *Tesino*, over which were brought all sorts of Provisions, detached Three Thousand Foot from the Army  
 at

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at *Monza* which was the smallest Body, A. D. 1523.  
and sent them to guard the Bridge, then  
reinforcing his own with another Part of  
that Army, he distributed the rest in  
*Marignano* and *Biagrassa* near the Bridge  
whence the Imperialists, having Possession  
of *Monza*, were plentifully supplied  
with all Necessaries.

THE *French* Army was very strongly  
encamped, it consisted of Eight Hun- Descrip-  
dred Light Horse, Six Thousand *Swiss*, tion of the  
Two Thousand *Italian* Foot, and Ten French  
Thousand between *French* and *Gascons*,  
and extended from the Abbey of *Chara-*  
*valle* as far as the Road to *Pavia*, and  
from thence for the Space of a Cannon  
Shot towards *Milan*, they had at the  
Bridge of the *Tesino* One Thousand *Ger-*  
*mans*, and One Thousand *Italians*, and  
the same Number at *Biagrassa*, where  
*Renzo da Ceri* was placed. In *Novara*  
they had Two Hundred Lances, and  
Two Thousand Foot between *Alessandria*  
and *Lodi*.

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1523.

Imperial  
Forces in  
*Milan.*

IN *Milan* there were Eight Hundred Lances Eight Hundred Light Horse, Five Thousand *Spaniards*, Six Thousand *Germans*, and Four Thousand *Italian* Foot, besides the Multitude of armed Inhabitants, who in Heart and Hand were ready to encounter the *French*. The Marquis of *Mantoua* was in *Pavia* with Five Hundred Lances, Six Hundred Light Horse, Two Thousand *Spanish* Foot, and Three Thousand *Italians*; *Vitelli* at *Castel Nuovo* in the *Tortonese* with Three Thousand Foot, tho' a little after he retired to *Seravalle*, being apprehensive that a Body of *French* who were gone towards *Alessandria* might intercept his Return to *Genoa*. The *Venetians* had Six Hundred Men at Arms, Five Hundred Light Horse, and Five Thousand Foot, but of these last One Thousand were sent to *Milan* at the Request of *Prospero*, who prided himself on having it known that he was assisted by the *Venetians*, and a little after on some Suspicion of a Plot, another Body of them were sent to *Cremona*.

THE

THE Admiral at last pressed by the Difficulty in procuring Provisions, the extream Coldness of the Season, the deep Snows, and the Grumbling of the *Swiss*, who protested they would bear no longer so many Inconveniencies, resolved to decamp from *Milan*, but before he made known this Resolution, at his Request *Galeazzo Visconti* asked Leave to make a Visit in *Milan* to *Madamma Chiara*, who was no less famous for her extraordinary Beauty than for having entirely captivated the Heart of *Prospero Colonna*. As soon as *Galeazzo* entered *Milan*, he made Proposals for a Truce, which were readily hearkened to, and the next Day near the Fortifications of *Alarcone*, *Pagolo Vettori* the *Florentine* Commissary, and *Girolamo Morone* had a Meeting with *Galeazzo Visconti*, and the General of *Normandy* on the Part of the Admiral, who proposed a Suspension of Arms for all the following Month of *May*, and to quarter their Army in the neighbouring Towns and Villages, and would at least have consented to reduce all their Forces beyond the *Tesino*. But the

German



*A. D. 1523.* German Officers, vexed that their Hopes of Victory should be interrupted by a Truce, refused to agree to any Terms without the Approbation of the Vice-king, wherefore the Admiral two Days after, before Break of Day ordered the Artillery to be carried to the Banks of the *Tesino*, which, as soon as it was light was followed by the whole Army, but in such Order, as to appear ready to fight if they were attacked. When the Retreat was discovered in the Town, not only the common Soldiers, and Citizens cried out loudly to be conducted to pursue them, but also the chief Officers, and those of the greater Authority made the same Instances to *Prospero Colonna*, laying before him the Facility of the Victory, for they reckoned themselves not inferior to the Enemy, and thought they should fight with much more Courage; for a Retreat must of Necessity put a Damp on most of their Spirits, which indeed was confirmed by several *Italians* who had just then deserted from them. They reminded him of the infinite Glory he would acquire, and how his Name would be perpetuated to the latest Posterity

if

if he added to the Merit of his past Victories the Glory and Triumph which he had now in his Power to gain. But it was *Prospero's* stated Maxim to avoid as much as possible to put himself in the Power of Fortune, wherefore, as immovable as the most solid Fabric against all the Efforts of blowing Winds, he made Answer, that it did not become a wise General to regulate his Conduct by popular Clamours, or lead out his Men against an Army whose Preservation depended on a desperate Defence, that he had already conquered and acquired sufficient Glory by obliging the Enemy to retire without Danger; or Effusion of Blood. That Men ought to limit their Desires, for any one might discern that, following their Council, if they miscarried the Loss would prove without Comparison much greater than the Advantage if they came off with Success. That by conducting himself with such Principles he had always came off with Honour in whatever he undertook. That the Reproach of Rashness is more injurious

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rious to Generals, than the Glory of a Victory is advantageous, for in the first Case the Blame falls solely and intirely on the General, whereas the Praise of Victory, at least, according to the Opinion of Mankind, is communicated amongst many. That now when he was so near his End he would not follow new Counsels, and abandon those which in the whole Course of his Life had procured him Glory, Profit, and Grandeur.

Negotia-  
tion con-  
cerning  
the Elec-  
tion of a  
new Pope.

THE *French* divided their Army in Two Bodies, the Admiral with the greatest Part stopped at *Bragrassa* and ordered the Remainder to *Rosa*, the first Place being distant Fourteen, the other Seven Miles from *Milan*. But a few Days after the Admiral was removed from *Milan*, a new Pope was created, after the Cardinals had been Fifty Days in the Conclave, which was opened with Thirty-six Cardinals, and Three others came in after. They wasted all this Time in making divers Conventions, being divided into Parties, not only on account of their dif-

different Attachments to *Cæsar* and the King of *France*, but also on account of the Grandeur of the Cardinal *de' Medici*, who, tho' opposed by all those who were in the *French* Interest, and by some of *Cæsar's* Adherents, yet had found Means to secure for himself the Votes of Sixteen Cardinals, who were determined to chuse him, or no other without his Consent. He had also the secret Promise of Five more which he procured by his own Interest, and was besides particularly distinguished by the Ambassador of *Cæsar* and all those who depended on his Authority. Tho' he had almost the same Interest at the Death of Pope *Leo*, yet he now entered the Conclave with a more firm Resolution, neither for Length of Time, or any other Accident to give up his Hopes, principally founded on the Necessity of a Concurrence of Two Thirds of the present Cardinals, in the Election of a Pontiff. Nor would he be removed from his Resolution by the common Danger of *Italy*, or the State of the Church in particular. As the Progress of the War varied, each Party endeavoured to protract

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the Election, in Hopes that whoever got the Victory would bestow Favours on his Adherents. And the Election would have been carried on to a much greater Length if all those who were averse to Cardinal *de' Medici*, and who were mostly the oldest of the College, had been as united in the Choice of any other as they were in opposing him, and setting aside their private Views, had been only unanimous in excluding Cardinal *de' Medici*. Cardinal *Colonna* was a Man of a hasty and very proud Temper, and Cardinal *de' Medici's* bitter Enemy, but being dissatisfied with the Cardinals of his Party, because he could not prevail on them to chuse Cardinal *Jacovaccio* a Roman of his Faction, and who had a great Dependance on him, he went of his own Accord to Cardinal *de' Medici*, offering him all his Interest for his Election. *Medici* gave him instantly a Bond under his Hand by which he engaged to make him Chancellor, which Post he then occupied himself, and make him a Present of his most sumptuous Palace, built by Cardinal *San Giorgio*, and given him by Pope *Leo*. *Colonna*,  
overjoyed

overjoyed at these Concessions, brought <sup>A. D.</sup> over Cardinal *Cornaro* and Two more; <sup>1523.</sup> as soon as this Change was known several others, as usually happens in Conclaves, carried away by Meanness of Spirit or Ambition, strove not to be the last in offering their Service, by which means that very Night the Cardinal *de' Medici* was unanimously adored as Pontiff, and the next <sup>Cardinal *de' Medici* created</sup> Morning the 19th of *November*, was <sup>Pope.</sup> elected, according to Form, with the usual solemn Scrutiny, that Day Two Years on which he had entered triumphantly into *Milan*. It was believed that the vast Number of Benefices and ecclesiastical Posts of which he was in Possession facilitated his Election, for when the Cardinals came into the Conclave they unanimously signed a Convention, by which all the ecclesiastical Revenues of the Person elected, should be equally divided amongst the rest of the College. He intended to retain the Name of *Julius*, but being told by some Cardinals that it had been observed, that those who after their Election had not changed their Names, had died <sup>and takes the Name</sup> within the Year, he assumed the Name of <sup>of *Clement*</sup> *Clement* VII.

A. D. *Clement* VII. either because the Festival  
 1523. of that Saint was near, or alluding to his  
 having after his Election forgiven and  
 taken into Favour the Cardinal of *Vol-*  
*terra* with all his Adherents, notwithstanding that *Adrian*, when he was drawing near his End, had declared that Cardinal incapable of assisting at the Conclave, and tho' after he was admitted by the College, he had obstinately stood out to the very last against the Election of *Julius*.

It is certain that the new Pope was in the highest Reputation in all Parts, and the Delay made in his Election, greater than had been for a long time, seemed to be recompensed by the vast Authority and Worth of the Person who was seated in the Chair, because he united the Sovereign Power he had in *Florence*, to the extensive Power of the Church, because he had for so many Years under *Leo* exercised in a manner the whole Power of the Pontificate; because he was reputed to be a Person of Gravity and firm to his Resolutions, and because several Actions which proceeded from *Leo*, being attributed

buted to him, every one pronounced him <sup>A. D.</sup> to be a Person full of Ambition, of a <sup>1523.</sup> great and turbulent Spirit, passionately desirous of Novelties, to which may be added that he was no ways addicted to Diversions, and as it was known that he had applied himself seriously to Business, every one expected very grand and extraordinary Achievements. His Election at once restored absolute Security to the State of the Church, for the Duke of *Ferrara*, terrified at the Election of so resolute a Person, and giving over all Hopes of obtaining *Modena* by the Coming of the Viceroy of *Naples*, and trusting still less to the *French* Messengers, who by Means of *Teodoro Trivulzi* came to make him vast Offers if he would enter into their Alliance, after leaving sufficient Garrisons in *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, returned to *Ferrara*. The Affairs in *Romagna* were also quieted, where *Giovanni da Saffatella*, who, in the Life of *Adrian*, had been driven away by the *Ghibellines*, since his Death, at the Head of a good Number of *Guelfs*, was



*A. D.* returned into that Country under the  
 { 1523. Pretext of distressing the opposite Faction,  
 but in reality by the Encouragement of the  
*French.*

*Arona*  
 besieged.

BUT as soon as the *French* Army was disposed between *Biagrasa* and *Rosa*, the Admiral, retaining only Four thousand *Swiss*, disbanded the Troops of *Dauphiné* and the *Languedoc* Foot as useless, and sent the heavy Artillery on the other Side the *Tesino*, determining to wait in his Camp for the Supplies that were getting ready in *France*, not being in the least apprehensive of being forced, and having Provisions in Plenty. But not to be idle he ordered *Renzo*, with Seven Thousand *Italians*, to besiege *Arona*, a strong Place on the Borders of the *Lago Maggiore*, in the Possession of *Anchise Visconti*; but *Prospero Colonna* sent a Succour of Twelve Hundred Foot to reinforce it. The Castle of *Arona* commands the Town, which, on that account, is of no Use to any one without the Castle. *Renzo* therefore laid Siege to the Castle, but after giving several Assaults to no Purpose, for almost a  
 Month

Month together, with the Loss of many of his Men, he broke up the Siege, confirming the Opinion that had been some time since entertained of him by the *Italians*, that none of his Actions, since the Siege of *Crema*, had been answerable to his Defence of that Town.

A. D.

1523.

PROSPERO was all this while drawing near his End, having been for Eight Months in a languishing Condition, not without some Suspicion of Poison, or a Love Potion. He had once been jealous of the Arrival of the Viceroy, but now finding himself unable to carry on the Business of the War, was very solicitous for his Coming. The Viceroy at last arrived, but when he approached *Milan*, would not for several Days enter the Town, out of Respect and Regard to the Merits and Reputation of so famous a General; but when he heard he was at the last Extremity and delirious, he would not lose the Satisfaction of having the Sight of so great a Man, and came to his Bedside a few Hours before his Death; tho' some have asserted that he did not enter *Milan* before he ex-

Death of  
Prospero  
Colonna.

*A. D.* 1523. pired, which was on the last Day but one of the Year. He was no doubt reputed a famous General, and his Reputation and Authority were very much increased in his latter Days. By a long Experience he made himself a perfect Master of the military Art, yet he was not quick in embracing the Opportunities which were offered him from the Disorders and Weakness of his Adversaries; but by such Proceedings he gave also little Opportunity to the Enemy for distressing him. He was naturally very slow in his Undertakings, and may deservedly be called the Cunctator \*. But the World is justly indebted to *Prospero* for teaching how to carry on a War more effectually with Counsel than with the Sword, and the Art of defending States without running the Risque of a Battle without Necessity. In our Days the Manner of making War has undergone several Variations; for, before the Expedition of *Charles VIII.* into *Italy*, the Strength of an

His Character.

*Prospero's new Way of making War.*

The old Way.

\* This Title of Cunctator, which signifies the Delayer, was given to *Fabius Maximus* when he obstructed *Hannibal's* Progress in *Italy* by avoiding an Action.

an Army consisted more of Horse in heavy Armour than in Foot. The Instruments for battering Towns were extremely inconvenient for Carriage, and unhandy when put to Use : Battles were often given, yet the Slaughter was not considerable, and little Blood was spilt. When any Town was besieged, tho' never so small or weak, it would hold out for several Days against a strong Army, not so much thro' the Skill of the Besieged as from the Unskilfulness of the Besiegers, which rendered it very difficult for any Prince to get Possession of his Neighbour's State. But since the Arrival of *Charles* in *Italy* the Terror of Foreigners, the Ferocity of a differently disciplined Infantry, and above all the Execution of the Artillery, have filled the Minds of the *Italians* with Terror, and convinced them that there was no Hopes of defending themselves without keeping the Field; for the Men in Garrisons, quite ignorant how to defend the Towns, gave them up at the first Approach of the Enemy, and if any had the Courage to resist, in a few Days they were not able to stand the

Assault.

G 3




A. D. 1523. Affault. Thus the Kingdom of *Naples* and the Dutchy of *Milan* were attacked and taken, as one may say, the same Day. Thus the *Venetians*, after the Loss of one Battle, immediately abandoned all their *Terra Firma*. In the same manner the *French*, at the very Sight of the Enemy, deserted the Dutchy of *Milan*. Mankind, terrified at the easy Loss of their Towns by these destructive Instruments, applied all their Wits and Art to find out Methods of Defence, and with such Success that they have fortified even their smallest Towns with Ramparts, Ditches, Flanks, Outworks, and Bastions, whence being assisted by a numerous Artillery, which does more Execution in the Defence than in the Siege of Places, the Towns are rendered secure, it being a very hard matter to take a Town fortified in such a Manner. The Recovery of *Otranto* from the *Turks* in our Forefathers Times, gave us perhaps the first Notions of such Sort of Fortifications; for *Alfonso* Duke of *Calabria*, on entering that Town, found that the *Ottomans* had made several Works unknown to the  
*Italians,*

*Italians*, but the Memory of them had A. D.  
1523. been only retained, for they were never put in Practice. *Prospero* by these Arts, much to his Honour, twice defended the Dutchy of *Milan*, he being the only or the chief Person who used them both defensively and offensively; for by cutting off his Enemy's Provisions, and prolonging the War, he consumed them with Weariness, Length of Time, Poverty and Disorders. In this manner he both defended himself and conquered without fighting, and even without drawing a Sword, or breaking a single Lance. His Example has been since followed, and many Wars, that had lasted for several Months, have been terminated more by Industry and good Management, and making a proper Use of all Advantages, than by Battles.

SUCH were the Transactions of the Year 1523 in *Italy*, and the same Year there were great Expectations from the Preparations that were making beyond the Mountains, which produced Effects not worthy of such great Princes, for

A. D.

1523.


*Cæsar* and the King of *England* had agreed with the Duke of *Bourbon*, that they would with mighty Armies make an Irruption, one into *Picardy*, the other into *Guyenne*; but the Motions of the King of *England* in *Picardy* were to little Purpose, and the Attempt of *Bourbon* in *Burgundy* soon came to nothing; for not being able to pay his *German* Foot, some of the Officers agreed with the King of *France*, and withdrew Part of their Troops, and *Bourbon* despairing of Success in *France* went to *Milan*, where *Cæsar* not liking he should go to *Spain*, lest perhaps he should perfect the Matrimony, which he did not desire should take Place, sent him by *Buren* the Title of his Lieutenant General in *Italy*, desiring him to continue there. Nor did *Cæsar's* Affairs on the Side of *Spain* proceed according to his Wishes; for tho' solicitous for the War he was arrived at *Pampelona*, in order to enter *France* in Person, and had already sent the Army beyond the *Pyrenean* Mountains, which had taken *Sauterre*, not far distant from *St. Jean du Pied de Port*, yet his Power

not

*Spaniards*  
 invade  
*France.*

not being equal to his Eagerness, for want of Money he could not subsist such a Number of Forces as was necessary for so great an Undertaking; nor had he been able on the same account to assemble his Army, till towards the latter End of the Year; and the Coldness of the Season with the Scarcity of Provisions, that could not be easily conveyed at such a Distance, were additional Difficulties, which at last obliged him to disband this Army, which had been assembled against the Advice of almost all his Council. And *Federigo* of *Toledo*, Duke of *Alva*, a Nobleman of great Age and Authority, did not scruple saying in the Heat of the War, that *Charles* in many Things resembled *Ferdinando*, his Grandfather by the Mother's Side, but in this Expedition he acted more like *Maximilian*, his Grandfather by the Father's Side.

A. D.

1523.

Spanish  
Army dis-  
banded.

WE are now entering on the Year 1524, in the Beginning of which *Cæsar's* Commanders, taking Advantage of the Distress of the *French*, hoped they should be able

1524.



A. D.  
1524.

able to put an End to the War: For this Purpose they sent for the Duke of Urbino, and *Pietro da Pefaro*, the *Venetian* Proveditor, to come to *Milan*, in order to consult on the future Operations: When it was unanimously resolved that as soon as the Six thousand *Germans* which the Viceroy had ordered to be enlisted, were arrived at *Milan*, the Imperial and *Venetian* Army should jointly approach the Enemy, and expel them from that State with Sword or Famine. As they were persuaded they had a sufficient Force to compass this Design, there remained no other Obstacle than the Difficulty of raising Money; for as the Soldiery were greatly in Arrears, there was no Hopes of making them march out of *Milan*, or the other Towns, till they were paid; nor was it less necessary, while the Army kept the Field, to make Provision for the ordinary Course of Payments. To remove these Difficulties in part, the *Milanese*, being heartily tired of the War, raised Ninety Thousand Ducats amongst themselves, and lent them chearfully to the Duke,

Scarcity  
of Money  
in the Im-  
perial Ar-  
my.

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Duke, whose Punctuality had already been experienced, when he repaid them out of his Treasury the Sums they had advanced when *Lautrech.* lay before *Milan.* The Pope also at this Juncture gave a helping Hand; for, dreading by what had past, the Effects of a *French* Victory, unknown to the Messengers sent by the King of *France*, to whom he pretended the contrary, he very privately gave *Cæsar's* Ambassadors Thirty Thousand Ducats, and insisted that the *Florentines*, of whom the Viceroy demanded a fresh Contribution, by Virtue of the Confederacy made in *Adrian's* Time, should pay Thirty Thousand Ducats in full of all Demands. Not that the Pope had any Intention to shew for the future any Partiality to either of the contending Parties: On the contrary, his Impartiality was plainly seen; for when *Cæsar* and the King, on his Assumption to the Pontificate, sent him, one *Buren*, and the other *San Massan*, to engage him in their Interest, he hearkened to neither, but resolved, as soon as the present Disturbances were composed, to proceed with that Moderation

*Clement* is resolved to stand neuter between the Emperor and the King of *France.*

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deration in Differences between Christian Princes as was proper for a *Roman* Pontiff, and, without shewing any particular Propensity to either, use his utmost Endeavours to dispose them to Peace. This Behaviour was at that Time agreeable to the King of *France*, who feared that *Clement* entertained the same ill Disposition towards him now he was Pope, as he had when Cardinal ; *Cæsar* on the contrary was displeased, thinking his past Friendship, and, since *Leo's* Death, the Interest he had given him for his Election, ought to have induced him not to separate from him ; wherefore he took it very ill when it was signified to him, on the Part of the Pontiff, that tho' he had not divested himself of the Benevolence which he had hitherto entertained for him, yet since he had now laid aside the private Person, and was become a common Father, he was in Duty bound for the future to dispense common Duties.

BUT whilst the Viceroy was getting himself in Readiness to march against the Enemy, he sent *Giovanni de' Medici* to besiege

besiege *Marignano*, which together with the Castle surrendered; and a few Days after the Marquis of *Pescara*, who, not being disposed to serve under *Prospero Colonna*, did not come to the Army till that General was at the last Extremity, being informed that *Bayard* was posted in *Rebecca* with Three Hundred Light Horſe, and a good Body of Foot, in conjunction with *Giovanni de' Medici*, he suddenly attacked them, and took most of their Men, with their Horſes, and diſperſed and put to Flight the reſt; then with all Speed he retired to *Milan*, that he might not give Time for thoſe in *Biagrasſa* to purſue him. His Industry and Valour were much cried up on this Occaſion, but much more his Speed; for *Rebecca* is but Two Miles diſtant from *Biagrasſa*, but is Seventeen from *Milan*, from whence he had ſet out.

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*Marignano*  
no taken.  
Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
routs a  
Party at  
*Rebecca*:

THE State of the War was now reduced to this Point, that the Hopes of the *French* conſiſted in their Enemy's Want of Money, and thoſe of the Imperialiſts in their Adverſary's Want of Proviſions,



A. D. Provisions, for they could not think of

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dislodging them by Force from their very strong Camp of *Biagrassa*; yet both Parties expected Succours, these of *German* Foot, and the other of *Swiss* and other Foot. The Admiral set Fire to the Town of *Rosa*, and withdrew the Garrison to *Biagrassa*, and to annoy the Enemy made Excursions all over the Country, burning and destroying every Thing before him. But the *German* Foot being at last arrived the Imperial Army, consisting of Sixteen Hundred Men at Arms, Fifteen Hundred Light Horse, Seven Thousand *Spaniards*, Twelve Thousand *Germans*, and Fifteen Hundred *Italians*, with the Duke of *Milan*, the Duke of *Bourbon*, the Viceroy and the Marquis of *Pescara* at their Head, after Four Thousand Foot had been left to guard

Imperial  
Army  
marches

to *Venasco*.

*Milan*, went and encamped at *Venasco*, where a few Days after the Duke of *Urbino* joined them with Six Hundred Men at Arms, Six Hundred Light Horse, and Six Thousand *Venetian* Foot. The Castle of *Cremona*, in the mean Time,

Castle of  
*Cremona*  
surrenders

not being able to hold out any longer for Want of Food, and *Federigo*  
da

*da Bozzole* having in vain attempted to relieve it, surrendered to the Imperialists.

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After this the *Cæsarean* Army marched to *Casera* Five Miles distant from *Bia-grassa*, where the Admiral, after distributing Two Hundred Lances and Five Thousand Foot between *Lodi*, *Novara*,

Description  
of the  
French  
Army.

and *Alessandria*, had posted himself with Eight Hundred Lances, Eight Thousand *Swiss*, which a few Days after were increased with Three Thousand more, Four Thousand *Italian*, and Two Thousand *German* Foot, and having as yet sufficient Quantity of Provisions in the Army and neighbouring Towns for Two Months, it was impossible to attack him in his strong Entrenchments without the utmost Hazard. Wherefore the Imperialists had very often attempted to pass the *Tesino*, in order to take those Towns which supplied the Enemy with Necessaries on that Side, and prevent what Succours might come from *France* from joining the Army, but were always fearful that such a Step might endanger *Milan*, till at last, considering

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dering the Confidence they might repose in the People of that City, they thought a very large Garrison was not necessary, and therefore came to a Resolution of passing that River, and the Duke with *Giovanni de' Medici* returned to *Milan*, where the Garrison now consisted of Six Thousand Foot. On the Second Day of *March* the Army passed the *Tesino*, near *Pavia*, over Three Bridges, the main Body quartered at *Gambalo*, and the Remainder were distributed in the neighbouring Villages. On occasion of this Passage the Admiral, to secure *Vigevano*, sent thither immediately *Renzo da Ceri*, and Five Days after fearing he should lose that Town, and the rest of the *Lomellina*, which if taken would leave him in a manner besieged, decamped with his whole Army, leaving One Hundred Horse and One Thousand Foot at *Biagrassa*. He placed his Van-guard before *Vigevano*, and the main Body at *Mortara*, Two Miles from *Gambalo*, where the Viceroy was posted ; he was very safe in this Situation, had Plenty of Provisions, and a secure Communication with the *Monferrato*,  
*Vercelli*,

*Vercelli*, and *Novara*, and the Places A. D.  
 being near many others, all Necessaries 1524.  
 passed from Town to Town with as much  
 Ease as if they were under a Convoy.

THE Admiral for two Days successively offered Battle to the Enemy, who, tho' sensible of their superior Numbers, and Valour of their Men, refused to fight, not being willing to put to Chance their almost certain Hopes of Victory, for by some intercepted Letters they were informed the Enemy began to want Money.

AFTER the Imperial Army had passed the *Tesino*, the Duke of *Urbino* with the *Venetian* Troops laid Siege to *Garlasco*, a Town strongly situated, and well fortified with Ditches and Ramparts, and garrisoned by Four Hundred *Italian* Foot, which lying on the other Side of the *Tesino*, between *Pavia* and *Trumello*, where he had designed to encamp, intercepted the Access of Provisions, not only to him, but to all the rest of the Army. On his Arrival he raised a Bat-  
 VOL. VIII. H tery,



A. D. 1524. tery, and gave, the same Day, the Assault, in which being repulsed, many of his Men, and some of those of *Giovanni de' Medici*, passed the Ditches up to their Necks in Water, and made so vigorous an Attack, that they forced their Way into the Town with great Slaughter of the Enemy.

THE Imperial Army moved afterwards to *San Giorgio* near *Pieve al Carro*, with an Intent of laying Siege to *Sartirano*, situated on the Side of the *Po*, a strong Town which lay convenient for preventing Provisions going to the *French*. The Care of this Place was committed to *Ugo Pepoli*, and *Giovanni Birago*; it had in Garrison some Horse and Six Hundred Foot; but *Giovanni d' Urbino*, arriving with some Artillery and Two Thousand *Spaniards*, took first the Town and then the Fort, putting the common Soldiers to the Sword, and making the Officers Prisoners. The *French* were on their March to succour *Sartirano*, but were prevented by the Speed of the Enemy, and on hearing on the Road what

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what had happened, they stopped with their whole Army at *Monza*. Neither had the *French* better Success in other Parts of the Dutchy; for the Garrison of *Milan* forced the Town of *San Giorgio*, that lay beyond *Monza*, from whence those of *Biagrassa* were supplied with Provisions, to surrender. *Vitelli* recovered *Stradella*, where the Inhabitants had sent for the *French* quartered in *Lodi*, on account of the ill Usage they received from the *German* Garrison. *Pagolo Luzzasco* meeting a strong Body of *French* Horse put them to Flight; and *Federigo da Bozzole* having set out from *Lodi* to make an Attempt on *Pizzichitone* returned with Shame instead of Victory, being repulsed after many of his Men had been killed and many wounded. The only Advantage they obtained was the intercepting of Fourteen Thousand Ducats sent to the Army by *Cæsar*, which were seized in an Excursion between *Piacenza* and *Tortona*.

## THE HISTORY OF

IN the Midst of these Difficulties, two Things kept up the Admiral's Spirits, one his Hopes of a Diversion, the other of a speedy Succour; for the King had sent, by the Mountain of *Monginevra*, Four Hundred Lances, which were to be joined by Ten Thousand *Swiss*, and *Renzo da Ceri* was conducting Five Thousand new enlisted *Grisons*, by the Way of *Val di Sassina* into the Territory of *Bergamo*, whence they were to proceed to join *Federigo da Bozzole* who had with him a good Number of *Italian Foot*. The Admiral expected that the Imperialists on their Arrival would be obliged to repass the *Tesino*, for the Security of *Milan*. The Duke of *Milan* sent *Giovanni de' Medici* against those Forces, with Fifty Men at Arms, Three Hundred Light Horse, and Three Thousand Foot, who joining Three Hundred Men at Arms, Three Hundred Light Horse, and Four Thousand Foot of the *Venetians*, approached the Enemy who was at *Cravina*, a Country Seat between the Rivers *Adda* and *Brembo*,  
Eight

# THE WARS IN ITALY. 117

Eight Miles distant from *Bergamo*, and with Part of his Men made Excursions to their very Camp. But the *Swiss*, the Third Day after their Arrival, complaining that in *Cravina* they had neither found Money nor Horſe, nor another Body of Foot, as they had been promiſed by *Renzo*, returned into their own Country.

AFTER the *Swiss* had broke up, *Giov. de' Medici* took *Caravaggio*, and then paſſing the *Adda* with the Artillery deſtroyed the Bridge of the *French* at *Bufaloro* on the *Tefino*. *Biagrassa* was now the only Place remaining in Poſſeſſion of the *French* between *Milan* and the *Tefino*, it was well ſtored with Proviſions, and had a Garrifon of One Thouſand Foot under *Girolamo Caracciolo* a *Neapolitan*. This Town being ſituated on the great Canal, was of great Hindrance to the Proviſions which were uſually ſent that Way to *Milan*. The Duke took with him to this Siege *Giovanni de' Medici*, and was accompanied by all the *Milaneſe* Youth as well as Soldiery, and



A. D. 1524. having battered the Walls from Sunrise till Noon, the Town was taken that very Day, to the great Honour of *Giov. de' Medici*, who on this Occasion gave Marks not only of a superior Valour, but acted with as much Prudence and Authority as could be expected from any great General. *Caracciolo* was taken Prisoner, many of the Garrison were killed in the Action, and *Medici* ordered several who had deserted from him to be hanged. As soon as the Town was taken those in the Castle capitulated, and surrendered on a Promise of Safety for their Persons. This Victory was joyful News for the Inhabitants of *Milan*, but their Misfortune, without Comparison, exceeded their Joy. For the Plague that had begun in *Biagrasa*, by means of Goods carried away in the Plunder was transported to *Milan*, and a pestilential Contagion being spread, it made such a Havock, that in *Milan* only Fifty Thousand Persons were carried off.

THE Whole of the War was now centered on the other Side the *Tesino*, where the Admiral after the Loss of *Sartirano*, on a new Approach of the Imperialists, abandoned *Mortara*, and in Two Marches arrived at *Novara* with his Army greatly diminished, for many of his Foot and of his Lances also had filed off and were returned to *France*, so that he had no other Measures to take than to gain Time, till he could be joined by Eight Thousand *Swiss*, who were arrived in the Neighbourhood of *Jurea*. On the other Hand the Imperialists, intent on preventing this Succour, and reducing the Enemy into Difficulties by cutting off their Provisions, possessed themselves of the Villages round *Novara*, putting to the Sword the *French* who had been left to guard them; and after placing a Garrison in *Vercelli* to prevent the *Swiss* from entering that Town, posted themselves at *Biandra*; a Place between *Vercelli* and *Novara*, where their Camp was surrounded by Ditches, Trees and Waters. At last the Admiral being informed that the

A. D. *Swiss* were moved from *Jurea*, and had

1524.

halted at the River *Slesia*, which they had not been able to pass on account of the Height of the Waters, and being desirous to join them, in order, as it was thought, to make a secure Retreat, quitted *Novara*, and went and encamped on the same River; where being in Want of Provisions, and his Men daily deserting, he ordered a Bridge to be laid between *Romagnana* and *Gattinara*, whilst the Enemy from *Bian-dra* had marched to *Briona*, and from thence formed their Camp within two Miles of *Romagnana*. The *French* thus strengthened passed the River the Day following, and if the Enemy had narrowly watched their Motions, it was thought they might have obtained that Day a compleat Victory. But their Generals differed in their Counsels, some being desirous to fight, others to let them depart unmolested. Nor indeed did military Affairs in the Imperial Army seem to be conducted with proper Care and Attention. The Marquis of *Pescara* was the sole Person who, for a constant Steadiness in all his Actions, seemed worthy of being entrusted

entrusted with the supreme Power ; but A. D. 1524.  
 the other Commanders, envious of his Merit and Glory, fought rather to obscure his Fame by despising and contradicting his Counsels, than to augment his Credit by concurring with him. It was late in the Day when the News of the Departure of the *French* reached the Imperial Camp ; but as soon as it was known many Light Horse, and many Foot in a disorderly manner, without Colours, waded the River and followed them, and coming up to their Rear, began to skirmish ; the *French* fighting and marching forwards sustained them for a long Time, yet at last they left behind Seven Pieces of Artillery and a very great Quantity of Ammunition and Provisions, besides Part of the Baggage of the Horse and Foot, and had many of their Men killed in fighting. They made a Feint as if they intended to lodge at *Gattinara*, a Mile distant from *Romagnana*, and at the same Time secretly sent forward their Baggage and Artillery. But as soon as the Enemy, imagining they had taken up their Quarters at *Gattinara*, had begun to retire, they



*A. D.* 1524. marched on Six Miles farther to *Ravifingo* which lies towards *Jurea*. The Imperialists lodged quietly the same Night on the River, but passed it as soon as the Moon began to shine, though not followed by the *Venetians*, who being entered into the Territory of the Duke of *Savoy*, thought they had already exceeded the Obligation of their Confederacy, by which they were only engaged to defend the Dutchy of *Milan*. The *French* proceeded with a slow March, and in very good Order, and having placed the *Swiss* in the Rear, they repulsed the first Horse and Foot that overtook and attacked them in a disorderly manner Two Miles beyond *Ravifingo*. On the Arrival of the Marquis of *Pescara* the Fight was renewed, but not in such a Manner as to stop the March of the *French*, who in this last Skirmish lost *Giovanni Gabaneo*, and *Monf. de Bayard*, who having received a Musquet Shot was made Prisoner, and died soon after of his Wound. The Marquis, tho' by this time he had been joined by a good Number of his Men, did not think it proper to continue the Pursuit without  
the

the Assistance of the whole Army and the Artillery ; and thus both *French* and *Swiss* without farther Molestation returned to their own Habitations, after leaving at *Bauri*, beyound *Jurea*, Fifteen Pieces of Artillery to the Care of Three Hundred *Swiss*, and one of the Lords of that Country ; but this did not secure them, for the Imperial Generals on Notice given sent and seized them. The conquering Army was afterwards divided into several Bodies. The Duke of *Urbino* was ordered to *Lodi*, the Marquis of *Pescara* to *Alessandria* ; those two Cities only remaining in Possession of the *French*, for *Novara*, on the Approach of the Duke of *Milan* and *Giovanni de' Medici*, had surrendered. The Viceroy undertook to march against *Rotellino*, who with Four Hundred Lances had passed the Mountains ; but he, on hearing of the Admiral's Retreat, returned immediately into *France*. Nor did *Boissi* and *Giulio da Sanseverino*, to whose Care the Defence of *Alessandria* was committed, make any Resistance : And *Federigo*, after obtaining a few Days time to certify himself of the Admiral's Departure, gave up

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up *Lodi*, on Condition of having Liberty to transport his *Italian* Foot into *France*, as had been permitted to those in *Alessandria*, and these Troops, which in both Cities amounted to about Five Thousand Men, were afterwards of signal Service to the King of *France*.

THUS ended the War against the Dutchy of *Milan*, under the Direction of the Admiral; by which the Power of the King of *France* receiving no Diminution, and the Roots of Evils not being extirpated, but only covered, new Calamities were expected to arise; for tho' *Italy* was freed from its present Disasters, it was not free from Jealousies of their being renewed. *Cæsar* however, at the Persuasion of the Duke of *Bourbon*, and invited by the Hopes that his Authority would be of very great Moment, attempted to transfer the Seat of the War into *France*, in concert with the King of *England*.

IN


IN the Beginning of this Year he laid Siege to *Fonterabia*, a very small Town on the Frontiers of *Spain* and *France*; and tho' it was plentifully provided with military Stores, Victuals and Men, who had sufficient Notice to repair the old and raise new Fortifications, yet for want of Experience they made them with so little Skill, that finding themselves exposed to the Fire of the Enemy, they were soon obliged to capitulate, and surrendered on Condition of Safety for their Persons.

AFTER the Recovery of *Fonterabia*, The Pope *Cæsar* formed greater Projects, and there-  
 fore paid little Regard to the Persuasions and Authority of the Pope, who in the Beginning of this Year had sent to him and to the Kings of *England* and *France*, to solicit them to enter into a Treaty of Peace, or at least agree to a Suspension of Arms, but with little Hopes of Success. The King of *France*, not expecting to obtain a Peace answerable to his Wishes, was desirous of a Two Years Truce; whilst  
*Cæsar*,



A. D. *Cæsar*, despising a Truce, which would

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only give Time to the King to be better prepared for a new War, wanted Peace and any Sort of Convention made by the Pope was disagreeable to the King of *England*, from a Desire he had entertained of being constituted the sole Mediator, to which he was persuaded by the ambitious Counsels of the Cardinal of *York*. This Man, tho' of a very low Extraction and despicable Blood, found means to gain such an Ascendant over that Prince, as to make it evidently appear to every one that the King's Orders, without his Approbation, were of no Significancy; and on the contrary, whatever Orders he issued, even without the King's Knowledge, were punctually executed. But the King and the Cardinal at this Juncture dissembled with *Cæsar*, and seemed ardently desirous of making War against *France*, to which King-

Pretensions of the  
*English*

Sovereigns from the  
Time of *Edward* III. King of  
the Kingdom  
of *France*.

dom *Henry* pretended, for various Reasons, to have a Right, grounding his first Claim from the Time of *Edward* III. King of *England*. This *Edward*, after the Death of *Charles* IV. King of *France*, surnamed the

the *Fair*, who in 1328 died without *A. D.*  
 Issue Male, being born of a Sister of <sup>1524.</sup>  
*Charles*, made Instances to be declared  
 King of *France*, as the nearest Male akin  
 to the deceased King. But he was ex-  
 cluded in a general Parliament of *France*,  
 which decreed that, according to the Salic  
 Law, which was a very antient Law of  
 that Kingdom, not only Females but  
 all Descendants of the female Line were  
 excluded from the Succession. But *Ed-*  
*ward*, soon after taking upon him the  
 Title of King of *France*, entered that King-  
 dom with a powerful Army, and obtained  
 several Victories both over *Philip de*  
*Valois*, who by general Consent had been  
 declared Successor to *Charles the Fair*,  
 and over *John* his Son, whom he took in a  
 Battle, and carried Prisoner into *England*.  
 After some Time he made a Peace with  
*John*, who yielding to him several Pro-  
 vinces and States in the Kingdom of  
*France*, *Edward* renounced the Royal  
 Title of that Kingdom. But the Arti-  
 cles of this Peace not being long com-  
 plied with, several Wars and lasting Truces  
 ensued, till *Henry V.* of *England*, enter-  
 ing

A. D. 1524. ing into an Alliance with *Philip* Duke of *Burgundy*, who was fallen out with the Crown of *France* on account of the Murder of his Father Duke *John*, was so successful against *Charles* the VI. a Lunatic, that he made himself Master of almost the whole Kingdom, with *Paris* its Capital, where meeting with the King and Queen, he married their Daughter *Catherine*, prevailing on the distracted Sovereign to agree that, notwithstanding his Son *Charles* was living, the Kingdom after his own Death should be transferred to *Catherine* and her Children. By Virtue of this invalid and unreasonable Title, after *Henry's* Death, his Son *Henry* VI. was solemnly crowned King of *France* and *England* in *Paris*. But *Charles*, after his Father's Death called *Charles* VII. taking Advantage of the bloody Wars which were afterwards kindled in *England* amongst the Princes of the Royal Blood, expelled the *English* out of all their Conquests in *France*, excepting *Calais*; and sent them on the other Side of the Ocean: Yet the Kings of *England* have continued to retain the Title of King of  
of

of *France*. These Reasons were sufficient to excite *Henry VIII.* to a War, who was more secure than any other of his Predecessors in his Kingdom. For the Kings of the House of *York*, which gave Name to one of the Factions, having depressed those of the House of *Lancaster*, the Name of the other, the *Lancastrians*, after the Extinction of the Male Issue of that Family, exalted to the Throne *Henry* of *Richmond*, as the nearest in Blood of that Race, who after the Death and Overthrow of the Kings his Adversaries, that he might reign with the greater Security and Authority, married a Daughter of *Edward* the last King but one of the House of *York* \*. Wherefore it appeared that on *Henry* born of that Matrimony were transferred all the Rights of both Families, who bore for their Ensigns the Red and White Rose. *Henry* however was not so much induced to take up Arms in hopes of conquering the Kingdom of *France*, which he knew

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would

\* The Author, by calling *Edward* the last King but one of the *York* Line, seems to have overlooked *Edward V.*



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would be attended with innumerable Difficulties, as by the Cardinal of *York's* Sollicitations, who, foreseeing the many Troubles and Inconveniencies which must necessarily arise in the Course of a War, ambitiously coveted and expected that the King his Master would be constituted Umpire of all Differences. And, as he knew his Authority in settling the Articles of Peace would have the greatest Weight, he pleased himself with the Thoughts of making his Name glorious throughout the Universe, and intended at the same time to establish his Interest with the King of *France*, to whom he had secretly inclined: And this was the true Reason why his Engagements at this Juncture were not so strong as they ought to have been, had he really intended to come heartily into a War. But these were sufficient to confirm *Cæsar* in his Resolution to take up Arms, and a still greater Inducement were the Hopes he had placed on the vast Interest and Authority of the Duke of *Bourbon* in the Kingdom of *France*, which he expected would raise considerable

# THE WARS IN ITALY. 131

derable Commotions in that Country. *A. D.*  
 Wherefore, tho' many, laying before him *1524.*  
 the Want of Money, and the uncertain  
 Faith of his Allies, counselled him to  
 shake off all Thoughts of a War at-  
 tended with so many Difficulties, and  
 to consent that the Pope might treat  
 for a Suspension of Arms, he entered into  
 a Confederacy with the King of *Eng-*  
*land*, and the Duke of *Bourbon*, on these *Confede-*  
 Conditions: That the Duke should march *racy be-*  
 out of *Italy* into *France* with Part of the *tween Cæ-*  
 Army which was in *Italy*: As soon as *far, the*  
 he had passed the *Alps*, the King of *King of*  
*England* should pay him One Hundred *England,*  
 Thousand Ducats towards the first Month's *and Duke*  
 Expences of the War, and should be *of Bour-*  
 afterwards at Liberty either to conti-  
 nue his monthly Contributions, or to  
 pass with a powerful Army into *France*,  
 and open the Campaign the first Day  
 of *July*, and continue his Operations  
 till the End of *December*, in which Case  
 the States of *Flanders* should supply him  
 with Three Thousand Horse, One Thou-  
 sand Foot, and a sufficient Train of  
 Artillery and Ammunition: That if they

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proved successful the Duke of *Bourbon* should be restored to his Estate, which had been seized by the King, and put in Possession of *Provence*, which he claimed by Virtue of a Cession made by the Duke of *Lorraine*, after the Death of *Charles VIII.* to *Anne* Dutcheſs of *Bourbon*; and it was to be created into a Kingdom in his Favour: That the Duke should acknowledge *Henry* for King of *France*, and pay him Homage, the Treaty otherwise to be void and null: That *Bourbon* should not enter into any Negotiation with the King of *France* without the Consent of both Parties. That *Cæſar* should at the ſame time attack *France* from the Frontiers of *Spain*: That the Ambaſſadors of *Charles* and *Henry* should use their beſt Endeavours to induce the *Italian* Powers to contribute Money towards an Expedition which would ſecure them for ever from a *French* War. But in this Point they failed of Succeſs; for the Pope not only reſuſed to make any Contribution, but expreſſly condemned the whole Undertaking, foretelling *Cæſar* that he would not

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 133

only be disappointed in all his Expectations in *France*, but also be the Cause of bringing a new War into *Italy*, much more dangerous than the first.

IN Pursuance of this Scheme the War was resolved on, notwithstanding the Duke of *Bourbon* absolutely refused to acknowledge the King of *England* for King of *France*. The Duke proposed going directly to *Lyons*, which was near his patrimonial Estate; but it was thought more proper to march into *Provence*, from whence he might with greater Conveniency be supplied from *Spain*, and be benefited by the Fleet which *Cæsar* was fitting out at his own Charge at *Genoa*.

*Bourbon's*  
Expedi-  
tion into  
*Provence*.

THE Circumstances attending this Expedition were, that *Bourbon*, accompanied by the Marquis of *Pescara*, who, disdaining to serve under the Duke, got himself declared the Emperor's Lieutenant General, came to *Nice*, but with a much less Force than was intended. They had Five Hundred Men at Arms, Eight Hundred



*A. D.* 1524. Light Horse, Four Thousand *Spanish* Foot, Three Thousand *Italians*, and Five Thousand *Germans*; but the Three Hundred Men at Arms, and Five Thousand more *Germans* designed for this Expedition, for Want of Money, were not raised; and the Viceroy, unable to enlist a fresh Body of Foot, as had been resolved in the first Council, in order to oppose *Michel Agnolo*, Marquis of *Saluzzo*, who was marched out of his own State, and posted on the Mountains with One Thousand Men, was obliged to keep with him his Men at Arms for the Defence of the Country. To this must be added that *Cæsar's* Fleet, one of the chief Hopes on which the Undertaking depended, through the Negligence or Treachery of the Commander *Don Ugo di Moncada*, a Pupil of *Valentino*, and a Man of no Morals or Principles, was found to be much inferior to the *French* Fleet, which had sailed from *Marseilles*, and was come to an Anchor in the Port of *Villa Franca*.

THE Imperialist however entered *Provence*, where *Palisse*, *la Foellette*, *Renzo da Ceri*, and *Federigo da Bozzole*, the King's Generals,

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Generals, not having a sufficient Force A. D.  
1524.  
to oppose them, had distributed themselves in the Towns. Part of the Imperialists marched along the Coast, and, after taking the Tower which commands the Port of *Toulon*, joined the Army with Two Pieces of Cannon.

*Aix*, the Capital of *Provence*, both for *Aix* sur-  
renders.  
her Dignity and for being the Seat of the Parliament, surrendered, as did also several other Towns of that Country. After the Taking of *Aix*, *Bourbon* advised to pass the *Rhone*, and, removing farther from the Sea, endeavour to enter into the Heart of *France*, before the Country was better provided for their Reception: For the Lances, who had suffered greatly in *Italy*, and were now but indifferently paid, the Royal Treasure being exhausted, little expecting that their Enemies would follow them out of *Lombardy* into *France*, were in such Disorder that they could not easily be re-established; and the King distrusting, as usual, the Valour of his *French* Infantry, could not take the Field before the Arrival of the *Swiss* and *Germans*; and

*A. D.* *Bourbon* in the mean time was in hopes

1524.

that by passing the *Rhone* he might make some important Progress. But the Marquis of *Pescara* and the rest of the *Spanish* Commanders would not agree to such a Proposal; they were for getting Possession of *Marseilles*, which they knew was *Cæsar's* Intention, because lying on the Sea, the Fleets from *Spain* might conveniently from thence annoy the *French* Coast, and the Troops make their Passage that Way into *Italy*. As *Bourbon* could not contradict them, Siege was laid to *Marseilles*. *Renzo da Ceri* had entered that Town with the *Italian* Forces he had brought with him from *Lodi* and *Alessandria*, and the Besiegers were Forty Days before the Place to little Purpose; for tho' they battered the Walls in several Places, and attempted to make Mines, yet they found too many Difficulties to struggle with, such as the Thickness of the Walls of an antient Structure, the Valour of the Besieged, and the natural Inclination of the Inhabitants, as much devoted to the *French* as bitter Enemies to the *Spaniards*, ever since

since old *Alfonso* King of *Aragon*, in his *A. D.*  
 Return from *Naples* to *Spain*, by Sur-<sup>1524.</sup>  
 prise put their Town to the Sack ; and  
 they were now in high Spirits on ac-  
 count of the Succours they expected  
 not only by Sea but also by Land. For  
 the King was come to *Avignon*, a Town  
 on the *Rhone*, belonging to the Church,  
 intent on assembling a powerful Army.  
 To these Difficulties must be added the  
 Want of Money in the Army ; they  
 had lost besides all Hopes that the  
 King, by being attacked in other Parts  
 of his Kingdom, would be disabled from  
 moving his whole Force to one single  
 Part : For tho' the King of *England* had  
 sent *Richard Pacey* to *Bourbon*, yet he  
 refused the second Monthly Payment  
 of the Hundred Thousand Ducats, and  
 gave no Marks of any Design of invad-  
 ing *Picardy* ; on the contrary he admitted  
*Giovanni Giovacchino*, of *Spetie*, who  
 was sent to him by the King of *France* ;  
 and the Cardinal of *York* giving at the  
 same Time cross Answers to the Impe-  
 rial Ministers, *Cæsar* began to entertain  
 no small Jealousy of the King's Intentions.  
 Neither



A. D. Neither from the Side of *Spain* did the

1524

Siege of  
*Marfeilles*  
raised.

Succours answer *Cæsar's* Desires, for the  
CORTES of *Castile*, the Name given to the  
Assembly of the Deputies of the whole  
Kingdom, had refused to grant him the  
Supply of Four Hundred Thousand Du-  
cats, with which they were used to supply  
their Kings on Occasions of Importance,  
which prevented his sending Money to the  
Army in *Provence*; and his Preparations  
for attacking *France* from his Frontiers  
were weak and insignificant. All these  
Accidents so disheartened the Besiegers,  
that despairing of obtaining *Marfeilles*,  
and fearing great Danger from the King's  
Approach, they broke up the Siege the  
same Day that the King, after assem-  
bling Six Thousand *Swiss*, was setting out  
from *Avignon* with his Army. As soon as  
the Siege was raised, the Imperialists turned  
their Faces towards *Italy*, marching with all  
the Speed imaginable, as sensible of the  
Risque they shovld run if overtaken by the  
Whole or any Part of the King's Army  
in an Enemy's Country.

FRANCIS

FRANCIS now thought he had a very fair Opportunity for recovering the Duchy of *Milan*, both in regard to his own powerful Army, and the weak Condition of the Enemy, and because he hoped that, by taking the direct Road, he might get into *Italy* sooner than those who were marching from *Marseilles*. Being therefore determined not to let slip the Occasion which Fortune had thrown in his Way, he thus addressed his Army: "I am determined without Delay to go in Person into *Italy*, and shall therefore not only not hearken to, but also take it very ill of any one who should presume to advise the contrary. Let every one punctually obey the Orders which shall be given, and attend to perform the Duties of his Office. God the Lover of Justice, in order to chastise the Insolence and Rashness of my Enemies, has at last opened a Way for my recovering what had been unjustly ravished from me." His Constancy in this Resolution, and his Speed in its Execution kept equal Pace with his Words; for he immediately moved with his Army consisting of

Two

Francis I.  
declares  
his Inten-  
tions of  
going into  
*Italy*.

A. D. Two Thousand Lances, and Twenty

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Thousand Foot, avoiding a Meeting with his Mother, who was coming from *Avignon*, to persuade him not to pass the Mountains, but to leave the Management of the War to his Generals. He ordered *Renzo da Ceri* to embark on the Fleet with his Troops that were in *Marseilles*, then to put a Stop to all Treaties, or distrusting the Pope, he forbade the Archbishop of *Capoua*, who was sent Ambassador to him, and was afterwards to pass to *Cæsar*, to proceed any farther ; signifying to him that he might reside at *Avignon* with his Mother, and execute his Commission by Letters, or else return to the Pope. He was in the mean while with all Speed following the Enemy, who, despising the Molestations given them by the Country People, and proceeding in very good Order along the Sea Shore, were arrived at *Monaco*, where bursting their Cannon, and loading the Mules with the Pieces for the more easy Conveyance, they advanced to *Finale*, at which Place, hearing of the King's Motions, they redoubled their Speed to arrive in Time for the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*,  
for

for the Troops they had left were not sufficient to make a Resistance.

A. D.


1524.

BOTH Armies proceeding in this Manner towards *Italy*, it happened that the same Day the King came to *Vercelli*, the Marquis of *Pescara*, with the Horse and Spanish Foot, entered *Alba*, the Duke of *Bourbon* with the German Foot being a Day's March behind; the Duke, hardly allowing himself Time to breathe, the Day following from *Alba* arrived at *Voghiera*, which was a March of Forty Miles, in order to enter *Pavia* the next Day. He there joined the Viceroy, who with great Speed was come from *Alessandria*, where he had left Two Thousand Foot in Garrison, just at the Time that the King's Army began to arrive on the Banks of the *Tesino*. At a Council at *Pavia*, at which *Girolamo Morone* assisted, it was at first resolved to leave a sufficient Garrison in *Pavia*, and then to make a Stand, as had been practised before, at *Milan*; and *Morone* was ordered thither to provide all Necessaries, and the Duke, who had been sent for to come to *Pavia*, was to follow him



A. D. him, *Antonio de Leva* being left in *Pavia*

1524.



Plague in  
*Milan.*

with Three Hundred Men at Arms, and Five Thousand Foot, all *Germans*, excepting a few *Italians*. They accordingly set out for *Milan*; but that Town, having been all the Summer sorely afflicted with the Plague, had no Resemblance of its former Lustre; for vast Numbers of the Citizens having perished, and of those who had escaped so dire a Calamity many being gone away, there was no more to be seen that Plenty of Provisions, and it was very difficult to raise Money; and as no Care had been taken to keep up the Fortifications, they lay in Ruins; yet, in the Midst of all these Misfortunes, the People were as ready as before to undergo the same Labour and Danger. But *Morone*, being convinced that to bring the Army to *Milan* would rather prove the Destruction of the Soldiery than the Defence of the City, took another Resolution, and, in the Midst of a Multitude of Citizens, made the following Speech:

WE

“ WE may repeat this Day, with no less Anguish of Mind, the same Words that were pronounced by our Saviour in his Agony ‘The Spirit indeed is ready, but the Flesh is weak.’ You are in the same Disposition as ever to live under the Government of your Duke *Francesco Sforza*, and his Heart is equally oppressed for the Miseries and Dangers of his beloved People; he is willing and ready to lay down his Life for your Safety, and you are as much desirous to expose your Persons for his Support as you have done on former Occasions. But your Strength is no ways equal to your good Will, for the City is almost void of Inhabitants, we are straitened for Provisions and Want of Money, and your Fortifications are in so bad a Condition, that it is impossible to prevent the Enemy’s Entrance. It is Death to the Duke to be obliged to desert you, but it would be worse than Death, if, undertaking your Defence, he should prove the Cause of your utter Destruction, which would infallibly be the Event. In such dangerous Cases that Person is reckoned prudent, who

*Morone’s  
Speech to  
the Mi-  
lanese.*

A. D.

1524.

who chuses the lesser Evil, and does not at once with one desperate Resolution deprive himself of all Hope. It is on this Principle that the Duke advises you to submit to the present Necessity, and obey the King of *France*, till the Return of better Times, which we have very good Reason to expect very soon. The Duke at present will take Care of himself, but afterwards your Concerns will be his chief Attention: *Cæsar's* Power is very great, his good Fortune not to be described, the Cause is very just, our Enemies the same we have so often conquered. God will be pleased with your Loyalty to the Duke, and with the Duke's Attention to his Country, and we ought to assure ourselves that it is for some good End to permit us at this Instant to labour under such Calamities, and be confident that very soon he will assist us in obtaining so compleat a Victory over our proud Enemies, as will enable us to retrieve all our Losses during the long Peace it will procure us." As soon as he had finished this Speech, after furnishing the Castle with Provisions, he quitted the Town.

THE

THE Duke, ignorant of what had passed, was coming towards *Milan*, and had no sooner got out of *Pavia* than he met *Ferrando Castriotta* with the Artillery, who informed him that Part of the Enemy had passed the *Tesino*, and that meeting with *Zuccherò Borgognone* on that River, with his Light Horse, they had put him to Flight; the Duke, fearing therefore he should fall in with the *French* on the Road, returned to *Pavia*.

*Ferrando  
Castriotta  
Captain  
of the Ar-  
tillery.*

THOUGH the Duke and *Morone* had acted with Sincerity in this Affair, yet the Imperial Commanders, who were with the Army at *Binasco*, suspected that they had made some private Agreement with the King of *France*, and therefore sent *Alarcone* with Two Hundred Lances to *Milan*, whom they designed to follow, or not, according to the Advices he should give them. On his Arrival the *Milanese*, who were already treating with some Exiles sent thither by the King, taking Courage, cried *Cæsar* and *Francesco Sforza*! But *Alarcone* finding it was not practica-



A. D. ble to defend the Town, and having No-

1534.

The French enter Milan. notice that the Van of the *French* was approaching, quitted the Place, and thro' the *Roman* Gate made towards *Lodi*, whither the whole Imperial Army was marching at the same Time that the Enemy were entering *Milan* thro' the Gates of the *Tesino* and of *Vercelli*: And if, instead of making for that City, they had followed and attacked the Imperialists, who were tired with their long Marches, and had lost a great Number of Arms and Horses, it is the general Belief that they might have dispersed them with Ease; nay, if, even after approaching *Milan*, they had immediately turned towards *Lodi*, the Imperial Commanders would not have ventured to continue there; and perhaps, if they had then crossed the *Adda* with the same Speed, they might in all Likelihood, with the same Ease, have put the Remainder of the Army into great Confusion.

BUT the King, either that he thought it to be a Matter of the highest Concern to make himself sure of *Milan*, from whence

whence he always received the principal <sup>A. D.</sup> Opposition, or that he was not aware of <sup>1524.</sup> the Opportunity, or from some other Reason, not only approached *Milan*, <sup>The King orders the Castle of *Milan* to be besieged.</sup> which he neither entered himself, nor permitted his Army to enter, but halted

there till he had put therein a proper Garrison, and given Orders for the Siege of the Castle, which was defended by 700 *Spaniards*. It must however be said to his great Praise, that out of his great Goodness, and merciful Temper, he gave Orders that none of the *Milaneses* should be molested. After settling what he <sup>And marches to *Pavia*.</sup> thought requisite at *Milan*, he marched his Army to *Pavia*, thinking it was dangerous to leave behind a Town full of Soldiers. The King's Army was at this Time, reckoning those left in *Milan*, computed to consist of Two Thousand Lances, Eight Thousand *Germans*, Six Thousand *Swiss*, Six Thousand Volunteers, and Four Thousand *Italians*, which last grew afterwards considerably more numerous.

A. D.

1524.

Marquis  
of Pescara  
at Lodi.

THE Marquis of *Pescara* was at this Time at *Lodi* with Two Thousand Foot, and the Viceroy, after leaving Garrisons in *Alessandria*, *Como* and *Trezzo*, was gone to *Sonzino*, with *Francesco Sforza*, and *Charles de Bourbon*. It was joyful News to the Imperialists, amidst so many Difficulties, to hear the King was gone to *Pavia*. This raised their drooping Spirits, and giving them Hopes of being able to put themselves in a better Condition, provided that Town held out for some Time, without which they had no Prospect of retrieving their Affairs, they instantly sent into *Germany* to enlist Six Thousand Foot, having in their Hands for their Salary, and other necessary Charges, Fifty Thousand Ducats, which *Cæsar* had lodged in *Genoa* for the Use of the War in *Provence*. Yet nothing so much embarrassed their Counsels as the Want of Money, nor could they hope to raise any in the Dutchy, nor expected from *Charles*, in his penurious Condition, any thing more than his Orders to mortgage, as far as he could, the Revenues of the Kingdom of *Naples*.

Little

Little or no Supply either of Men or Money was expected from their old Allies, for both the Pope and *Florentines*, being desired to contribute Money, had given general Answers. The Pope, after the Departure of the Admiral, being fully determined to stand neuter in the War between *Cæsar* and the King of *France*, would not renew the Alliance made by his Predecessor, nor enter into any new Confederacy with any Prince: And at the very Time that he made Profession of Friendship to *Charles* and the King of *England*, he had secretly assured the King of *France* that he should not oppose him whenëver he attacked the Dutchy of *Milan*: And the *Venetians* being required by the Viceroy to send to the Army the Troops they had engaged for in the Articles of the League, tho' they did not absolutely refuse, yet gave very cool Answers, with an Intention to regulate their Counsels according to the Turn of Affairs, either because some of them called to Mind their antient Confederacy with *France*, or because they believed that the King of *France* being in

A. D.

1524.

*Venetians*  
do not  
care to  
join the  
Imperi-  
alists.



A. D.  
1524.

*Italy* with so powerful an Army, and his Enemy in so weak a Condition, he must of course be victorious ; or that they more than ever suspected the ambitious Views of *Cæsar*. For to the Surprise, and with the Complaints, in a manner, of all *Italy*, he had not yet given to *Francesco Sforza* the Investiture of the Dutchy of *Milan*. They were besides held in Suspense by the Pope's Authority, whose Counsels and Example had a great Weight with them at this Juncture.

*Pavia*  
besieged.

BUT the King of *France*, having made his Approach to *Pavia*, on the upper Side, between the *Tesino* and the High Road that leads to *Milan*, and posted the Vanguard in the Suburb of *Sant' Antonio*, on the other Side the *Tesino*, on the Road to *Genoa*, took up his own Quarters in the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, a Mile from the Walls of the Town. After two Days firing from two Batteries, with his Army in Battle Array he began the Assault ; but observing that the Town was well fortified within the Walls, that the Enemy made a gallant Defence, and on the

the contrary that his own Men gave manifest Tokens of Fear, after many of them had been killed, he ordered to sound the Retreat ; and finding how difficult it would prove to take a Town defended by so numerous and warlike a Garrison by Storm, he determined to make a regular Siege, by cutting of Trenches, and erecting Platforms, with a vast Number of Pioneers employed in working on the Flanks, that the Soldiers might with less Danger make their Approaches. To this tedious and difficult Work he added that of making Mines, being determined to gain his Point, tho' he should advance but Inch by Inch ; and at last, under great Doubts from the Bravery and Numbers of the Besieged, and taking Advice of many able Engineers, perfectly acquainted with the Course of the River, which two Miles above *Pavia* divides itself into two Branches, and then a Mile below it, before entering the *Po*, unites again, he resolved to turn that Branch which passes by the Side of *Pavia* into the other lesser Branch, called *Gravallone*, in hopes it would facilitate the Taking

A. D.

1524.

*A. D.* of it on that Side, where the Wall, on account  
 1524. of the Security it received from the Depth  
 of the Water, had no Fortification. In  
 this Work, which was carried on with an  
 incredible Number of Hands, at a vast  
 Expence, and not without Apprehension  
 of frequent Sallies from the Besieged,  
 he wasted many Days, sometimes the  
 Violence of the Waters, very much  
 swelled by heavy Rains, ruining the Banks,  
 which were cast up in the Channel where  
 the River divides itself, in order to force  
 it into the lesser Stream, and sometimes he  
 expected to overcome the Violence of the  
 River by Dint of Men and Money; but  
 at last Experience convinced him of what  
 is most commonly the Case that the Ra-  
 pidity of Rivers has greater Power than  
 all the Labour of Workmen, and the In-  
 dustry of expert Engineers. The King  
 therefore deprived of this Hope, and of  
 taking the Town by Force, or by Arts of  
 Engineers, was obliged to content himself  
 with carrying on a formal Siege, by the  
 Length of which he imagined to reduce the  
 Garrison to a Necessity of surrendering.

BUT

BUT whilst Affairs were proceeding in the Manner related, the Pope, as soon as he heard that the King had got Possession of *Milan*, much concerned at so prosperous a Beginning, and therefore desirous to secure his own Affairs, sent to him *Gian Matteo Giberto*, Bishop of *Verona*, his Datary, a Person he could intirely confide in, and who he knew was not unacceptable to the King. He was commissioned to call first at *Sonzino*, to exhort the Viceroy and other Commanders to enter into some Terms of Agreement, and acquaint them that he was proceeding on the same Errand to the *French* Camp: But the Imperial Generals, grown sanguine at the stout Resistance made at *Pavia*, fiercely answered that they would give Ear to no Composition which should leave the King of *France* in Possession of a Foot of Land in the *Milanese*. He found no better, and perhaps a harder Disposition in the King of *France*, who, elated with the Power of his Army, and by his being in a Condition not only to subsist but also increase

The Pope sends the Bishop of *Verona* to the King.

who refuses to comply with his Desire.



A. D.

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crease it, answered the Bishop that it was chiefly on those Grounds he had undertaken to pass into *Italy*, and not, as it might be thought, with a View only of getting thither before the Enemy, tho' in this he had in a great measure succeeded: And now he made no Doubt of taking *Pavia*, the Walls of which he was briskly battering, having made such Works as he hoped could not be resisted by the Enemy for their Want of Powder, which was comprehended by their slow Firing; they had also a Scarcity of Bread, and he did not despair of turning the *Tesino*: That he was far even from thinking that the sole Recovery of *Milan* and *Genoa* were sufficient Rewards for his great Trouble, and immense Expences, and therefore had as-much in View the attacking the Kingdom of *Naples*. The Bishop then entered on the chief Business for which he had been sent, which was soon brought to a Conclusion; for the Pope engaged that neither he nor the *Florentines* should give any Assistance either open or secret against the King, who took both the Pope and *Florentines* into his

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 155

his Protection by a Deed, in which he A. D.  
 particularly inserted the Authority of the 1524.  
 Family *de' Medici* in *Florence*, and it was  
 agreed that this Convention should not  
 be divulged till his Holiness thought proper. But tho' this Agreement came not  
 to the Knowledge of the Imperialists, yet  
 their Jealousy of the Pope's Intentions  
 increased: And in order to make a full  
 Discovery of his Mind, they sent to  
 him *Marino*, Abbot of *Nagera*, who  
 was Commissary of their Camp, with  
 Proposals that might work both upon his  
 Hopes and Fears; for on one Hand they  
 made him vast Offers, and on the other  
 they represented that, as *Cæsar* and the  
 King of *France* were in the Height of  
 their Contention, *Cæsar* could not but  
 regard as Enemies whoever at this Junc-  
 ture should stand neuter. But *Clement*  
 replied, that nothing could be more un-  
 becoming a *Roman* Pontiff than to make  
 himself a Party in Quarrels amongst  
 Christian Princes: The Office of a Pas-  
 tor was to be neuter, by which Means  
 he should with greater Authority be-  
 come a Mediator between them, for  
 which

A. D. which End he was already treating with  
 1524. *Cæsar* by means of the Archbishop of  
*Capua*, who after the Acquisition of *Mi-*  
*lan*, with a Pass from the King's Mo-  
 ther, passed thro' *Lions* into *Spain*, where  
 after excusing, with the same Reasons,  
 the Pope's Refusal to renew the League  
 which *Cæsar* had vehemently pressed as  
 soon as he heard of the King's March  
 towards *Italy*, he earnestly exhorted  
 him that either with a Truce or Peace  
 he would lay down his Arms. *Cæsar*  
 furrounded by so many Difficulties was  
 willing to come into an Agreement, for he  
 considered that he could not raise Mo-  
 ney in *Spain* for the *Italian* Affairs, that  
 the King of *France* seemed to carry all  
 before him, and he suspected that the King  
 of *England* had made some secret Agree-  
 ment with his Enemy, because that King  
 not only refused to let the Fifty Thou-  
 sand Ducats which he had remitted to  
*Rome*, for the War in *Provence*, be sent to  
 the Army in *Lombardy*, but, what gave a  
 greater Suspicion, demanded of *Cæsar*, in  
 a Time of so great Distress, a Restitution  
 of Money lent, and Payment of all the  
 Sums

*Cæsar*  
 suspects  
 the King  
 of Eng-  
 land's Sin-  
 cerity.

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A. D.

1524.

Sums for which he was engaged. For *Cæsar*, so long ago as when he went into *Spain*, being very desirous of an Alliance with the King of *England*, in order to remove any Obstacle that might keep him in Suspense, engaged to pay him the same yearly Pension which was allowed him by the King of *France*, and Twenty Thousand Ducats more for the Pensions *Francis* paid to the Cardinal of *York* and other *English* Ministers, and also the Thirty Thousand Ducats which were allotted to *Queen Blanche*, who had been married to King *Lewis*, of all which Sums nothing had hitherto been paid. To all these inward Afflictions must be added, that *Cæsar*, at that Time, laboured under a bodily Infirmary, for he took so much to Heart the Miscarriage at *Marseilles*, that it threw him into a Quartan Ague; yet, either because he was of so high a Spirit, that no Difficulties could prevail on him to stoop to an Enemy, or confiding in the Valour of his Officers in case of a Battle, or promising himself that he must needs be an extraordinary



A. D.

1524.

traordinary Favourite of Fortune for the future as well as in Times past, he answered that it was below his Dignity to come into any Convention whilst the King of *France* molested with his Army the *Milaneſe*.

THE King, in the mean Time, was come to a Resolution of invading the Kingdom of *Naples*, in hopes that the Viceroy, alarmed at the Danger, for no Garrisons had been kept in the Towns, would either draw off his Forces from that Dutchy to defend that Kingdom, or would at least agree to lay down his Arms on disadvantageous Conditions, which was what he began almost to wish when he found so many Difficulties in the Siege of *Pavia*.

Duke of  
*Albany*  
ſent for  
the King-  
dom of  
*Naples*.

HE appointed *John Stuart*, Duke of *Albany*, of the Blood Royal of *Scotland*, for his Commander in Chief in this Expedition, with a Detachment from the Army of Two Hundred Lances, Six Hundred Light Horſe, and Four Thouſand Foot, one Half of which were  
*Italians*,

*Italians*, Four Hundred *Swiss*, and the *A. D.* rest *Germans* ; and ordered *Renzo da Ceri*, <sup>1524.</sup> in order to join him, to land at *Livorno* the Foot destined for the Fleet, which, being retarded by the Difficulty in providing Necessaries for its Equipment, was still at Anchor in the Port of *Villa Franca* ; and that *Renzo* and others of the *Orsini* should enlist Four Thousand Men in the Territory of *Rome*. He notified this Resolution to the Pontiff by *Alberto* Count of *Carpi*, his Ambassador, soliciting Leave to levy Men in *Rome*, and for his Army to pass thro' the Ecclesiastic State.

THE Pope was very uneasy at such a Request, and could not bear to think that the King of *France* should make himself Master both of the Dutchy of *Milan* and of the Kingdom of *Naples* ; but not daring to give a flat Denial, he exhorted him to lay aside this Undertaking for the present, that he might not put him under a Necessity of refusing him what he could not consent to for just Causes, demonstrating to him, with solid Reasonings, that this

Point

A. D. 1524. Point was contrary to his own Interest; for if the Desire of recovering the Dutchy of *Milan* had stirred him up so many Enemies; what could he expect if he was also to aspire to the Kingdom of *Naples*? Who would wonder if the *Venetians* should, at such a Provocation, join the Emperor, even with a greater Force than they were engaged to by Treaty? He begged of him to consider that if by any Accident his Progress should be obstructed in *Lombardy*, with what Discredit he would enter *Naples*, and how his Miscarriage in any one of these States would inevitably be the Cause of his Overthrow in the other. And, lastly, that he ought to remember how he had commended him for betaking himself to the Duty of a Pontiff, and therefore it would be absurd to oblige him now to act the contrary Part.

BUT all he alledged was to no Purpose, for the Duke of *Albany*, without waiting for an Answer, as if he were sure of the Pope's Concession, had passed the *Po* at the Passage of *Stellata*, in the  
*Milanese*,

*Milanese*, but after Five Days he returned; for the King, on the News that the *Ger-*  
*mans* had begun to arrive in the Enemy's Camp, and that the Duke of *Bourbon* was gone himself into *Germany* to raise more Men, thought it proper to keep his whole Army together, till it was increased with a new Supply of *Swiss* and *Grisons*, whom he had sent to enlist.

In the mean time the military Operations were in a manner at a stand; the King indeed continued the Siege of *Pavia*, working at the Trenches and Batteries without ceasing, whilst the Imperialists lay quiet, waiting the Return of *Bourbon*, except that the Marquis of *Pescara*, who, for his Foresight and Resolution, had the greatest Sway in their Councils, and to whom, without Dispute, was committed the Execution of all their Resolutions, set out from *Lodi* one Night with Two Hundred Horse and Two Thousand Foot, and unexpectedly entering the Town of *Melzi*, negligently guarded by *Girolamo* and *Gianfermo de' Trivulzi*, with Two Hundred Horse; made them both Pri-

A. D.  
1524.

Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
surprises a  
Body of  
*French* at  
*Melzi*.



A. D. 1524. soners, with almost the whole Garrison,  
and *Girolamo* died a few Days after of a  
Wound he received in the Action.

*Grifons*  
and *Swiss*  
join the  
*French*  
Army.

By this time the *Grifons* and *Swiss*  
joined the Royal Army, at whose Com-  
ing the Duke of *Albany* crossed again the  
*Po* at *Stradella*, in the *Piacentine*, the Pope  
not being able to dissuade the King from  
his Enterprize on *Naples*, and, for Fear  
perhaps of giving him Cause of Jealousy, he  
was no longer eager in pressing him against  
it, but thought it proper however to inform  
the Imperialists of the Convention he had  
made with his Majesty, and, at the same  
time, to offer anew his Mediation for a  
Peace, which he had Reason to think the  
Parties would now more willingly hear-  
ken to, on account of the Difficulties in  
the Siege of *Pavia*, and the Danger of  
the Kingdom of *Naples*. For this Pur-  
pose he sent *Pagolo Vettori*, the Captain  
of his Gallies, to the Viceroy, to ac-  
quaint him how it had not been in  
his Power, tho' he had earnestly endea-  
voured it, to dissuade the King of  
*France* from invading the Kingdom of  
*Naples*;

The Pope  
sends *Pa-  
golo Vet-  
tori* to  
the Vice-  
roy.

*Naples*, nor could he, without drawing A. D. 1524.  
the War on his own Dominions, which he was not in a Condition to sustain, refuse a Passage to the *French* Army; on the contrary, he was under a Necessity, for his own Safety, to enter into new Conventions with the King; but he might rest secure that he should not agree to any Article prejudicial to *Cæsar*, who he was certain could not take a better Step, in his present Condition, than to enter into a Treaty of Peace, which, that it might be negotiated before greater Disorders arose, he intreated the Viceroy to consent to a Cessation of Arms, and to deposit, since the King would not otherwise agree, into neutral Hands what he and the Duke of *Milan* were in Possession of in the *Milanesè*. When this should be effected, some proper Expedient might be found out for making an honourable Peace, in which it was intended intirely to separate the Dutchy of *Milan* from the Crown of *France*, the Emperor, in Consideration of a proper Sum of Money, giving the Investiture of it to a Second Son of the King; that

A. D.

1524.

*bon* should be honourably provided for, and that the Pope, *Venetians* and *Florentines* should engage to join the Emperor against *France*, if the King made any Infringement of what should be stipulated. The Imperial Commanders were sensible of their great Difficulties and Dangers, in being obliged, with such a Scarcity of Money, to sustain at the same time the War in *Lombardy*, and take Care of the Kingdom of *Naples*, whilst it was manifest they should receive no Subsidies from the Pope and *Florentines*, and whilst they were already certain they should be treated in the same manner by the *Venetians*, who, tho' by enlisting Men they endeavoured to make them believe that they intended to stand to the League, yet deferred with various Excuses its Execution. Wherefore the Viceroy, not being averse from an Agreement, was inclined, for the Security of the Kingdom of *Naples*, to retire thither with his Army. But the Marquis of *Pescara's* Opinion prevailed in the Council, who boldly as well as prudently made it appear that,

despising

despising all other Dangers, it was necessary to carry on and continue the War in *Lombardy*, because their Whole depended on a Victory in that Country. That it was not designed to attack the Kingdom of *Naples* with such Forces, nor could they get thither with the supposed Expedition, for they would meet with many fortified Towns, defended by those whose All depended on their Defence, and therefore would hold out at least for many Months, by which time an End, in all Likelihood, would be put to the War in the *Milanese*; and, if with Victory, who could doubt but they should immediately free the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, tho' *Cæsar* kept Possession but of one single Tower? By remaining in *Lombardy* they might possibly conquer both at *Milan* and *Naples*, but by going to *Naples*, *Milan* would be certainly lost, without lessening the Danger of *Naples*, which would immediately become the Seat of the War. And what must be our Hopes in returning thither as conquered? Whereas the *French*, entering in a triumphant Manner, would presently have in their Fa-

A. D.


1524.

Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
prevail on  
the Impe-  
rialists not  
to quit  
*Lombardy*.



A. D.

1524.



your the Cry of the People, who always, from their voluble Nature, Hatred and Fear, are every Day ready to meet the Fortune of the Conqueror; whence the Kingdom of *Naples* would no more defend itself than the Dutchy of *Milan*. Nor has indeed the King of *France* any other View in dividing his Army, whilst he is still doubtful of his Success in *Lombardy*, and beginning a new War whilst the first is depending, than that he expects that, out of so great a Concern for the Kingdom of *Naples*, we should leave him in Prey the Dutchy of *Milan*. Shall we therefore be directed by the Enemy's Counsels, and at their Pleasure march our Army, so often victorious? What else can it mean than that, to our eternal Disgrace, we are willing to yield up to the Threats of the Conquered that Glory which we have acquired by fighting so often against them?

THE Viceroy at last submitted, and sent the Duke of *Trajetto* to *Naples* with Orders that, after collecting all the Money that could be got, *Ascanio Colonna* and  
the

the Barons should attend to the Defence A. D.  
of that Kingdom; and, tho' he had 1524.  
given a civil Answer to the Pope's Messenger, he now wrote to *Rome* in a very angry Stile, refusing to hearken to any Accommodation whatsoever. Hence the Pope pretending to be driven by Necessity, because the Duke of *Albany* daily advanced, declared, not as a Thing before transacted, that he had made an Agreement with the King of *France*, only by a simple Engagement not to molest one the other; and by a Brief he notified the same to *Cæsar's* Agents, in which he gave his Reasons, which consisted particularly in the Necessity which had induced him. This Brief was delivered to *Cæsar* by *Giovanni Corsi*, the *Florentine* Ambassdor, with such softening Speeches as the Subject required. But *Charles*, who hitherto seemed to persuade himself that the Pope would not so much as think of abandoning him in his present Distress, answered in great Heat, that neither Hatred nor Ambition, nor particular Views had induced him at first to enter into a War with the King of *France*, but

L 4
only

A. D. 1524. only the Sollicitations and Authority of Pope *Leo*, at the Instigation, as he said, of the present Pope, at that Time Cardinal *de' Medici*, who represented it to him as very dangerous to the public Welfare, that the King of *France* should have any Footing in *Italy*: That the said Cardinal had been the Author of the Confederacy which was made for that Purpose before *Adrian's* Death; he therefore took it extreemly ill that the Person, who, above all others, ought to have stood by him in Time of Danger, should be the first to abandon him in the Difficulties in which he had himself involved him, and make a Change so hurtful to him without any Necessity. For to what could such a Step be attributed, but to a groundless Fear, whilst *Pavia* defended itself? He then observed how much he had taken his Interest at Heart since *Leo's* Death, especially in two Conclaves, and how he bestirred himself in favour of his Election to the Pontificate, on a Supposition that, thro' his Means. the Liberty and Welfare of *Italy* would be established. Nor could he

he persuade himself that his Holiness *A. D.*  
 could ever forget the faithless Treatment *1524.*  
 he had received from the King of *France*,  
 or that he would not consider what he  
 had Reason to hope or fear from a *French*  
 Victory. He concluded, that, neither on  
 the Pope's unjust and unexpected Re-  
 solution, nor for any other Accident, he  
 should be wanting to himself; nor would  
 he have it thought that, for Want of  
 Money, he might change his Sentiments;  
 for he would sooner run the Risque of  
 losing all his Kingdoms and his Life, and  
 that he was so determined to put in Exe-  
 cution what he had proposed, that he  
 prayed to God it might not endanger his  
 eternal Salvation.

To these Complaints the *Florentine* Mi-  
 nister replied, that the Pope, after his  
 Election to the supreme Dignity, was no  
 longer bound to act as Cardinal *de' Medici*,  
 but as *Roman* Pontiff, whose Office it  
 was to make it his Business to compose  
 Quarrels between Christians; which he  
 thought so necessary a Duty that he had  
 often writ to his Majesty on that Sub-  
 ject,



A. D.

1524.

ject, and twice sent to him the Archbishop of *Capua* to acquaint him of his just Resolution of being neuter. He had communicated these Sentiments to him when the Admiral left *Italy*, there being no Juncture in which he could treat with greater Honour to himself; but all the Answer he could draw from your Majesty was, that nothing could be done without the Consent of the King of *England*. He desired *Cæsar* to recollect how much the Pope dissuaded the Irruption into *Provence*, because it wholly broke off all Hopes of Peace; and how, divining at what after happened, he had foretold that the Necessity laid on the King of *France* for collecting an Army might be the Cause of greater and more dangerous Combustions in *Italy*: That he had employed the Bishop of *Verona* to persuade the King, after he was in Possession of *Milan*, and the Viceroy to come into some Terms of Agreement; but that he had not found in either any Inclination to Peace. That he had since, with many cogent Reasons, and in an absolute Manner, refused to grant a Pass for the  
*French*

*French* Troops through the ecclesiastical State in their Way to the Kingdom of *Naples*. But the King not only paid no Regard to his Speeches, but sent Troops into the *Piacentine*, without waiting for his Answer; which had at last induced him to send *Pagolo Vettori* to the Viceroy to exhort him to a Cessation of Arms, on such Terms as the Times would allow of, and to inform him of the Necessity he was under of securing himself from imminent Danger, especially since the *Venetians* stood in Suspense, and the King of *England* was unwilling to concur in the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, unless *Cæsar*, in Conjunction with him, would commence a War in *France*. But when he found that the Viceroy rejected all Proposals, and *French* Troops still advanced, he was obliged to make himself sure of the King, and take his Word that he should not be molested, on no other Obligation than not to act against him. But *Cæsar* complained that the Conditions offered to the Viceroy had been unreasonable, for it was required that he should deposit what he was in Possession

*A. D.* session of, without any Mention being  
 1524. made that the King of *France* was to  
*Cæsar* re- do the same; and concluded, that tho'  
 fuses to make a Truce. the Marquis of *Pescara*, in counselling  
 him to come to some Agreement, had re-  
 presented the Camp full of Disorders, and  
 his Affairs in a dangerous Situation, yet  
 he should not think of suing for Peace,  
 but, depending on the Valour of his  
 Soldiers, hoped he should obtain a Victo-  
 ry whenever the two Armies met.

Duke of *Ferrara* THE Siege of *Pavia* continued all this  
 taken into While, tho' with some Intermiſſion in the  
 the King's Firing of the Artillery, for want of Am-  
 Protection munition. To remedy this Inconveni-  
 ency, the King was content that the  
 Duke of *Ferrara*, whom he had lately  
 received into his Protection, on the Obli-  
 gation of paying down Seventy Thousand  
 Ducats, should account for Twenty Thou-  
 sand of them in Ammunition, which he  
 sent through the *Parmesan* and *Piacen-*  
 and ſends Ammuni- *tine*, the Countrymen, by the Pope's Or-  
 tion to the der, furniſhing Waggons and Oxen for the  
 Army. Carriage; for which heavy Complaints  
 were made by the Viceroy, as if ſuch a

Step



# THE WARS IN ITALY. 173

Step had been expressly taken with an Intent to serve the King of *France*. The King, for the safe Convoy of those Stores, had sent Two Hundred Horse and Fifteen Hundred Foot, under *Giovanni de' Medici*, who, from the Beginning of the War, under a Pretence that the Viceroy looked upon him with an evil Eye, and did not allow him Money sufficient for marching his Men, had quitted the Imperial Service, and entered that of *France*. This Escort was thought sufficient for securing the Ammunition, because the Duke of *Albany* was at Hand, having just then passed the *Po*. But the Viceroy and the Marquis of *Pescara*, in order to intercept this Supply, laid a Bridge near *Cremona*, and passed the *Po* with Six Hundred Men at Arms, and Eight Thousand Foot, and came the first Day to *Monticelli*; but, on hearing that the King had sent after them *Thomas de Foix* with Part of the Army, they speedily repassed the River.

As soon as the Viceroy was retired, the Duke of *Albany* continued his March through the Country of *Reggio*, and over the *Naples*.



A. D. the *Appennine* Mountains, by the *Car-*

1524.

*fagnana*; but he proceeded so very slow, that he confirmed the Belief that the King's Design in that Expedition was more to frighten the *Germans* into a Peace, or to induce them to abandon the Affairs of *Lombardy*, than out of Hopes of making any Progress. *Renzo da Ceri* joined the Duke, near *Lucca*, with Three Thousand Foot, that were come on Board the Fleet, which, in its Passage, took *Savona* and *Varagine*, by Composition, and afterwards, returning on the western *Riviera* of *Genoa*, kept that City in Awe.

1525.

Now follows the Year 1525, in the Beginning of which Don *Ugo di Moncada*, setting Sail from *Genoa* with the *Spanish* Fleet, made a Descent with Three Thousand Men at *Varagine*, which had a small Garrison of *Frenchmen*: But the *French* Fleet coming to its Relief, under the Marquis of *Saluzzo*, the Enemy's Squadron, destitute of Foot, retired, and the *French* landing, attacked the *Spaniards*, and, after killing a great Number, broke them, and took Don *Ugo* Prisoner.

IN

IN the Beginning of this Year the Duke of *Albany* constrained the *Lucchese* to pay him Twelve Thousand Ducats, and to lend him some Artillery; then advancing thro' the *Florentine* Dominion, where he was treated as a Friend, he halted at *Siena*, at the Pope's Desire, who, not being able to redress his Grievances by Authority or Force, was resolved to try how far he could prevail with Art and Industry.

CLEMENT was no ways uneasy at the King's getting Possession of the Dutchy of *Milan*, because he imagined that whilst *Charles* and *Francis* had both a Footing in *Italy*, the Apostolic See, and his Pontificate would be secure from the Power of both; and for this very Reason he could not be pleased at the King's making himself Master of the Kingdom of *Naples*, dreading that a Prince, already so powerful, should be Master at the same time of that Kingdom and the Dutchy of *Milan*. Wherefore, seeking Occasion to defer the March of the Duke of *Albany*,

A. D.  
1525.

Government of  
Siena.

*bany*, he solicited the King that in his Passage he would put the Government of *Siena* on a new Footing; for that City being situated between *Rome* and *Florence*, he was desirous to have it under the Direction of his Friends, as it had been, thro' his means, a few Months before. For Cardinal *Petrucchi* dying in the Pontificate of *Adrian*, *Francesco* his Nephew, aspiring to his Succession in the Government, was opposed, on account of his arrogant Behaviour, by the Magistracy *de' Nove*, tho' they were of the same Party. They applied to the Duke of *Sessa*, *Cæsar's* Ambassador, and to Cardinal *de' Medici*, to alter the Constitution of their City, either by restoring it to its pristine Liberty, or investing *Fabio*, the Son of *Ridolfo Petrucci*, with that Authority, tho' he had not long before stolen away from *Naples*. After this Affair had been long deliberated, on *Clement's* Assumption to the Pontificate, by his and *Cæsar's* Approbation, *Fabio* was at last restored to his Father's Place; but not having the Authority his Father had enjoyed, the City in general inclined to Liberty, the Magistracy *de' Nove* not heartily uniting with him,

nor

nor well agreeing amongst themselves, <sup>A. D.</sup> the Weakness that attends the Power of <sup>1525.</sup> a single Person, when it is not founded on the Love of the Citizens, nor managed totally, and in all Respects different from the Manner of a Tyrant, was the Cause that, notwithstanding the Place was guarded with his own People, on a popular Tumult, excited one Day by his Adversaries, without the Help of foreign Soldiers, he was easily drove out of the City. Wherefore the Pope, who could not confide in the Multitude, nor in the other Faction, was desirous to replace the Authority in the Hands of the Magistracy *de' Nove*, that he might afterwards have it in his Power to place at the Helm either *Fabio* or any other amongst them whom he should think fit. When a Person is once suspected, all his Actions are misconstrued ; so this Step of the Pontiff increased the Notion of the Imperialists, that the Capitulation between *Clement* and the King contained other Obligations and Matters which would produce Effects of much greater Importance than a Neutrality.



A. D.

1525.

THE Duke's Stay in the Neighbourhood of *Siena* was the Cause that the *Senese*, to free themselves from the Molestations of the Army, conferred a very ample Authority on those Citizens in whom the Pope could confide for settling the Form of Government. After this was accomplished, the Duke receiving some Artillery, and a certain Sum of Money from the *Senese*, proceeded forwards, but with his usual Slowness. From *Monte Fiascone* he repaired to *Rome*, to have a Conference with his Holiness; then crossing the *Tiber* at *Fiano*, he quartered his Men in the Towns of the *Orsini*, where they were assembling new Troops, raised in *Rome* by the Pope's Permission, who gave the same Liberty to the *Colonnas*, who were gathering Soldiers for the Defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had their head Quarters at *Marino*. But the People in general had but an indifferent Opinion of the Duke of *Albany's* Expedition, both on account of his tardy Motions, and for his Want of Money.

THE

THE Eyes, Ears, and Thoughts of the Public were now wholly employed on the Affairs of *Lombardy*, which seeming to be drawing to an End, by reason of different Incidents, excited sometimes the Hopes, and sometimes the Fears of each Party. In *Pavia* the Besieged were in great Want of Money, and Ammunition for their Artillery. Their Wine began to fail, and all other Provisions, Bread excepted. The *German* Foot, insolent enough of themselves, demanded their Pay at the Instigation of their Officers, in a sort of a riotous Manner, which gave a Suspicion that they had secretly agreed with the King of *France*. On the other hand the Viceroy, on the Approach of the Duke of *Bourbon*, who was bringing with him from *Germany* Five Hundred *Burgundian* Horse, and Six Thousand *German* Foot, which had been enlisted with Money of the King of the *Romans*, was gone to *Lodi*, where the whole Army was to rendezvous, and, as was thought, would not be inferior to that of the *French*; but there was

A. D.

1525.

no Money, nor Means of procuring any, for marching or subsisting the Army. They quite despaired of getting Money from the Pope or *Florentines*, as also from the *Venetians*, who, after so many Delays and Excuses, had declared at last to the Protonotary *Caracciolo*, the Emperor's Ambassador, that they should regulate their Proceedings by those of the Pope, by whose Means, it was thought, they had with all Secresy agreed with the King of *France* to stand neuter. They certainly pressed his Holiness to bring into *Italy* Ten Thousand *Swiss*, offering to contribute Half the Expence, that they might not be under any Consternation at the Victory of either Party. The Pope approved of the Scheme, but for Want of Money, and on account of the Pope's natural Indolence, it was executed so slowly, a long Time was consumed before he sent into *Switzerland* the Bishop of *Veruli*, to dispose the *Helvetic* Body to grant his Request.

THE Difficulties in *Pavia* were, in some measure, removed by the Vigilance and Industry of the Viceroy and other Commanders; for some Merchants being sent to the *French* Camp to sell Wine, *Antonio da Leva*, at the Sign agreed upon, sent a Party that Way with Orders to begin skirmishing; which creating a Noise, the Merchants, in the Confusion, staved a large Butt of Wine, and taking out a small Pot, which was concealed in it, containing Three Thousand Ducats, ran with it into *Pavia*. The Receipt of this small Sum made the *Germans* sensible how difficult it was to supply them with Money, and made them more patient; and the Death of their Leader now happening, so opportunely that it was believed he was poisoned by *Antonio da Leva*, removed the main Fomenter of the Tumults.

IN the mean time the Marquis of *Pescara* laid Siege to *Casciano*, guarded by Fifty Horse, and Four Hundred *Italian* Foot, which he obliged to surrender at



A. D. Discretion. But *Bourbon* being now ar-

1525.

rived with the *German* Foot, nothing else retarded the Generals, anxious for the Danger of *Pavia*, but the extream Want of Money; for they not only had not a Sufficiency to pay the Army, but laboured under great Difficulties how to raise what was necessary for moving the Ammunition and Artillery. In so great a Distress, by flattering the Soldiery with the Honour and Riches they would acquire by gaining a Victory, reminding them of their Profits in former Battles, and raising their natural Indignation against the *French*, they prevailed on the *Spanish* Foot to promise that they would serve for a Month without demanding any Money, and the *Germans* to be satisfied with what would barely suffice for purchasing necessary Food. But the greatest Difficulty was how to content the Men at Arms and Light Horse, that were quartered in the Villages of the *Ghiaradadda* and *Cremonese*. They had not received for a long Time any Pay, and represented that it was impossible for them to follow the Army without Money

Marquis  
of Pescara  
prevails  
on the  
Foot to  
wait for  
their Pay.

Money to provide for themselves and their Horses. They complained that their Service was less valued than that of the Foot, amongst whom, at times, some Money had been distributed, but none to them for a long time past; yet they were not inferior to them either in Courage or Fidelity, but much their Superiors in Birth and past Merits.

THE Marquis of *Pescara* allayed this Uneasiness by going to their Quarters, and sometimes excusing Matters, sometimes comforting, and sometimes reproving them, represented to them in a winning Manner; that the more they were illustrious for their Virtue and Courage, the more they ought to strive not to be outdone in their Fidelity and Love to *Cæsar*, whose Glory and Honour were not only at Stake at this Juncture, but also all his Dominions in *Italy*: That if they sincerely desired his Grandeur, and earnestly wished him well, they could never have a better Opportunity of manifesting their Sentiments; and, since they had so often exposed their Lives for his Service, with what Shame must they be branded, if, by an unheard

A. D. 1525. of Resolution, they should refuse to serve for the Want of a few dirty Pence, The Persuasions and Authority of the Marquis had such Effect, that they agreed to serve a Month, and be contented with a very small Portion of their Pay.

and upon  
the Horse

THE Army then being assembled, and computed to contain Seven Hundred Men at Arms, the same Number of Light Horse, One Thousand *Italian* Foot, and above Sixteen Thousand between *Spaniards* and *Germans*, they set out from *Lodi* the 25th Day of *January*, and arrived the same Evening at *Marignano*, as if they intended to go to *Milan*, in hopes that either the King, in Fear of losing that City, might break up the Siege of *Pavia*, or that the *French* Soldiery would abandon *Milan*; but after they had passed the River *Lambro*, near *Vidigolfo*, they directed their March to *Pavia*.

THE King paid for Thirteen Hundred Lances, Ten Thousand *Swiss*, Four Thousand *Germans*, Five Thousand *French*,

# THE WARS IN ITALY. 185

*French*, and Seven Thousand *Italians*; A. D. 1525. but by the Negligence of the Ministers, and Frauds of the Officers, the Number of the Foot was much less. *Teodoro da Trivulzi* guarded *Milan* with Three Hundred Lances, Six Thousand Foot between *Grifons* and *Vallese*, and Three Thousand *French*; but as soon as the Imperial Army moved towards *Pavia*, the King, ordering but Two Thousand Foot to be left in *Milan*, recalled the rest to strengthen his Army. On the Enemy's March the King held a Council of War, in which *Tremouille*, *Palisse*, *Thomas de Foix*, and several other general Officers, persuaded the King to break up the Siege of *Pavia*, and post his Army either at the Monastery of the *Cartusians*, or at *Binasco*, which were strong Situation (as there are several in that Country, rendered so by the Canals cut for overflowing the Meadows) demonstrating that by this means they might soon obtain a Victory without Blood or Danger, because the Imperial Army, being destitute of Money, could not keep together many Days, but would be obliged to break up,

The King holds a Council,

is persuaded to raise the Siege of *Pavia*.



A. D.

1525.

up, or quarter dispersed in different Towns.

That the *Germans* in *Pavia*, lest they should be charged with making their Want of Pay an Excuse for covering their Cowardice, had, for several Months, bore patiently that Inconvenience, but would, as soon as the Siege should be raised, demand Payment; and as their Commanders had neither Money nor any apparent Hopes, with which they might, tho' vainly, feed them, they would excite some dangerous Tumult: That nothing else kept the Enemy together, but the Hopes of coming to an immediate Engagement, which being put out of their Power, and the War protracted, they would be brought into Difficulties and Confusion. They laid before his Majesty the Danger of being situated between a Town garrisoned with Five Thousand Foot of a most warlike Nation, and an Army marching to its Succour, powerful for its Number, and for the Valour and Experience of its Leaders and Soldiers, elated with their former Victories, and placing their Hopes in a Battle: That no Infamy attended a Retreat made by Prudence,

Prudence, and not out of Fear; when made to avoid leaving to the Power of Chance what is certain, and when the speedy End put to the War shall demonstrate to the whole World the Reasonableness of this Counsel: And no Victory could certainly be more advantageous, honourable or glorious, than that which is gained without Loss or Bloodshed: That the chief Praise in the Art of War consisted more in a General's not exposing his Army to unnecessary Dangers, and in rendering vain the Artifices and Designs of the Enemy, than in fighting bloody Battles. The same Counsel was given to the King by the Pope, to whom the Marquis of *Pescara*, under Apprehensions from so great a Poverty in the Camp, had before signified that the Difficulties which *Cæsar's* Army laboured under were such that he almost despaired of Success. But the King, whose Resolutions were intirely governed by the Counsels of the Admiral, laying a greater Stress on vain Rumours, and on every slight and variable Accident, than on Events of Moment and Importance, thought it would be a great Reflection on his Honour, that

an

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*A. D.* 1525. an Army, in which he was present in Person, should retire with a Show of Fear at the Approach of an Enemy. He let himself also be worked upon by a Suggestion, than which nothing can be more imprudent in a General, that he was in a manner bound to act in Conformity to some idle Words he had dropped, because he had often publicly declared, and signified all over *Italy*, that he would sooner chuse Death than retire from before *Pavia* without taking it. He trusted in the Easiness of fortifying his Camp in such a Manner, as it should not be penetrated by any sudden Assault. He hoped that, on account of the Want of Money, every little Delay would disorder the Enemy, who having no Means to purchase Provisions, and necessitated to plunder the Country for Subsistence, would not be able to keep their Camp. He hoped also to obstruct the Conveyance of Provisions to their Camp, as the greatest Part he knew must come from *Cremona*, because he had taken anew into his Service *Giovann Lodovico Pallavicino*, with a View that

that he might either seize on *Cremona*, A. D. 1525. in which was a small Garrison, or at least secure all the Avenues by which Provisions might come from that City. These Reasons confirmed the King in his obstinate persevering in the Siege of *Pavia*, and to prevent the Entrance of Succours into that Town he altered the Disposition of his Army. The King himself was at first quartered on the Side of *Borgorato*, at the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, situated half a Mile beyond *Pavia*, beyond the Road that leads from *Pavia* to *Milan*, and on the River *Tesino*, near the Place where it had been attempted to divide the Waters. *Palisse* with the Van and *Swiss* lay at the *Ronche* in the Suburbs, near the Abbey of *Santa Justina*, and had erected Fortifications at the Churches of *San Piero*, *Sant' Apollonia*, and *San Girolamo*; and *Giovanni de' Medici* was posted with his Horse and Foot at the Church of *San Salvatore*. But, on Advice of the March of the Enemy from *Lodi*, the King removed his Quarters to the Park, at the Palace of *Mirabello*, on this Side *Pavia*,



*A. D.* *Pavia*, leaving the *Grisons* at *San Lan-*  
*1525.* *franco*, but without altering the Position  
of his Van. At last he changed once  
more his Quarters, and lodged at the  
Monasteries of *San Pagolo*, and *San Ja-*  
*copo*, convenient Places, on Eminences  
overlooking the Country, very near *Pavia*,  
but a little out of the Park. *Monf. D'-*  
*Alençon* was removed with the Rear to *Mi-*  
*rabello*, and for Conveniency of succour-  
ing one another Part of the Park  
Wall was broke down. The Camp  
extended downwards as far as the *Te-*  
*sino*, and upwards to the Road that leads  
to *Milan*. By this Disposition *Pavia* was  
surrounded, and as the *French* had the  
Command of the Rivers *Gravalone* and  
*Tesino*, and of the *Torretta* which lies over  
against *Darsina*, the Imperialists could  
not get into *Pavia* without crossing the  
*Tesino*, or making their Way through the  
Park. The whole Care of managing the  
Army lay on the Admiral, the King wast-  
ing the greatest Part of his Time either in  
Idleness or in vain Pleasures, without find-  
ing Leisure for Business or serious Thoughts,  
holding in Contempt all other Comman-  
ders,

ders, consulting only with the Admiral, *A. D.* and hearkening also to *Anne de Montmo-* 1525.  
*rency*, and *Philip Chabot*, Lord of *Brione*, great Favourites, but of little Experience in military Affairs. Nor did the Numbers in the King's Army answer common Report, nor even what the King imagined himself. For one Part of the Cavalry was with the Duke of *Albany*, another was left with *Teodoro Trivulzio* in Garrison at *Milan*, and many having their Quarters situated in the neighbouring Towns and Villages, there never were constantly in the Camp above Eight Hundred Lances at a time. And as to the Foot, tho', thro' the Frauds of the Captains, and Negligence of the royal Ministers, his Majesty paid for an unreasonable Number, yet they were far short of what was imagined by the Public. The *Italian* Officers, more than the rest, were concerned in the Cheat; for, tho' they received large Sums for great Bodies of Men, they had but small Numbers to pay. The same was the Case with the *French* Foot; and Two Thousand *Vallese* quartered at *San Salvadore*, between *San Lan-*  
*franco*

A. D. *franco* and *Pavia*, had been suddenly  
 1525. attacked by the Besieged, and dispersed.

IN this Situation of Affairs the Imperial Generals, as soon as they had passed the *Lambro*, approached the Castle of *Sant' Angelo*, which being situated between *Lodi* and *Pavia*, if not in their Possession, would give great Impediment to the Conveyance of Provisions from *Lodi* to the Army. *Pirro*, Brother of *Federigo da Bozzole*, guarded this Place with Two Hundred Horse, and Eight Hundred Foot, and the King a few Days before, unwilling to expose the Garrison to Danger, had sent this *Federigo*, with *Jacques Chabanes*, to view the Strength of the Castle, who reported that the Garrison was sufficient for its Defence. But Experience proved their Mistake, for as soon as *Ferdinando Davaio* approached the Town with the *Spanish* Foot, and had ruined the Defences with the Artillery, the Besieged terrified retired to the Fort, and a few Hours after agreed that *Pirro*, *Emilio Cavriana*, and Three Sons of *Febus da Gonzaga*, should remain

remain Prisoners, and the rest, giving up  
 their Arms and Horses, might depart on  
 their Parole of not serving against *Cæsar*  
 for one Month.

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THE King had sent for Two Thousand  
*Italian* Foot of those from *Marseilles*, which  
 were in *Savona*. These Troops being ar-  
 rived in the Territory of *Alessandria*, near  
 the River *Urbe*, *Gasparo Maino*, who was  
 in Garrison in *Alessandria* with Seventeen  
 Hundred Foot, sallying forth with a few  
 of them, fell upon the *Italians*, and find-  
 ing them weary with their Journey and  
 unguarded, because they had no Suspicion  
 of being attacked, broke them with Ease,  
 and they fled to *Castellaccio*, where soon after  
 they surrendered with Seventeen Co-  
 lours. Nor had *Lodovico Pallavicino* bet-  
 ter Success in his Expedition: That Of-  
 ficer entered *Casal Maggiore* with Four  
 Hundred Horse, and Two Thousand  
 Foot; and the Town having no Walls  
 he made some Fortifications, and soon  
 after taking Possession of *San Giovanni*  
*in Croce*, he began from that Place to  
 make Excursions all over the Country,



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making it his particular Business to cut off Provisions. Wherefore *Francesco Sforza*, who was at *Cremona*, with great Difficulty, got together Fourteen Hundred Foot, which, with a few Horse of *Ridolfo da Camerino*, and those of his own Guards, he sent, under *Alessandro Bentivoglio*, towards *Casal Maggiore*. When they approached that Place, *Pallavicino*, on the 19th of *February*, trusting to his Superiority in Numbers, without waiting for *Francesco Rangone*, who was expected with a Supply both of Horse and Foot, sallied forth and attacked *Bentivoglio*; but whilst he was rallying his Men, who were retiring, he was thrown from his Horse, made a Prisoner, and all his Troops were broken and dispersed.

To these Misfortunes was added an Accident of great Importance to the French: For *Gian Jacopo de' Medici*, of *Milan*, Governor of *Mus*, where he had been once committed by the Duke of *Milan* for the Murder of *Monfignorino Visconti*, having, in the Night Time, laid an Ambush near the Fort of *Chiavenna*, situated

situated on an Eminence at the Head <sup>A. D.</sup>  
 of the Lake, at some Distance from the <sup>1525.</sup>  
 Houses of the Town, seized on the  
 Governor as he had been walking out  
 to take the Air, and carrying him  
 immediately before the Gate of the  
 Fort, and threatening to kill him, pre-  
 vailed on his Wife to deliver up the  
 Fort; then suddenly, at the Head of  
 Three Hundred Men which he had  
 placed in another Ambush, entered thro'  
 the Fort into the Town, and took it.  
 This Accident gave such Umbrage to  
 the Leagues of the *Grisons*, that a  
 few Days before the Battle they recal-  
 led the Six Thousand *Grisons* that were  
 in the King's Army.

ABOUT this Time the Chevalier *Ca-*  
*sale* came to the Imperial Camp, sent  
 thither by the King of *England*, with  
 mighty Promises; for that King began  
 to grow envious of the Prosperity of  
 the King of *France*, and, being also pro-  
 voked that the *French* had taken some  
*English* Ships in the *Scottish* Seas, threa-  
 tened to make War in *France*, and

A. D. <sup>1524.</sup> was desirous of supporting the Imperial Army; and for that Purpose had commissioned *Pacey*, who was at *Trento*, to go to *Venice*, and insist, in his Name, on that Senate's Performance of the Articles of the League, to which he thought he might the more easily induce them, because *Cæsar* had put the Investiture of *Francesco Sforza* in the Hands of the Viceroy, with Orders to dispose of it according to the Occurrences of Affairs. King *Henry* also commissioned his Ambassador at *Rome* to solicit the Pope to favour *Cæsar's* Cause, from which he excused himself on account of the late Convention he had made with *France* for his own Security, without engaging to act offensively against *Cæsar*. He complained also that, after the Return of the Army from *Provence*, Twenty Days had passed before he could be informed of their Designs, and whether they had a Mind to defend or abandon the State of *Milan*.

BUT

BUT now the Treaties and Negotiation of Princes, and the Diligence and Sollicitude of Ambassadors were become of little Importance ; for the Armies now approaching, the Result of the whole War, and of the Difficulties and Dangers which had been undergone for so many Months, were reduced to the Fortune of a few Hours. For the Imperial Army, after the Acquisition of *Sant' Angelo*, still advancing, encamped the 1st Day of *February* at *Vislarino*, and the next Day at *Lardirago*, and *Sant' Alessò*, beyond the little River *Lolona*, Four Miles from *Pavia*, and Three from the *French* Camp. On the 3d of *February* they came and encamped in *Prati*, towards the Gate of *Santa Justina*, extending themselves between *Prati*, *Trelevero*, and *la Motta*, and in a Wood near *San Lazzaro*, which Posts were Two Miles and a Half distant from *Pavia*, and a Mile from the Van of the *French*, and Half a Mile from the Ramparts and Ditches of their Camp, and were so near that the Artillery on both



A. D. 1525. Sides did considerable Execution. The Imperialists had taken Possession of *Belgiojoso*, and all the Towns in the Country behind them except *San Colombano*, which continued in the Hands of the *French*, tho' blocked up so closely that none could stir out. They had found great Quantities of Provisions in *Sant' Angelo* and *Belgiojoso*, and, that they might be more plentifully supplied, they endeavoured to get the Command of the *Tesino*, as they had already of the *Po*, by which they obstructed the Convoys to the *French* Camp. *Santa Croce* was in their Possession, but they did not chuse to quarter Men in the Charter-House, which had been abandoned by the King, when he removed to *Mirabello*; lest the Provisions which must have been conveyed thither might be in Danger. The *French* were in Possession of *San Lazzaro*, but the Enemy's Fire obliged them to quit it.

BETWEEN both Camps was a running Stream called *Vernacula*, which has its Rise in the Park, and, passing between  
*San*

*San Lazzaro* and *San Piero in Verge*, A. D. 1525. fall into the *Tefino*. The Imperialists intent on passing this Brook, as a Matter of great Importance, that they might advance with the less Difficulty, met with a stout Defence from the *French*, who were assisted by the Depth of the Channel, and the Height of the Banks, which, with the Care that every Particular took to fortify his own Quarter, rendered the Passage very difficult. The King's Quarters in Front, in his Rear, and on the left Flank, had thick Ramparts, surrounded with Ditches, and strengthened with Redoubts, the right Flank being defended by the Wall of the Park, which was reputed very strong. The like Fortifications surrounded the Camp of the Imperialists, who were in Possession of all the Territory of *San Lazzaro*, towards *Belgiojoso*, down to the *Po*, and by that Situation had Plenty of Provisions. The Ramparts of the two Camps were but Forty Paces asunder, and their Redoubts at so little a Distance, that they were within Musquet-shot.

THIS was the Disposition of both Armies on the 8th Day of *February*; both Sides were continually skirmishing, but each kept themselves in their strong Camp, not chusing to fight to Disadvantage. The Imperialists imagined they had already done great Matters, by approaching so near *Pavia* as to be enabled, in case of a Battle, to have the Assistance of the Garrison. In *Pavia* there was great Want of Powder, wherefore the Imperialists sent Fifty Men on Horseback, each carrying behind him a Bag of Powder: These, in the Night-time, entering the *Milan* Road, waited there till the Imperialists gave an Alarm to the *French* Camp, and then conveyed themselves safely into *Pavia*, from whence *Antonio da Leva* made frequent Sallies, infesting the Enemy by different Ways. One Day he attacked and broke the Garrisons of *Borgorato*, and *San Lanfranco*, and carried off Three Pieces of Artillery, and several Waggons of Ammunition.

IN this State of Affairs one cannot well express the Vigilance, Industry and Fatigues both of Body and Mind of the Marquis of *Pescara*, who Day and Night never ceased to annoy the Enemy by Skirmishes, Alarms, and casting up new Works, always advancing by Trenches Ditches, and Redoubts. The Imperialists were at Work on a Platform upon the Canal, and the *French* greatly annoying the Workmen with Two Pieces of Artillery planted at *San Lazzaro*, they pointed their Artillery that Way, and ruining the Place constrained them to abandon it. The *French* suffered much from the Artillery of the said Platform, and likewise from another erected at *Pavia*; and the *Spaniards* fortified themselves in such a manner with Redoubts and Ramparts, and were so well disposed, that they annoyed very much the *French* Camp, without receiving much Hurt themselves. The *French* therefore changed the Position of their Artillery, in order to take the *Spaniards* in Flank, whilst they were  
vigor-



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vigorously continuing their Works, in order to gain Ground Inch by Inch. This Position necessarily occasioned frequent Skirmishes, in which the *French* were almost constantly worsted. All this while neither of the Parties intermitted their Operations, on account of the Negotiation of a Truce, of which the Pope's Nuncios in both Armies were continually treating: Nor would the King give any Attention to his intimate Friends, or to the Pope, who often counselled him, in order to avoid so great a Danger, to decamp with his Army from *Pavia*, because, on account of the Enemy's Want of Money, he would necessarily obtain a Victory in a very short Time, and without Blood.

On the 17th Day of *February* the Garri-son sallied out and attacked the Regiment of *Giovanni de' Medici*, who gallantly repulsed them, and returning afterwards to shew the Admiral the Spot of Ground where the Action happened, whilst he was pointing out the Particulars, by a Volley of Shot fired from

from a House, he received a Wound <sup>A. D.</sup>  
 in the Heel, which broke the Bone, <sup>1525.</sup>  
 to the King's great Concern, and it was  
 necessary to have him carried to *Pia-*  
*cenza*. On account of this Accident  
 the Skirmishes were not so frequent and  
 vigorous, and the Fierceness of the *French*  
 in their Assaults was immediately al-  
 layed; whilst those in *Pavia* made eve-  
 ry Day bolder Sallies, and having burnt  
 the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, were be-  
 come too hard for the *French*, who seem-  
 ed very much dispirited. The Marquis  
 of *Pescara* on the 20th, before Day, with  
 Three Thousand *Spanish* Foot, attack-  
 ed the Enemy's Redoubts, and mounting  
 the Ramparts, killed above Five Hun-  
 dred Foot, and brought off Three Pieces  
 of Cannon.

AT last the Imperial Generals, being  
 sensible they could no longer remain in  
 that Situation for Want of Money, and  
 considering that, if they retired, not  
 only *Pavia* would be lost, but that there  
 remained no Hopes of defending the  
 other Places they possessed in the Dut-  
 chy

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chy of *Milan*, full also of Confidence of obtaining a Victory thro' the Valour of their Soldiers, and relying on the Multitude of Disorders in the *French* Army, many of the Enemy's Foot being gone off, and the Number remaining not answering by far to those paid for, on the Night before the 25th of *February*, a Day dedicated, according to Christian Rites, to the Apostle *Matthias*, and *Cæsar's* Birth-Day, took a Resolution to march to *Mirabello*, where some Companies of the Enemy's Horse and Foot were posted, with an Intent, if the *French* did not move, to raise the Siege of *Pavia*, and if they moved to try the Fortune of a Battle. With this View, on the Beginning of the Night, to fatigue the Enemy, they often beat to Arms, making a Feint of attacking them on the Side of the *Po*, at the *Tesino*, and at *San Lazzaro*. At Midnight an Order was issued for all the Soldiers to put on a White Shirt over their Arms, as a Sign to distinguish themselves from the *French*. The Horse formed themselves into Two Squadrons, and

and the Foot into Four Bodies; the first of which was composed of Six <sup>A. D. 1525.</sup> Thousand *Germans*, *Spaniards* and *Italians* in equal Proportions under the Marquis *del Guasto*; the second consisted only of *Spaniards*, under the Marquis of *Pescara*; the third and fourth were *Germans*, commanded by the Viceroy and the Duke of *Bourbon*. Arriving at the Park Wall some Hours before Day, by the united Help of Bricklayers and Soldiers, they threw down Sixty Braces of the Wall. The first Body then marched to *Mirabello*, and the rest towards the *French* Camp. But the King, on Notice that the Enemy had entered the Park, imagining they were proceeding to *Mirabello*, marched out of his Entrenchments in order to fight in the open Field on even Ground, chusing rather to fight there on account of the Superiority of his Horse. At the same time he ordered his Artillery to be pointed towards the Enemy, which taking them in Flank did some Damage to the Rear. The Imperialists in the mean time attacked the King's Squadron,



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dron, which used to be commonly the main Battle, but by the March of the Squadrons was become the Van, where the King, fighting very gallantly, sustained the Shock of the Enemy, who however, with their Fire Arms obliged those about him to give Way, till the *Swiss* arriving, and the Cavalry charging them in Flank, the *Spaniards* were repulsed. But the Viceroy, called by the Marquis of *Pescara* to his Assistance, and coming up with the *German* Foot, the *Swiss* were easily broken with great Slaughter, their Valour no way corresponding that Day with the Courage they had shown in former Battles. The King in the mean time, having been with a great Number of his Men at Arms in the Midst of the Battle, and endeavoured to stop the Flight of his Men, after a long Combat, his Horse killed under him, himself wounded, tho' but slightly, in the Face, and in the Hand, and fallen to the Ground, was taken by some Soldiers, who did not know him. But when the Viceroy came up he discovered himself to him, who, after kissing

kissing his Hand with profound Reverence, received him Prisoner in the Name of the Emperor. By this Time *Guasto* with the first Squadron had broke the French Horse posted at *Mirabello*, and *Leva*, who, as some say, had, for this Purpose, demolished so much of the Wall of *Pavia*, that One Hundred and Fifty Horse might sally out abreast, attacked the Enemy's Rear, in such a manner that the whole Army betook themselves to Flight, but were all intercepted and plundered, except the Rear of the Horse under *Alençon*, which retired intire at the Beginning of the Fight.

It was a received Opinion that the French, between killed and drowned in their Flight in the *Tesino*, lost above Eight Thousand Men, and about Twenty of the first Rank of the French Nobility, amongst whom were the Admiral, *Jacques Chabanes*, *Palisse*, *Tremouille*, the Grand Ecuyer, *Aubigny*, *Boissy*, and *L'Escud*, who expired of his Wounds soon after he was taken.

Amongst

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Amongst the Prisoners were the King of *Navarre*, the Bastard of *Savoy*, *Montmorency*, *St. Paul*, *Brion*, *de l'Aval*, *Chandiou*, *Imbercourt*, *Galeazzo Visconti*, *Federigo da Bozzole*, *Bernabo Visconti*, and an infinite Number of Gentlemen, and almost all the General Officers which were not killed. *Girolamo Leandro*, the Pope's Nuncio, was also taken, but released by Order of the Viceroy. Of the Prisoners *St. Paul*, and *Federigo da Bozzole* were committed to the Castle of *Pavia*, but soon after, by corrupting the *Spanish* Guards, found Means to make their Escape.

OF the Imperialists were killed about Seven Hundred, but no general Officer except *Ferrando Castriota*, Marquis of *Sant' Angelo*: The Plunder was so great, that no Soldiers in *Italy* were ever richer. The Marquis of *Pescara* received Two Wounds, one of them with a Musquet, and *Antonio da Leva* was slightly wounded in his Leg. Of so great an Army *Alençon* only, with Four Hundred Lances which he commanded


manded in the Rear, saved themselves A. D. 1525. without fighting, being neither attacked, nor pursued; but leaving behind them their Carriages, they rode with full Speed into *Piedmont*. As soon as the News of this Victory reached *Milan*, *Teodoro Trivulzi*, who was left there with Four Hundred Lances, departed thence towards *Musocco*, and was followed by all the Soldiers, in scattered Bodies; by which means, the same Day the Battle was fought, the whole Dutchy of *Milan* was freed from the *French*. The Day after the Victory the King was conducted to the Castle of *Pizzichitone*, because the Duke, for his own Security, would by no means consent that he should be conducted to the Castle of *Milan*, and, except his Liberty, for that was guarded with the utmost Care, he was, in all other Respects, treated and honoured as a King.

*The End of the Fifteenth Book.*






*Francesco Guicciardini's*  
**H I S T O R Y**  
O F  
**The WARS in ITALY.**



**B O O K XVI.**



**T H E C O N T E N T S.**


*The Victory of Charles alarms the Italians.  
Tumult in Siena. Francis, refusing to  
sign the Articles offered him, is carried  
Prisoner into Spain. The Duke of Mi-  
lan and others conspire against Cæsar.  
The Marquis of Pescara discovers the  
Plot, and gets Possession of Part of the  
Dutchy of Milan. Conditions and Cere-  
mony with which the King of France is  
set at Liberty.*

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THE French Army being thus  
not only overthrown by the  
Imperialists, in the Battle fought  
in the Park of *Pavia*; but the most  
Christian

Christian King made Prisoner, and the greatest Part of the Officers and the *French* Nobility killed or taken near their King, the *Swiss*, who had hitherto made War in *Italy* with so great a Reputation, having behaved so basely, the Residue of the Army, after losing their Camp, making no Stop till they arrived at the Foot of the Mountains, and, what mightily added to the Reputation of the Conquerors, the *Cæsarean* Generals having acquired so memorable a Victory with so little Blood on their Side, it is not to be expressed what an Astonishment so great an Event excited in all the Potentates of *Italy*, who, finding themselves in a manner wholly disarmed, were struck with the greatest Terror at the Thoughts of *Cæsar's* having so very powerful an Army in the Field, without an Enemy to oppose him. Nor were their Fears so much allayed by what many reported of *Cæsar's* good Disposition and Inclination to Peace, without any Desire of usurping the States of others, as they were increased on the Consideration

A. D. 1525.  ration of the Danger that, moved either by Ambition, a Passion natural to all Princes, or by that Insolence which commonly attends Victories, and besides instigated by the forward Zeal of those who had the Management of his Affairs in *Italy*, or, lastly, stimulated by his Council and whole Court, he would not neglect so fair an Opportunity, of itself sufficient to warm the coldest Disposition, to turn his whole Thoughts on making himself Lord of all *Italy*; especially as they were not ignorant how easy it was for any great Prince, and much more for a *Roman* Emperor, to justify their Undertakings under Pretences which might have the Appearance of Reason and Honour. This Fear did not only seize on those Potentates that were of lesser Force and Authority, but even the Pope and the *Venetians* seemed to be more alarmed than the rest. The last, not only from a Consciousness of having, without any just Cause, failed in fulfilling the Articles of their Confederacy, but much more on the Remembrance of the antient Animosities,

sities, and frequent Provocations passed <sup>A. D.</sup> between them and the House of <sup>1525.</sup> *Austria*, and of the vexatious Wars in which they had but a few Years before been engaged with *Maximilian*, when the Name and Memory of the almost dormant Pretensions of the Rights of the Empire to their Dominions on the *Terra Firma* were strongly revived; and because they were also sensible that whoever aimed at establishing his Grandeur in *Italy* must of necessity apply himself to depress the too exorbitant Power of their Republic. The Pope had Reason for Apprehensions because, setting aside the Majesty of the Pontificate, which had suffered frequent Eclipses from the Greatness of the Emperors, even in those antient Times when a greater Reverence was paid by the World to the Apostolic See, he was in every other Respect exposed to Injuries; for he was disarmed, without Money, and the Ecclesiastic State, in which there are but few fortified Towns, was in a very weak Condition, the People neither united nor steady in their Affections to

O 3

their



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their Prince, but, on the contrary, almost the whole Dominion of the Church divided into the two Factions of *Guelfs* and *Ghibellines*, the latter, from an inveterate and almost natural Impression, inclined to the Imperial Authority, and the City of *Rome*, above all others, weak, and infected with these Seeds of Contention.

To this must be added *Clement's* Sollicitude for the Affairs of *Florence*, which depending on him, and concerning his own Grandeur, as well as the antient Splendor of his Family, he had their Interests perhaps as much at Heart, as those of the Church. Nor was it less easy to make Alterations in that State than in the others; for the City of *Florence*, after the Expulsion of the *Medici* in the Passage of King *Charles*, having, under the Name of Liberty, tasted the Sweets of popular Government for the Space of Eighteen Years, was become dissatisfied at the Return of that Family, and few of the Citizens were heartily pleased at their Power. The Pope was also extremely

treably apprehensive that to such inviting Opportunities would be added a strong Inclination to fall upon that State. But there were Grounds besides to fear that this Inclination would not abate, not so much because the less powerful is never wholly secure from the Ambition of the more potent, as from an Apprehension that on several accounts his Name was at that Time become odious to *Cæsar*. He reasoned within himself, that tho', during the Reign of *Leo*, and after his own Promotion to the Cardinalship, he had taken a World of Pains for advancing the Grandeur of *Cæsar*, and that tho' *Leo* and himself, with excessive Cost and Danger, had opened the Way to so great a Power in *Italy*, and that after his own Assumption to the Pontificate he had furnished Money to his Generals whilst the Admiral was in *Italy*, and procured a Contribution from the *Florentines*, and had not recalled from the Army the Troops of the Church and of that Republic, yet, either on considering that it belonged to his Office to act

A. D.

1525.

A. D.

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as a Father and common Pastor between Christian Princes, and to be rather a Peacemaker than a Fomenter of Wars, or beginning, tho' late, to be alarmed at so much Grandeur, he had betimes retired from following his Fortune, and therefore would not be persuaded to renew the Confederacy made for the Defence of *Italy* by his Predecessor. And when the Year before *Cæsar's* Army with the Duke of *Bourbon* had entered *Provence*, he had not consented to assist it with Money, which tho' it had given no just Cause for Complaint to the Imperial Ministers, his Holiness not being bound by the League of *Adrian* to act in Concert against the *French* in the Wars of *Italy*, yet this Manner of Proceeding laid a Foundation for their thinking that he no longer heartily concurred in *Cæsar's* Interest, and, on the contrary, greatly lessened the Opinion which they had hitherto entertained of his Faithfulness; acting like Men who, led only by Passion or Necessity, resented it as an Injury, if others did not lend the same Assistance towards carrying on  
their


their particular Enterprises, concerted with A. D. 1525. a View to seize on *France*, as they had before done to Undertakings of universal Concern, set on foot with a Pretence of securing *Italy* from the *French* Power. But these Complaints and Dissatisfactions begun and discovered themselves, when the King of *France* marched on his Expedition against *Milan*; for tho' the Pope, as he afterwards wrote in his querulous Brief to *Cæsar*, had privately supplied the *French* with a Sum of Money in their Retreat from *Marseilles*, yet he had never afterwards held any confidential Correspondence with them: But as soon as the King had taken *Milan*, seeing his Affairs in so prosperous a Condition, he had indeed entered with him into Articles, tho' he excused it to *Cæsar* by alledging that his Generals, at that Juncture, not having, for Twenty Days together, let him into any of their Designs, despairing of the Defence of that State, and under Apprehensions also for *Naples*, and the Duke of *Albany* pushing forwards with his Troops towards *Tuscany*, he had been obliged



A. D. 1525. obliged to think of Measures for his own Security. The Regard however to his own Danger had not so much influenced him as not to make him agree on Conditions tending as much to *Cæsar's* Interest as his own, and not to despise the immense Offers made him by the King of *France* to intice him into a Confederacy with him.

BUT his Excuses had not been sufficient to quiet the Minds of *Cæsar* and his Ministers, who were under great Concern, not so much because they saw themselves wholly deprived of any Hopes of future Subsidies from him, as because they doubted that the Capitulation contained something more than an Obligation to a bare Neutrality, because they thought that on all Occasions he had spoken too favourably of the *French* Enterprize, and were also apprehensive that he had drawn in the *Venetians* to follow his Example, the Truth of which was afterwards confirmed by Letters and Briefs found in the King's Tent after the Battle. In  
the

the last Place these Jealousies and Dissatisfactions were greatly increased, when the Pope permitted the Ammunition, furnished by the Duke of *Ferrara* to the *French* King at the Siege of *Pavia*, to pass through his Dominions, and to be forwarded by the Assistance of his Subjects, but much more at the March of the Duke of *Albany* on the Enterprize against the Kingdom of *Naples*; for he was not only treated as a Friend through all the Ecclesiastic and *Florentine* States, but also stopped many Days about *Siena*, in order to reform, at the Request of the Pontiff, the Government of that City. And tho' this Stay protracted the March of the Duke to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had been procured by *Clement* principally for that Purpose, because he would have been very uneasy to see the same Person Lord of *Naples* and *Milan*, yet the Imperialists had put such a Construction on this Step, as to infer that the Convention between him and the King of *France* contained something more than a simple Engagement not to act offen-

A. D. 1525.  offensively against each other. On these Considerations the Pope had just Reason to fear, not only, like all the rest of the *Italian* Powers, that, when proper Time and Occasion offered, he should be attacked by the Imperialists, but that the State of the Church, or that of the *Florentines*, would be immediately invaded without waiting for a fairer Opportunity. And this Fear was increased when the Duke of *Albany*, on advice of the King's Misfortune, having retired, for his Security, from *Monte Rotondo* towards *Bracciano*, and ordered thither One Hundred and Fifty of his Horse from *Rome* (which the Pope, on receiving Intelligence that the Duke of *Sessa* and the Imperialists were preparing to fall upon them, caused to be escorted thither by his own Guards) it happened that Four Hundred Horse and Twelve Hundred Foot of the Troops of the *Orsini*, in their March from *Sermoneta*, being pursued by *Giulio Colonna* with a good Body of Horse and Foot, were routed by him at the Abbey of the *Three Fountains*, and flying

flying into *Rome* for Shelter thro' the *A. D.*  
 Gates of *San Pagolo* and *San Sebastiano*, <sup>1525.</sup>  
 the *Colonnas* entered with them, and  
 in *Campo di Fiore*, and other Parts of  
 the Town put some of them to the  
 Sword, which causing a great Tumult  
 the whole City rose up in Arms, to  
 the great Terror of the Pontiff, which  
 was succeeded by no less Indignation  
 at the little Reverence and Respect paid  
 to his Authority.

BUT in the Midst of all these Doubts  
 and extream Anxiety of Mind, his  
 Holiness was seasonably relieved by En-  
 couragements and Offers from the *Ve-*  
*netians*, who, being equally affected with  
 the same Terror, endeavoured, with the  
 most earnest Instances, to persuade him  
 to join with them in sending immedi-  
 ately for Ten Thousand *Swiss* into *Ita-*  
*ly*, and enlist a large Body of *Italians*  
 to make a Resistance against so great a  
 Danger; promising at the same time,  
 according to their Custom, to do, for  
 their Part, much more than they in-  
 tended to perform. They represented  
 to



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to the Pontiff that the *German* Foot who assisted at the Defence of *Pavia* had not for several Months received their Pay, and finding after the Victory the same Difficulties in their Payments had made a Mutiny, and seizing on the Artillery had fortified themselves in *Pavia*: That on the same account all the rest of *Cæsar's* Army were become tumultuous, and would grow so more and more every Day, the Commanders not being able to pay them: That on these Grounds, if his Holiness joined with their Republic in making a powerful Armament, if they mutually put their Dominions in a State of Defence, and improved the Opportunity, the Imperialists, involved in those Difficulties, and under a Necessity of constantly keeping a large Body of Forces as a Guard on their Royal Prisoner, would fall into Disorders of themselves. Besides, it was not to be doubted but that the Princess Regent, in whom the whole Power of the *French* Government resided, ardently desirous of such a Conjunction, would,

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would, at their Request, not only order A. D.  
the Duke of *Albany* immediately to 1525.  
hasten to their Assistance with his own  
Troops, and the Four Hundred Lances of  
the Rear, who had retired from the  
Battle, and saved themselves, but would,  
with the Concurrence of the whole  
*French* Nation, contribute large Sums  
of Money for the Safety of *Italy*, as  
knowing that on this Liberality depend-  
ed, in a great measure, the Hopes of  
recovering her Son : That this Reso-  
lution was certainly the best if taken  
speedily, but Delay might enable *Cæsar* to  
remedy the Disorders in his Army, and  
so much the more as any Potentate who  
did not resolve to put himself in  
Arms would be under a Necessity of  
compounding with, and furnishing him  
with Money, and consequently be him-  
self the Instrument of freeing him from  
all his Difficulties, and establishing him-  
self in a State of perpetual Subjection.  
They also gave him Hopes that their  
Example would be followed by the  
Duke of *Ferrara*, who, both on ac-  
count of his antient Dependencies on  
the

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the *French*, and the Assistance he had given the King in that War, was not without very great Apprehensions : And his Conjunction appeared of no small Importance, on account of the great Conveniency of his State in the Wars of *Lombardy*, and because the City of *Ferrara* was very strong, and extreamly well stored with Ammunition and Artillery, and, as it was reported, very rich in Money.

NEITHER the Hopes of coming off victorious in so difficult an Enterprize, nor the Consideration of Danger at a considerable Distance, for which Time often produces Remedies unthought of, would have inclined *Clement* to give Ear to these Arguments, if the Fears of a present Attack had not induced him to chuse rather to expose himself to a less certain Danger, than to a Danger which appeared greater and more present. The Negotiations therefore were so long carried on between them, till there remained nothing to do but only to draw up the Articles in Writing,

Writing, it was expected every Hour *A. D.*  
 that a Convention would be settled; <sup>1525.</sup>  
 so that the Pope, looking upon the  
 Treaty as concluded, posted away *Gi-*  
*rolamo Ghinuccio* of *Siena*, Auditor of  
 the Apostolic Chamber, to the King of  
*England*, to use all his Dexterity for per-  
 suading him to oppose the exorbitant  
 Greatness of *Cæsar*, - when opportunely  
 arrived the Archbishop of *Capua*, his  
 antient Secretary and Counsellor, who  
 had for many Years been of great Au-  
 thority with him.

THIS Prelate, as soon as he had  
 heard of the Victory of the Imperi-  
 alists, had set out for the Camp, to  
 wait on *Don Carlo di Lanoia*, Viceroy  
 of *Naples*, and having informed himself  
 of his Intentions, immediately rode Post  
 to the Pontiff, carrying with him cer-  
 tain Hopes of an Agreement. For the  
 Viceroy and the other Generals had at  
 that Time two Things that employed  
 their Thoughts; one was, to provide  
 Money for satisfying the Army, at which  
 they were in very great Confusion, for



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Want of Money to pay the Soldiers ; the other was, to conduct the Person of the King of *France* to a Place where the Difficulty of guarding him would not keep them in continual Uneasiness ; and these two Points being well settled they imagined that Affairs would be in such a Situation as to put it in their Power always to accomplish their Designs. Wherefore they desired an Accommodation with the Pope, proposing to draw out of him a large Sum of Money ; and to dispose him to a more ready Compliance by putting him in a Consternation, and to ease the Dutchy of *Milan*, which was much exhausted, of the Burden of quartering Soldiers, they had sent Four Hundred Men at Arms and Eight Thousand *Germans* to take up their Quarters in the *Piacentine*, not as Enemies, but sometimes pretending that the Dutchy of *Milan* could not maintain so great a Number of Troops, and sometimes threatening to make them pass into the Territory of *Rome*, in order to find out the Duke of *Albany*, if the Troops levied by

by the *Orfini* were not disbanded. But A. D.  
1525. these Pains were needless; for as soon as the Pope was satisfied that it lay in his own Power to avoid the present Dangers, he laid aside all other Thoughts, and applied himself with all his Mind to find Means for an Agreement. Wherefore as soon as he had heard the Archbishop he sent to stop the Auditor of the Chamber on the Road, and to remove all Occasions that might obstruct an Accommodation, he procured that the Duke of *Albany* should disband all his Forces, except the Cavalry and Ultramontane Foot, and appointed him Quarters at *Corneto*, receiving a Promise of the *Cæsarean* Ministers that they would also disband their Troops which were about *Rome*, and put a Stop to *Ascanio Colonna*, and other Troops that were coming from the Kingdom of *Naples*; and he interposed also his Mediation that the *Colonnas*, who had begun to molest the Territories of the *Orfini*, should desist from Hostilities.

## THE HISTORY OF

THE Pontiff was desirous, and used all his Endeavours that the *Venetians* might be included in the Convention of which he was treating with the Viceroy: But the Difficulty lay in their refusing to pay the Money demanded of them by the Viceroy, for he required as much Money as they would have spent in the War to which they were to contribute, and that, for the future, they should contribute their Share not in Men but Money. He made also the same Demand of all those who were comprehended in the Confederacy contracted with *Adrian*. But this Obstinacy of the *Venetians* was of Service to the Pontiff, by giving Suspicion to the Viceroy that they were projecting new Movements.

WHILE these Affairs were under Negotiation, with the surest Prospect of bringing them to a Conclusion, the *Florentines*, by order of the Pontiff, sent the Marquis of *Pescara* Twenty-five Thousand Ducats for the Use of the Army, having first received a Promise from *Giovan Bartolo-*

*meo da Gattinara*, deputed by the Vice-roy to manage the Treaty at his Court, that this Sum should be reckoned as Part of a larger Sum which they were to pay by Virtue of the new Capitulation. But, a very few Days before this Treaty was concluded, the Duke of *Albany*, who had waited for the Fleet to carry him back into *France*, the same being arrived at *Porto di Santo Stefano*, and the Gallies sent to fetch him off, embarked on board, these and the Pope's Gallies lent him by Consent of the Viceroy, tho' no Pass had been granted either to the Fleet or to the Gallies. With the Duke embarked *Renzo da Ceri*, with the Artillery received from *Siena* and *Lucca*, and Four Hundred Horse, and One Thousand *German* Foot, but with a few *Italians*, the rest of the Troops being disbanded, and the Remainder of the Horses, partly sold off, and partly left behind. From the whole Progress of this Expedition it was easy to comprehend that the Duke of *Albany* was sent either with a View to oblige the Imperialists, out of Appre-

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ensions for the Kingdom of *Naples*, to quit the Dutchy of *Milan* in order to succour it, or that the same Fears should induce them to an Accommodation: And these were the Reasons of the Duke's slow Proceedings, the King wanting Forces to send him with a powerful Army.

BUT at last, on the first Day of *April*, a Confederacy, in which the *Venetians* were left out, was concluded at *Rome*, between the Pontiff and the Viceroy of *Naples*, as *Cæsar's* Lieutenant General in *Italy*, for whom acted as his Plenipotentiary *Giovanni Bartolomeo da Gattinara*, Grandson to *Cæsar's* Great Chancellor, comprehending the Pontiff himself and the *Florentines* on one Side, and *Cæsar* on the other. The Substance of the most important Articles was: That between the Pope and *Cæsar* there should be a perpetual Friendship and Confederacy, by which each Party shall be obliged to defend with a certain Number of Troops the Dutchy of *Milan*, at that Time possessed, under the Protection

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tion of *Cæsar*, by *Francesco Sforza*, who A. D.  
 was nominated as Principal in this Ca- 1525.  
 pitulation; and that the Emperor should  
 take under his Protection the whole State  
 of the Church, and that which was in  
 the Possession of the *Florentines*, and par-  
 ticularly the House of the *Medici*, with  
 the Authority and Prerogative which it  
 enjoys in that City; paying him on that  
 account at present One Hundred Thousand  
 Ducats, as an Equivalent for what they  
 ought to have contributed in the last War,  
 by Virtue of the League made with *Adri-*  
*an*, which was pretended not to expire  
 with his Death, it being specified in  
 the Articles that it should subsist for one  
 Year after the Death of any one of  
 the Confederates: That the *Cæsarean*  
 Generals should recall their Troops from  
 the Ecclesiastic State, and not send others  
 to take up their Quarters in the same  
 without the Pontiff's Consent. The *Ve-*  
*netians* were allowed the Term of Twen-  
 ty Days for entering into their Confe-  
 deracy on honourable Conditions, which  
 were to be declared by the Pope and  
*Cæsar*: That the Viceroy should be

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bound to procure *Cæsar's* Ratification of all these Articles to be returned within Four Months. And the Deputies of the Viceroy obliged themselves by a separate Article, confirmed by an Oath, that, if *Cæsar* should not ratify this Capitulation within the Term above mentioned, the Viceroy should repay the One Hundred Thousand Ducats, the League however, till the Failure of such Repayment, to remain inviolable. To this Convention were added Three Articles, not connected to the Capitulation but drawn in a separate Writing, and confirmed also by Oath, containing, that, in Matters relating to Benefices in the Kingdom of *Naples*, it should be permitted the Pontiff to exercise that Authority and Jurisdiction which were ordered by the Investitures of the Kingdom: That the Dutchy of *Milan*, for the future, should take its Salt from the Salt-pits of *Cervia*, at the same Price, and under the same Regulations as had been formerly agreed on between *Leo* and the present King of *France*, and confirmed by the Capitulation

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 233

lation made by the same *Leo*, in the Year A. D. 1525.  
 1521, with the Emperor: That the  
 Viceroy should be obliged to operate in  
 such a Manner that the Duke of *Ferrara*  
 should immediately restore to the  
 Church *Reggio, Rubiera*, and the other  
 Towns which he had taken during the  
 Vacancy of the *Roman See* by the Death  
 of *Adrian* \* : That in Consideration here-  
 of the Pontiff, as soon as he should be  
 put into intire Possession of those Towns,  
 should pay unto *Cæsar* One Hundred  
 Thousand Ducats, and, whenever he  
 should be required by him, absolve the  
 Duke from those Censures and Priva-  
 tions which he had incurred, tho' not  
 however from the Penalty of One Hun-  
 dred Thousand Ducats in which he  
 was engaged in case he contravened  
 the Covenant made with *Adrian* : Pro-  
 vided however, that, as soon as the  
 Pope had recovered Possession, it should  
 be submitted to Examination whether  
 these

\* In this Affair the Viceroy was guilty of a notorious Piece of Fraud and Double-dealing, for at the same time he agreed with the Duke, and received Money of him, that these Towns should not be restored to the Pontiff.



A. D. these Towns, with *Modena*, belonged to  
 1525 the Empire ; if to the Empire they  
 should be held in Fee from *Cæsar* ; but  
 if they appertained to the Church, the  
 Apostolic See was to remain in free  
 Possession.

THIS Step of the Pope was vari-  
 ously interpreted by the Public accord-  
 ing to the Difference of Passions and  
 Judgments ; the Multitude especially,  
 who are usually better pleased with spe-  
 cious than mature Counsels, and often  
 take those for generous who make a  
 wrong Estimate of Things, and also  
 all those who make a Profession of desiring  
 the Liberty of *Italy*, blamed him as if,  
 out of Meanness of Spirit, he had ne-  
 glected the Opportunity of uniting the  
*Italians* against *Cæsar*, and had assisted  
 with his own Money the Imperial Ar-  
 my to free themselves from all their Dif-  
 ficulties and Disorders. But most of  
 the wiser Sort of People were of a very  
 different Opinion ; for they considered  
 that a Resolution to make Resistance,  
 with new-raised Troops, against a very  
 numerous

numerous and victorious Army, was by A. D. no means prudent: That the Arrival, <sup>1525.</sup> of the *Swiss* could not but take up a long Time, whence it might easily happen for an Opportunity to be lost were they never so ready to hasten their Coming, of which, however, considering their Nature, and the Blow they had so lately received, there was no Certainty. Nor could any Thing better be expected from the Kingdom of *France*, where so great an Overthrow had left neither Courage nor Counsel, and where was no ready Provision of Money, or Men at Arms, of whom those few who had saved themselves in the Day of Battle, having lost their Baggage, wanted Time and Money to put themselves in new Equipages. This Union \* therefore had no other probable Foundation than the Hopes that the hostile Army would not be able to put themselves in Motion for Want of their Pay. But tho' this should be the Case, they

\* Of the States of *Italy* against *Cæsar*, the Neglect of which is above imputed to the Pope.

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they would not by that Means be deprived of the Dutchy of *Milan*, which, as long as it was governed under *Cæsar's* Direction, would always give the Pope very just Reasons for Apprehensions. But this Hope was also very uncertain; for it was to be feared that the *Cæsarean* Generals by their Authority and Policy, and by proposing the Pillage of some rich City of the Church, or of *Tuscany*, might dispose the Soldiers to march, as we find already that a Part of the *Germans*, only for the Sake of better Quarters, have passed the River *Po*, and spread themselves over the Territories of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, so that, if they had been resolved to have passed forwards, there could have been no Remedy but what would have come too late; and a Resolution of such Importance, in so imminent a Danger, must have been founded only on the Hopes of Disorders among the Enemy, from which it finally depended on their own Will to disentangle themselves. The Counsel of *Clement* therefore, with respect to the current Times, was prudent

dent and well considered ; but it would A. D.  
1525.  
perhaps have been more commendable, }

if he had used the same Prudence in all the Articles of the Capitulation, and had turned his Thoughts rather on healing the Wounds of *Italy*, than on opening and exasperating some of the most virulent Kind, in Imitation of those knowing Physicians, who, when the Remedies administered to cure the Indisposition of the other Members increase the Disorders of the Head or Heart, laying aside all Care of slighter Evils, which well wait Time, attend with all Diligence to that which is of most Importance, and most necessary to the Health of the Patient. For the better understanding of this Point it is necessary to go pretty far back, and repeat Part of those Things already, tho' in a scattering Manner, related, and reduce them to one Plan and View.

THE House of *Este*, besides having for a very long Time, under the Title of Vicars of the Church, held the Government



A. D.  
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vernment of *Ferrara*, were a long while in Possession of *Reggio* and *Modena* by the Investitures of the Emperors, there being no Question at that Time but that these Two Cities were under the Imperial Jurisdiction, and possessed them in Peace, till *Julius* II. the Reviver of the almost antiquated Rights of the Apostolic See, and the Author of much Mischief under a pious Title, in order totally to reduce *Ferrara* under the Dominion of the Church, made War upon Duke *Alfonso*. In this War, having met with an Opportunity of wresting from the Duke *Modena*, he kept it at first for himself, as a Place which, together with other Towns as far as the River *Po*, appertained to the Apostolic See, as being Part of the Exarchate of *Ravenna*; but a little after, being under Fear of the *French*, he gave it up to the Emperor *Maximilian*. Nor did this put a Stop to the War against *Alfonso*; for *Julius*, not long after, took from him also *Reggio*, and it was believed that, if he had lived longer, he would have also taken *Ferrara*, being

a most bitter Enemy to *Alfonso*, as A. D. 1525. well out of a pious Intention, with which he cloaked his Ambition of recovering to the Church whatever was said to have at any Time belonged to it, as from Indignation, because the Duke had preferred the Friendship of the *French* to that of his Holiness; and perhaps also from an implacable Hatred which he bore to the Memory and Reliques of *Alexander VI.* his Predecessor, whose Daughter *Lucretia* was married to *Alfonso*, and had several Children the Fruits of that Matrimony. *Julius* dying left to his Successors not only the Inheritance of *Reggio*, but the same Ambition of recovering *Ferrara*, to which they were stimulated by the glorious Memory which he seemed to have left of himself to Posterity. Wherefore this Ambition was more prevalent in his Successor *Leo*, than his Regard to the Greatness of the House of the *Medici* in *Florence*, to which it appeared more conducive that the Power of the Church should be diminished, than by an Addition of *Ferrara* to make

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make it more formidable to all its Neighbours. On the contrary *Leo* having purchased *Modena* bent all his Thoughts on making himself Master of *Ferrara*, but more by Plots and Treachery than by open Force, which was become too difficult, because *Alfonso* seeing himself in such great Danger had employed himself in making his City very strong, had cast a great Number of Cannon, and provided vast Magazines of warlike Stores, and, as it was believed, very large Sums of Money. And *Leo's* Enmity was perhaps greater, but managed with more Secrecy, than that of *Julius*; for, besides a Multitude of Plots by which he several Times attempted to take the Place by Surprise or by Fraud, he brought those Princes with whom he contracted Alliances under an Obligation that at least they would give no Obstruction to this Enterprize. Nor did he only continue this Design in the Lifetime of his Brother *Giuliano*, and of his Nephew *Lorenzo*, for whose Exaltation it was believed that he had entertained this ambitious Desire, but was

no less eager in pursuing it after their Deaths. And this Desire was so ardent in him, that many are persuaded that he was hurried on his last rather precipitous than prudent Resolution of joining with *Cæsar* against the King of *France*, in a great measure, by the same Passion; so that *Alfonso*, to satisfy the King of *France*, his only Foundation and Hope, was necessitated to enter on a War in the *Modenese*, while the Army of *Leo* and *Cæsar* laid Siege to *Parma*. And the Duke, meeting with ill Success in this War, would soon have been reduced to very great Straits, had not *Leo*, about this Time, been taken off by a sudden Death, in the Course of his Victories; a Death certainly no less seasonable for *Alfonso* than that of *Julius*.


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NOR am I satisfied that his Successor *Adrian* was not possessed of the same covetous Desire, tho', being new and unexperienced in the Affairs of *Italy*, he had, in the first Month after his Arrival at *Rome*, absolved the Duke from



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 Censures, granted him the Investiture anew, and permitted him to enjoy all that he had seized during the Vacations of the Church, and had given him Hopes of restoring to him *Modena* and *Reggio*; but afterwards, upon better Information, he grew every Day more averse to such Restoration. But by the Creation of *Clement* the Duke came under very great Apprehensions that old Times were returning: And indeed justly; for this Pope, had Things succeeded prosperously with him, would have been in the same Disposition with *Julius* and *Leo*. But not meeting as yet an Opportunity to attempt *Ferrara*, he was intent on recovering *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, as more feasible, and the more justifiable because they had been so lately in the Possession of the Church, and on that account would reflect no small Dishonour on him if they were not recovered. Hence arose that Sollicitude in him, which discovered itself many other Ways before, and lastly in the Convention with the Viceroy, when he shewed himself more mindful of that Affair than

than was desired by many, who knowing the Dangers impending on all from the Greatness of *Cæsar*, and that no Preservative against it was more effectual than a hearty, sincere, and ready Union of *Italy*, and that they had Reason to expect every Day either Occasion or a Necessity of taking up Arms, were of Opinion that it would have been better for the Pontiff not to exasperate the Duke of *Ferrara*, and force him to throw himself into the Arms of the Emperor, considering that he was a Prince whose Friendship, on account of his Riches, the Convenience of his Situation, and his other Conditions, was at that Juncture highly to be valued, and that he ought rather to have embraced a Reconciliation with him, and done his utmost for extirpating his Fears and Hatred, supposing however that doing a Kindness to one who is persuaded that he has received so many Injuries, is sufficient to cancel in ill-disposed and rancorous Minds the Memory of Offences, especially when the Favour is bestowed at a Time when it

*A. D.* appears to proceed rather from Necessity than good Will.

1525.

THE Capitulation being concluded, the Pontiff, not to be wanting in the suitable Offices due to so great a Prince, with the Viceroy's Permission, sent the Bishop of *Pistoja* to visit and comfort the King of *France*. The King, after some general Discourse in the Presence of General *Alarcone*, and intreating that the Pontiff would use his good Offices with *Cæsar* in his Behalf, asked the Bishop, in a low Voice, what was become of the Duke of *Albany*; and receiving for Answer that Part of his Troops was broken, and that he himself, with the rest, had passed into *France*, he was extreamly concerned.

Several of the States of *Italy* capitulate with the Viceroy. AT this Time the *Lucchese* agreed with the Viceroy to pay Ten Thousand Ducats, for which he received them under *Cæsar's* Protection. The *Senese* also made an Agreement to pay Fifteen Thousand Ducats, without obliging the Viceroy to favour one Form of Government

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Government more than another: For A. D. 1525.  
on one Side those of the *Monte de' Nove*,  
who, at the Instances of the Pontiff,  
by means of the Duke of *Albany*, had  
resumed, tho' not as yet consolidated,  
their Authority; and on the other hand  
those who, for their Profession of aspir-  
ing after Liberty, were commonly  
called *Libertines*, and much ani-  
mated, by the Battle of *Pavia*, to make  
Head against the Government introdu-  
ced by the Forces of the King of *France*,  
had each Party sent their Agents to  
the Viceroy, to render him propitious to  
their Designs; but, obtaining from him  
no certain Resolution concerning their  
Form of Government, had all readily  
joined in soliciting a Composition. This  
being made, and the Men, sent by the  
Viceroy to receive the Money, being  
arrived, while the Money was telling,  
and in their Presence, *Girolamo Severini*,  
a *Senese* Citizen, who had been some  
time with the Viceroy, assassinated *Ales-*  
*sandro Bichi*, the Head of the new Go- Bichi as-  
vernment, and the Person in whom sassinated.  
the Pope had designed that, for the  
present,



A. D. present, the whole Authority should  
 1525. center. On this Occasion others of the  
 Change of Go- Citizens concerned with *Severini* in the  
 vernment Conspiracy taking up Arms, in Con-  
 in *Siena*. junction with the Populace, who were  
 discontented under the Apprehensions  
 that the Government had reverted to a  
 Tyranny, expelled the Chiefs of the  
*Monte de' Nove*, and new modelled the  
 Government, putting it in the Hands of  
 the People, who were Enemies to the  
 Pontiff, and Adherents to *Cæsar*. These  
 Proceedings were not, as it is thought,  
 without the Knowledge of the Viceroy,  
 or at least his highest Approba-  
 tion of what had been done, consider-  
 ing of what mighty Convenience it was  
 for *Cæsar's* Affairs to have at his De-  
 votion that potent City, which has the  
 Advantage of Sea-ports and a fertile  
 Territory, is near the Kingdom of *Na-  
 ples*, and is situated between *Rome* and  
*Florence*, tho' the Viceroy and the Duke  
 of *Sessa* had given Hopes to the Pontiff  
 that no Alteration should be made in a  
 Government introduced with his Favour.

MANY others of the *Italian* Powers followed the Inclination of the above-mentioned, and the Fortune of the Conqueror; among whom the Marquis of *Monferrato* compounded for Fifteen Thousand Ducats, and the Duke of *Ferrara*, who could not so readily settle his Affairs on account of the Relation which they had to the Capitulation made with the Pontiff, and because it was necessary first to be assured of *Cæsar's* Intentions, was content to lend the Viceroy Fifty Thousand Ducats, with a Promise of Repayment unless they otherwise agreed. With this Money, and One Hundred Thousand Ducats promised them by the State of *Milan*, and the Sums for which the *Genoesse* and *Lucchese* stood engaged, together with the Money remitted by *Cæsar* to *Genoa* for the Support of the War, but which did not arrive till after the Victory, the Generals employed themselves, as fast as it came, in paying the Arrears due to the Army, sending back from

A. D. Time to Time, as they were paid, the  
 1525. *Germanſ* into their own Country.

As no Signs therefore appeared that they intended for the present to follow the Course of their Victory against any one, but that, on the contrary, the Viceroy had ratified the Capitulation made with the Pontiff, and was at the same time treating of making a new Appointment with the *Venetians*, which he eagerly desired, the Eyes of all People were turned upon *Cæſar*, to behold in what Manner he would receive the joyful News of the Victory, and to what End he would direct his Thoughts. In that Prince, as far as could be comprehended by outward Demonſtrations, appeared Marks of a Mind full of Moderation, qualified easily to reſiſt the Proſperity of Fortune\*, and ſuch as could hardly be believed in a Prince ſo powerful, young, and one who had never ſeen any

\* He ordered a Proceſſion and Supplications for three Days, that this great Succeſs might turn out to the Welfare and Advantage of all Chriſtendom. *Giovio.*

any other than happy Success. For on Advice of so great a Victory, which he received on the Tenth Day of *March*, together with a Letter from the King of *France*, written with his own Hand in a supplicant Manner, and more with the Spirit of a Prisoner than of a King, he immediately went to Church to render Thanks to God, with all Solemnity, for so great Success; and the next Morning, with Marks of the highest Devotion, received the Sacrament of the Eucharist, and went in Procession to the Church of our Lady, without *Madrid*, where he resided at that Time with his Court. Nor did he consent, as is customary with others, that there should be any Demonstrations of rejoicing by Balls or Bonfires, or in any other Manner, saying, that it was proper to make Rejoicings for Victories obtained over Infidels, and not for such as are gotten over Christians. And without shewing, either in his Words or Gestures, any Sign of immoderate Gladness, or of being puffed up in Mind, he answered the Congratulations of Ambassadors



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bassadors and of the Grandees who  
 were near his Person, that he was pleas-  
 ed with the Victory, because the As-  
 sistance of God, manifestly vouchsafed to  
 him on that Occasion, appeared to him  
 as a Sign that he was, tho' unworthy,  
 in his Favour; and because he hoped  
 that now he should have an Opportu-  
 nity of giving Peace to Christendom,  
 and of preparing War against the In-  
 fidels, and should also be the better en-  
 abled to be kind to his Friends, and  
 to pardon his Enemies; adding that,  
 tho' that Victory might justly be  
 accounted all his own, since none of his  
 Friends had assisted him in obtaining it,  
 yet he was willing that it should be  
 common to all. To this Purpose, after  
 he had given Audience to the *Venetian*  
 Ambassador, who justified the Steps  
 taken by his Republic, he said to the  
 Attendants that his Excuses were not  
 true, however he would accept of them  
 as such. After some Days had passed  
 in a Continuation of such like Speeches  
 and outward Demeanor, indicating the  
 highest Wisdom and Goodness, in or-  
 der

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der to proceed with Maturity, according to his Custom, one Day he called a Council, and signified to them that he desired their Advice how to regulate his Conduct with regard to the King of *France*, and what Ends he ought to serve by this Victory, commanding every one to give his Advice with Freedom in his Presence. In consequence of this Command, the Bishop of *Osma*, who held the Office of Confessor to *Cæsar*, made the following Speech:

“ THOUGH we are assured, most glorious Prince, that whatever happens in this lower World proceeds from the Providence of the Supreme Being, which daily gives Motion to Causes, and regulates Events, on some Occasions discovering its Operations in an extraordinary Manner, yet never did it give more evident Tokens of its intervening Power than in the present Victory: A Victory, which on account of its Greatness, the Ease with which it was obtained, and the great Power of the Enemies, who abounded with all the necessary Provisions of War

to

*Speech of  
the Bishop  
of Osma to  
Charles V.*

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to a far greater Degree than ourselves, every one must own to have been by the express Will of God, and almost miraculous. The greater therefore and more manifest the Favour of Heaven has appeared in this Event, the more strictly is your Majesty obliged to acknowledge it, and to shew all the Marks of a just Gratitude. This Behaviour consists principally in the Direction and Improvement of the Victory in such a Manner as may best promote the Service of God, and answer those Ends for which we may believe it has been granted. And indeed when I consider to what a low Ebb the State of Christendom is reduced, I cannot see that any Thing can be more holy, more necessary, or more pleasing to God, than an universal Peace between Christian Princes, without which we must be sensible that Religion, the Catholic Faith, and a good Life must fall under most manifest Decay and Disrepute. On one Side we have the *Turks*, who, taking Advantage of our Divisions, have made an amazing Progress, and now threaten *Hungary*, the Kingdom of your Sister's Husband.

And

And if they should get Possession of *Hungary*, as no doubt they will if the Christian Princes are not reconciled, they will have an open Road into *Germany* and *Italy*. On the other Side this *Lutheran* Heresy, so hateful to God, so reproachful to him who has Power to suppress it, and so dangerous to all Princes, has now gained such a Footing, that without due Care it will fill the World with Heretics, and no Provision can be made against it but by the Imperial Power and Authority, which, while your Majesty is involved in other Wars, cannot exert themselves for the Extirpation of this most pernicious Poison. But besides all this, had we nothing to apprehend either from *Turks* or Heretics, what can be more unseemly, more wicked, and more pestiferous, than that so much Christian Blood, which might be gloriously spent for propagating the Christian Faith, or at least reserved for more necessary Occasions, should be idly spilt for the Gratification of our Passions, attended with so many Rapes, Sacrileges, and horrible Out-



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Outrages? Evils, of which whoever is willingly the Author can never hope for Pardon from God, and which whoever commits out of Necessity, deserves no Excuse if he has not at least a full Intention to redress them as soon as it shall lie in his Power. The End therefore which you are to have in View, ought to be universal Peace among Christians, a Work above all others honourable, holy, and necessary, and which we are now to consider by what Means it may be accomplished. There are three Resolutions which lie at your Majesty's Choice concerning the King of *France*; one of keeping him a perpetual Prisoner; another of setting him at Liberty with Marks of Affection, and in a brotherly Manner, without any other Conditions than such as may serve to establish a perpetual Peace and Friendship between your Majesty and him, and to heal the Sores of Christendom. A Third Way is to give him his Liberty, but with Care to make all the Profit of it that may be possible. Of these Resolutions the first and last, if I mistake not, prolong and increase

crease the Wars. A loving and brotherly Dismission is the only Way to extirpate them for ever. For who can doubt that the King of *France*, quite charmed by such generous Treatment, and singular Liberality, from the Sense of so extraordinary a Benefit, will be more bound in Mind, and more in your Power, than he is at present in Body? And if a sincere Union and Harmony should happily be effected between your Majesty and that King, all the rest of Christendom will betake themselves to follow that Road which shall be marked out for them by two such Princes. But a Resolution to keep the King in perpetual Custody, besides incurring the too just Imputation of Cruelty, and discovering a Mind ignorant and insensible of Fortune, is the ready Way to propagate Wars without End, since it presupposes an Intention to conquer all or a great Part of *France*, which is impossible to be accomplished without new and very destructive Wars. If we chuse the Mean between these two Resolutions, which is to set the Royal Prisoner

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soner at Liberty, but on such Conditions as to yield us all the Profit that can possibly be made of it; it is, in my Opinion, more perplexed; and more dangerous than both the others. For whatever Affinity he may contract, whatever Articles or Obligations he may consent to sign, he will always remain an Enemy, and he will never want the Assistance of all those who are jealous of your Majesty's Greatness, whence may be expected new Wars, and those more bloody and more dangerous than the past. I am sensible how much this Opinion differs from the general Sentiment, that it is quite new and without Precedent; but these singular and extraordinary Resolutions may very well become *Cæsar*, nor is it at all surprising that his Largeness of Soul is very capable of such Notions as are above the Comprehension of all other Men, whom he ought to excel in Magnanimity as much as he is advanced above them in Dignity; and therefore he ought to know, above all others, how full of Glory an Act of such

such great Generosity would appear, and <sup>A. D.</sup> how much it is the Duty of *Cæsar* to <sup>1525.</sup> pardon and shew Kindness rather than to make Conquests: That God has not in vain almost miraculously put into his Hands the Power of giving Peace to the World; that it is incumbent on him, after so many Victories, after so many Favours bestowed upon him by the Almighty, after seeing all his Enemies prostrate at his Feet, to proceed no longer as an Enemy to any Person whatever, but to provide, as a common Father, for the Welfare of all. The Names of *Alexander the Great* and *Julius Cæsar* were rendered more glorious by the Magnanimity of pardoning Enemies, and restoring Kingdoms to the Conquered, than by the Multitude of Victories and Triumphs. Their Example deserves the more to be followed by him who, not proposing to himself, for his sole End, Glory, tho' a very great Reward, principally desires to discharge the true and proper Office that belongs to every Christian Prince. But to come closer to the Point, in order to convince

VOL. VIII. R those



A. D. those who estimate human Affairs by  
1525. human Ends, let us consider what Resolution is looked upon to be the most serviceable to those very Ends. I verily think that of all your Majesty's Greatness, there is no Part more marvellous, more worthy, than the Glory you have attained of being hitherto invincible, and of conducting all your Enterprises to a most happy Issue with so much Reputation and Prosperity. This is without Doubt the most precious Jewel, the most singular Treasure among all your Treasures. How then can it be better secured, or more certainly be preserved than by closing the War with so generous and magnanimous an End, by putting the Glory acquired out of the Power of Fortune, and bringing this Ship, laden with Wares of inestimable Value, out of the wide Ocean into a safe Harbour? But let us insist farther; is not that Greatness which is preserved by Free Will more desirable than that which is maintained by Violence? None doubts it, because it is more stable, more easy, more pleasing, and more honourable.

honourable. If *Cæsar* obliges the King of *France* by so signal an Act of Liberty, by so inestimable a Benefit, will not that King always be as a Guardian of him, and of his Kingdom? If he gives so manifest an Assurance to the Pope and to the other Princes, that he contents himself with the States which he has in Possession, and has no Thoughts but how to promote the universal Welfare of Christendom, will they not be satisfied, and renounce all Fears and Jealousies? And when they have no farther Grounds for Apprehensions or Disputes, they will not only love but adore such transcendent Goodness. Thus, with the voluntary Submission of all, will he give Laws to all, and have it infinitely more in his Power to dispose of Christians by Benevolence and Authority than by Force and Imperiousness. Assisted then and followed by all, he will be enabled to turn his Arms against the *Lutherans* and Infidels with more Glory, and with more Opportunities of making greater Conquests, which I see no Reason why we should not as well desire to be made

A. D. in *Africa*, or in *Greece*, or in the

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*Levant*, even tho' the Enlargement of Dominion among Christians were attended with so much Facility as many, in my Opinion, vainly, imagine: For the Power of your Majesty is so greatly augmented as to become too formidable to every one, and if they should perceive that it is designed to be carried to a greater Height, they will all unite against you. The Pope dreads your Power, the *Venetians* are under Apprehensions from it, all *Italy* stands in Awe of it, and, if we may judge by outward and frequent Signs, the King of *England* begins to take Umbrage at its Progress. The *French* may possibly be for some Months amused with Hopes and fruitless Negotiations, but at last it will be necessary to deliver their King, or they will be thrown into Despair, and when desperate they will join with all the rest of your Adversaries. If the King be set at Liberty on Conditions of little Advantage to your Majesty, where will be the Gain by losing the Opportunity of exercising such  
extra-

extraordinary Magnanimity, which, if A. D. 1525.  
 not exerted at this Beginning, when  
 you would afterwards seek to display it,  
 will carry with it neither Praise nor  
 Glory, nor the like Grace? If you set  
 him free on Conditions very advantageous  
 and profitable to yourself, he will not  
 observe them; for no Security that he  
 may give can be of such Importance  
 to him, but that he will be much more  
 concerned to prevent his Enemy from  
 becoming so great, as afterwards to have  
 it in his Power to oppress him. Thus  
 shall we have either a useless Peace, or  
 a dangerous War, the Issues of which  
 are uncertain. Whoever has enjoyed a  
 long State of Felicity has the greater  
 Reason to dread a Change of Fortune,  
 and he who once had it in his Power  
 to settle all his Affairs on a good Foun-  
 dation, feels the bitterest Regret when  
 Things fall out contrary to the Hopes  
 with which he had flattered himself.  
 I trust, *Cæsar*, that I have satisfied your  
 Command, if not with Prudence, yet  
 at least with Affection and Fidelity; and  
 now nothing remains on my Part, but



A. D. 1525. to pray God to give you a Mind and Ability to take such a Resolution as may be most agreeable to his Will, and most conducive to the Advancement of your own Glory, and finally best suited for promoting the Good of the Christian Commonwealth, of which, on account of the supreme Dignity in which you are placed, and because it is manifestly the Will of God, it is fit you should be Father and Protector."

CÆSAR heard this Counsel with great Attention, and without shewing any Sign of Displeasure or Approbation: But, after he had been a while silent, he made a Sign for others to speak; on which *Federigo*, Duke of *Alva*, a Person of great Authority in *Cæsar's* Court, made the following Speech:

Speech of the Duke of *Alva* to *Charles V.* "I SHALL hope to be excused, most invincible Emperor, if I should confess that, as for my Part, I have no Judgment different from the common Judgment; nor Capacity of carrying my Understanding to a higher Pitch than that to which the

the ordinary Understandings of other A. D. 1525.  
 Men have arrived; and, what is more,  
 I shall perhaps be the more commend-  
 ed if I should advise you to take the  
 same Steps, and proceed by the same  
 Methods by which your Fathers and  
 Grandfathers always proceeded. For new  
 and strange Counsels may perhaps at  
 first Sight appear more glorious and  
 more magnanimous, but are sure to prove  
 in the End more dangerous and more  
 fallacious than those which have at all  
 Times, and with all Men, been approved  
 by Reason and Experience. The Will  
 of God in the first Place, and, subor-  
 dinate to that, the Valour of your Ge-  
 nerals and Soldiers have given you a  
 greater Victory than has been gained  
 by any Christian Prince for these many  
 Ages; but all the Fruits of Success in  
 Battles consists in making a right Use  
 of the Victory, and not to do this is  
 the more disgraceful than not to over-  
 come, as it is a greater Fault to be  
 cheated of those Things which are in  
 the Power of him who suffers the Cheat  
 to pass upon him, than of those which

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depend on Fortune. The more then are we to beware of taking a Resolution which must in the End create us Shame before others, and Repentance in our own Breasts; and the more important the Affair is of which we treat, the more circumspectly are we to proceed, and to take with Maturity those Resolutions which once found erroneous can never afterwards be rectified; and you are to consider with yourselves that if the King be set at Liberty, he is immediately out of your Reach, but while he is a Prisoner it is always in your Power to release him. And he ought not to wonder at your Slowness, since, if I mistake not, he is conscious to himself in what Manner he would act if *Cæsar* were his Prisoner. The Capture of the King of *France* was certainly a very great Concern, but whoever well considers the Case will find his Dismission to be incomparably greater; nor can it ever be considered prudent to take a Resolution of such great Moment, without very long Consultation, and revolving the Case infinite Times

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in the Mind. I should not perhaps be <sup>A. D.</sup> of this Opinion, could I persuade my- <sup>1525.</sup> self that the King, if he were at present set at Liberty, would acknowledge so great a Benefit with due Gratitude; and that the Pope and the other *Italian* Powers would lay aside their Covetousness and Ambition, together with their Jealousies. But who knows not how dangerous it is to found so important a Resolution on so fallacious and uncertain a Supposition? since whoever well considers the Condition and Manners of Men will sooner judge the contrary. For nothing is in its own Nature more transitory, nothing of a shorter Date, than the Remembrance of Benefits, and the greater they are, the greater Measure of Ingratitude (according to the Proverb) is required to pay them. For he who is either unable or unwilling to cancel them by Recompensation, often strives to cancel them either by Forgetfulness, or by persuading himself that they are not so considerable; and he who is ashamed of having been reduced to a State that had need of Benefits,



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nefits, is besides galled at the Thoughts of having received them ; so that the Hatred arising from the Memory of the Necessity under which they were both fallen, operates more strongly in them than the Obligation presented from the Consideration of the Kindness that had been shewed them. Besides, what Nation is there to whom Insolence is more natural, or Levity more proper, than to the *French*? Now where there is Insolence, there is Blindness ; where there is Levity, there is no Knowledge of Virtue, no Judgment to qualify a Man for discerning the Actions of others, and no Gravity to enable him to estimate what is fit and proper for himself. What then can be expected from a King of *France*, puffed up with as much Pride as can be conceived in a King of *Frenchmen*, but that he burns with Rage and Indignation at being a Prisoner to *Cæsar*, at a Time when he thought himself sure of triumphing over him? The Memory of his Disgrace will always be fresh in his Mind, and after he is at Liberty he will be so far from be-

believing that the Way to obliterate it is by Gratitude, that he will be always striving to get the Superiority over you. He will persuade himself that he is dismissed on account of the Difficulty of retaining him, not out of Goodness or Magnanimity. Such is the Nature of Men in general, but is always the Nature of *Frenchmen*, in whom whoever expects Gravity or Magnanimity must expect new Orders and Regulations in human Concerns. Thus, in the Room of Peace, and Re-establishment of Order and Harmony in the World, new Wars and Contentions will arise, greater and more dangerous than the past. For your Reputation will be lost, and your Army, which expects the due Fruits of so great a Victory, deceived in its Hopes, will no longer exert the same Valour and Vigour, nor will your Affairs be attended with the same Fortune, who will hardly stay with those that would retain her, much less with such as drive her away. Nor will the imaginary Goodness of the Pope and *Venetians* prove of any other Kind, but, on the

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A. D. contrary, repenting of having suffered  
 1525. you to obtain the past Victory, they  
 will do their utmost to prevent you  
 from obtaining any more, and the Fear  
 which they now have of you will  
 prompt them to use all their Endeavours  
 to prevent their falling again under  
 new Fears; and thus, when it is in  
 your Power to hold your Enemies bound  
 with the Chains of Terror and Amaze-  
 ment, you yourself, out of a fond Ex-  
 cess of Goodness, will be the Instru-  
 ment to free them from those Shackles  
 that they might bid you Defiance.  
 What may be the Will of God in this  
 Case I pretend not to know, nor do I  
 believe it known to others, because we  
 are usually taught that his Judgments  
 are a deep Secret and unsearchable:  
 But if we may venture to guess from  
 such clear Appearances I imagine it  
 favourable to your Greatness, and can-  
 not suppose that he dispenses his Bles-  
 sings to you in such an Abundance with  
 a Design that you should cast them  
 behind your Back, but in order to ren-  
 der you as much superior to others in  
 Fact

Fact and Reality, as you are in Right <sup>A. D.</sup>  
and Title. To lose therefore so fair an <sup>1525.</sup>  
Opportunity, which God has put into your  
Hands, is wilfully to render yourself un-  
worthy of his Favours. Experience has  
always demonstrated, and Reason has  
made it appear, that Success never at-  
tends an Affair that depends on many  
Hands: I much question therefore whe-  
ther he who imagines that the Heretics can  
be oppressed, or the Infidels subdued by  
the Union of many Princes, forms to  
himself just Notions of the Nature of  
Mankind. These are Enterprises that  
require a Prince of such Greatness as  
to dictate and give Directions to the  
others, without which all Treaties and  
Efforts for those Purposes will meet  
with the same Success for the future  
as they have had in Times past. For this  
End, I believe, God has opened you a  
Way to universal Monarchy, which alone  
is sufficient to answer these holy Inten-  
tions; and it is best to delay the Com-  
mencement of the Undertaking, in or-  
der to proceed on better and more cer-  
tain Foundations. Nor suffer yourself  
to



A. D. to be diverted from this Resolution by

1525.

the Fear of so many Confederates who threaten you, for the Opportunity is too great which you have in your Power: For if Matters be rightly negotiated the King's Mother, out of natural Tender-ness, and from a Necessity of recovering her Son, will never suffer herself to be cut off from all Hopes of getting him out of your Hands by an Agree-ment; nor will the Princes of *Italy* ever unite with the Regency of *France*, knowing that it is always in your Power to break such an Union by delivering the King, and even to make it turn to their Disadvantage. They must of necessity remain in Suspense and Amaze-ment, and at last strive who shall be foremost in receiving Laws from your Imperial Majesty, for whom it will then be glorious to exercise Clemency and Magnanimity, when Affairs are reduced to such a Situation that they cannot help acknowledging you for their Superior. In such Cases did *Alexander* and *Cæsar* exercise these Virtues, freely pardon-  
ing Injuries, but were not so inconfide-

rate

rate as voluntarily to involve themselves afresh in those Difficulties and Dangers which they had overcome. He who acts in this Manner deserves Praise because he has but few Examples, but that Man is not perhaps to be commended for his Prudence who does a Thing for which there is no Example. Wherefore, *Cæsar*, my Opinion is that the greatest Profit be made of this Victory that is possible, and that with this View the King, always treated with the Honours suitable to Kings, be conducted, if it cannot be into *Spain*, at least to *Naples*; and that in Answer to his Letter you send him a Messenger with a very kind Message, who shall at the same time propose the Conditions of his Liberty, which may be such as, when they come to be particularly examined, may appear to carry in them a Reward worthy of such a Victory. These Foundations and Ends of your Proceedings being thus settled, Time and Accidents which arise, according to their Nature, will either hasten or retard the King's Deliverance, and shew whether we are

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*A. D.* to have Peace or War with the *Italians*,  
<sup>1525.</sup> to whom at present it may be expedient to give Hopes, and to augment as much as possible the Favour and Reputation of our Arms by Art and Industry, that we might not every Day have occasion to tempt Fortune anew, and may be prepared for an Accommodation with this or that Power, or with all together, or with none, as Opportunity shall direct. These are the Methods which were always pursued by wise Princes, and particularly by those who were the Founders of so much Greatness ; they never rejected the Means that offered themselves for their Promotion, nor slackened Sail before a prosperous Gale of Fortune. The same Duty is incumbent on you, to whom belongs in Justice what in some of them might appear Ambition. Remember, *Cæsar*, that you are a Prince, and that it is your Duty to proceed in the Way of Princes ; and that no Person divine or human forbids you to embrace the Opportunity of reviving and restoring the usurped and oppressed Authority of  
the

the Empire, but only obliges you to A. D. 1525.  
 have an honest Mind and Intention in recovering them by lawful Means. And remember above all how easy it is to lose great Opportunities, and how difficult to acquire them, and therefore that it is necessary to strive with all Diligence to keep fast Hold of them while we may, and not lay our Stress on the Goodness or Prudence of the Conquered, since the World is full of Imprudence and Malignity. Concluding then that the Christian Religion can rely on no other Means of Defence but from your Greatness, be not wanting to augment it with all your Might, not so much for the Interest of your own Glory and Authority, as for the Service of God, and out of Zeal for the universal Good."

It would be impossible to express the Satisfaction of the whole Council at this Speech of the Duke of *Alva*, every one having already proposed in his Mind the Empire of almost all Christendom; so that there was not a single Member of the Assembly, who did not confirm the same Opinion, without making any Re-



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ply, *Cæsar* himself also approving it, tho' rather to shew that he was not willing to reject the Counsel of his Friends than by declaring what Part he was willing to take of himself. He dispatched away therefore *Buren*, a Gentleman of his Bedchamber, and his intimate and well-beloved Confident, to notify his Resolution to the Generals, and to visit, in his Name, the King of *France*, and propose the Conditions on which he might obtain his Liberty. *Buren* having performed his Journey by Land, because the King's Mother, for the more convenient Negotiation of her Son's Affairs, did not hinder the Passage of Couriers and other Persons that came to and from *Cæsar*, went, together with *Bourbon* and the Viceroy, to *Pizzichitone*, where the King as yet remained, and offered him his Liberty, but on such hard Conditions that the King heard them with a vast Deal of Uneasiness.

Condi-  
tions of Li-  
berty pro-  
posed to  
the King  
of *France*.

For, besides the Cession of the Rights which he pretended to have in *Italy*, *Cæsar* demanded of him the Restitution of the Dutchy of *Burgundy* as his Property ;

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perty; that he should bestow *Provence* A. D.  
on the Duke of *Bourbon*, with other 1525.  
Conditions for the King of *England*  
and for himself of very great Importance. To these Demands the King  
constantly answered, That he was re-His  
solved to die a Prisoner rather than de-Answer;  
prive his Children of any Part of the  
Kingdom of *France*; and even if he  
should resolve otherwise it would not  
be in his Power to perform it, the an-  
tient Statutes of *France* not permitting  
the Alienation of any Thing belonging  
to the Crown without the Consent of  
the Parliaments, and of others in whom  
resided the Authority of the whole King-  
dom, who were accustomed, in the like  
Cases, to prefer the universal Safety to  
the particular Interest of the Persons of  
Kings. Let them demand of him such  
Conditions as were possible for him to  
execute, and they would find him very  
readily disposed to enter into Engage-  
ments with *Cæsar*, and to favour his  
Greatness. Nor did he omit the Op-His  
portunity of proposing different Condi-Proposals.  
tions, making no Scruple of very large

A. D.

1525.

that he might obtain his Liberty without any Obligation to diminish his own. As to the Substance of his Proposals, he offered to take in Marriage *Cæsar's* Sister, Widow of the late King of *Portugal*, with an Acknowledgment that he held *Burgundy* in Right of her Dowry, to which the Children born of that Matrimony should succeed : That he would restore to *Bourbon* his Dutchy, which had been confiscated, and make an Addition to it of some other States ; and in Recompense for *Cæsar's* Sister, who had been promised him, to give him his own Sister, just now become a Widow by the Death of *Alençon* ; to satisfy the King of *England*, and to pay a very large Sum to *Cæsar* for his Ransom ; to resign up to him his Rights to the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan* : To engage himself to accommodate him with a Fleet at Sea, and an Army by Land, whenever he should go to *Rome* to receive the Imperial Crown ; which was indeed the same as to promise to give him all *Italy* for a Prey.

## THE WARS IN ITALY. 277

Prey. With this Draught of Articles *A. D.*  
*Buren* returned to *Cæsar*, accompanied 1525.  
 by *Monf. Montmorency*, a Person at that  
 Time very agreeable to the King, who  
 afterwards promoted him first to the  
 Office of Great Master, and then to the  
 Dignity of High Constable of *France*.

BUT when the News came to *France* Consternation in  
France  
on the  
News of  
the Defeat  
 of the Defeat of the Army, and of the  
 Captivity of the King, the Confusion  
 and Despair that seized all Ranks of  
 People are beyond Imagination. For to  
 the immense Grief which the lamenta-  
 ble Misfortune of their King excited in  
 a Nation naturally most affectionate and  
 devoted to the Royal Name, was added  
 an Infinity of public and private Sor-  
 rows: Of a private Kind, because there  
 were few in the Court, and among  
 the Nobility, who had not lost in Bat-  
 tle Sons, Brothers, or other Kindred, or  
 choicest Friends; and of a public Con-  
 cernment, on account of so great a Di-  
 minution of the Authority and Splen-  
 dor of so glorious a Kingdom: An  
 Affliction the more grievous to them,



*A. D.* 1525. as they are by Nature arrogant and self-conceited, and because they were apprehensive that so great a Calamity was but the Beginning of worse Ruin, their King being taken Prisoner, and the Heads of the Government, and almost all the principal Officers of the Army being either taken with the King, or killed in the Battle, the Kingdom exhausted of Money, and surrounded with very potent Enemies: For the King of *England*, tho' he had entered into several Treaties, and seemed irresolute in many Things, yet a few Days before the Battle, breaking off all Negotiations with the King, had publicly declared that he would pass into *France*, if Affairs succeeded prosperously in *Italy*, Wherefore it was much to be feared that *Cæsar* and that King, having so fair an Opportunity, would commence a War in *France*, where, because there was no other Person at the Helm of Government than a Woman and the King's little Children, the eldest of whom was not full Eight Years old, and because they had with them the Duke of *Bourbon*,

*Bourbon*, a Lord of such great Power A. D. 1525.  
 and Authority in the Kingdom of *France*,  
 every Movement which they might  
 make must be very dangerous.

NOR was the King's Mother, under  
 so much Care and Fatigue, out of Love Conduct of the La-  
 to her Son, and a Regard to the Dan- dy Regent in France.  
 gers of the Kingdom, without her own  
 proper Passions: For being ambitious,  
 and most tenacious of Government,  
 tho' she was apprehensive that, if the  
 King's Deliverance should be protracted,  
 and some new Difficulties should arise  
 in *France*, she might be constrained to  
 resign the Administration to those who  
 should be commissioned by the States  
 of the Kingdom, yet in the Midst of  
 so much Concern and Perturbation, re-  
 collecting her Spirits, and encouraging  
 those who were about her, besides  
 making Provisions as soon as possible  
 for the Defence of the Frontiers of  
*France*, and for raising vast Sums of  
 Money, as Lady Regent, by whose  
 Order, and in whose Name all public Bu-  
 siness was dispatched, she wrote supplica-

A. D.  
1525.  
She solli-  
cits her  
Son's Li-  
berty.

tory Letters, full of moving Expressions tending to excite Compassion, by first introducing, and then, by degrees, solliciting as much as she could a Treaty of Agreement. For this Purpose, a few Days after, she set at Liberty Don *Ugo di Moncada*, and sent him to *Cæsar* with Offers that her Son should renounce all Claims to the Kingdom of *Naples* and the State of *Milan*: That he was content to have the Title to *Burgundy* examined, and that if it was found to belong to *Cæsar* he would acknowledge it in the Name of his Sister's Dowry: That he would restore to *Bourbon* his State with his Movables which were of very great Value, and the Profits of it which had been seized by the Royal Chamber \*: That he would give him his Sister in Marriage, and consent that he should have *Provence*, if it should be judged that he had the better Right to it.

THAT these Negotiations might be the more facilitated, rather than with a Mind

\* Or confiscated for the King's Use.

Mind bent on War, the Regentess immediately dispatched proper Persons to *Italy*, to recommend the Safety of her Son to the Pope and *Venetians*, offering, if, for their own Preservation, they would enter into a strict Alliance with her, and take up Arms against *Cæsar*, Five Hundred Lances, and a large Contribution of Money. But her principal Desire, and that of the whole Kingdom of *France* should have been to mitigate the Spirit of the King of *England*, judging, as it was true, that not having him for an Enemy the Kingdom of *France* was out of Danger of being molested. But if that King on one Quarter, and *Cæsar* on another should make an Attack upon them, they would find themselves involved in Difficulties and Dangers. But in a little Time the Regentess began to conceive some Hopes from that Side: For tho' the King of *England*, on the first News of the Victory, had shewed extraordinary Tokens of Rejoicing, and publicly declared that he designed to pass into *France* in Person, and had also sent Ambassadors



A. D. 1525. *hassadors* to *Cæsar* to treat, and solicit him to carry on a War in Conjunction, yet at the same time, proceeding in the same Humour in which he had proceeded on other Occasions, he requested also of Madam the Regentess to send him over some proper Person. She immediately dispatched a Person with a very ample Commission, and a Charge to use all Submission and possible Arts to mitigate the Mind of that King.

Seeks  
Peace  
with  
England.

HENRY, directed wholly by the Counsels of the Cardinal of *York*, seemed to propose for his principal End the Cognisance and Arbitration of the Differences between the other Princes, that all the World might know that the Decision of the main Point of Affairs of Moment depended on him. Wherefore at the same time he offered to *Cæsar* to pass into *France* with a potent Army, and to put in Execution the Affairs which had some time since been agreed between them, and, to remove all Doubts, offered to consign his Daughter, not yet of Years fit for Matrimony, to *Cæsar's* Charge

Charge without Delay. But this Affair <sup>A. D. 1525.</sup> met with no small Obstruction, partly occasioned by himself, and partly proceeding from *Cæsar*, who was not so forward to agree with him as he had been in Times past. For that King demanded in a manner all the Reward of the Victory for his own Share, as *Picardy, Normandy, Guyenne, and Gascony*, with the Title of King of *France*, and that *Cæsar*, tho' the Rewards were unequal, should pass into *France* in Person, and bear an equal Share in the Costs and Danger. The Inequality of these Conditions shocked *Cæsar*, and much the more when he called to Mind that in the last Years, when *France* was in the greatest Danger, he had always slackened the Prosecution of the War against it: Whence he persuaded himself that no Stress could be laid on such an Alliance, and that, as he was greatly exhausted of Money, and tired out with so many Fatigues and Dangers, he had Reason to hope for obtaining more of the King of *France* by means of Peace, than with Force of Arms, by acting in

Estrangement between *Cæsar* and the King of England.

Con-

A. D. Conjunction with the King of *England*.

1525.

Induced therefore by a Desire of having Children, and furnishing himself with Money, he had an Inclination to espouse the Sister of *John* King of *Portugal*, of an Age fit for Matrimony, with whom he expected to receive in Dowry a very large Sum of Money; and considerable Contributions, in case the Match should take Effect were offered by his own People, who were desirous to have a Queen of the same Language and Nation, and who was likely to be soon a Mother.

FROM these Causes the Negotiations between the two Princes meeting every Day with new Difficulties, to which must be added the Inclination which the Cardinal of *York* continually bore to the King of *France*, and the Complaints which he openly made of *Cæsar*, as well for the Interest of his King, as because he thought him beginning to fall into Contempt with *Cæsar*. For that Prince, before the Battle of *Pavia*, had never used to send him any Letters but such as were writ-

ten

ten all with his own Hand, and subscribed “Your Son and Cousin *Charles* ;” A. D. 1525. but since that Victory he had sent him Letters in which was nothing written with his own Hand except the Subscription, which was no longer in Titles that betokened so much Reverence and Submission, but barely his own proper Name “*Charles*.” On these Accounts the King of *England* received the Person sent by Madam the Regentess with very kind Words, and Marks of Respect ; and, encouraging her to hope well of future Events, not long after he totally abandoned *Cæsar*’s Interest, and entered into an Alliance with Madam, who contracted in the Name of her Son, in which he caused to be inserted an express Condition, that it should not be lawful to yield, even tho’ it were for the Deliverance of the King, any Thing that was at that Time belonging to the Kingdom of *France*. Confederacy between France and England.

THESE were the first Dawnings of Hope on the distressed Country of *France*, when she began to take Breath after her se-

vere



A. D. vere Trials and Afflictions; and this

1525.

Insolence  
of the Im-  
perialists.

Hope was afterwards continually increased by the Conduct of the *Cæsarean* Generals in *Italy*. These Commanders, grown most insolent by so great a Victory, and flattering themselves that all Men must submit, and all Difficulties give Way to their Will and Pleasure, lost the Opportunity of an Agreement with the *Venetians*, violated their Engagements to the Pontiff, and filled him, and the Duke of *Milan*, and all *Italy* with Jealousies, scattering Seeds of new Disturbances, which at last brought *Cæsar* under a Necessity of taking a precipitous Resolution, to the very great endangering of his State in *Italy*, had it not been over-ruled by his old good Fortune, and the most malignant Fate of the Pontiff; Points certainly most worthy of particular Notice, because from such memorable Events are understood the Counsels and Foundations preparatory to them, which are often secret, and many times divulged in a Way and Manner very far distant from the Truth.

THE

THE Pontiff then had hardly capitulated with the Viceroy, when he received large Offers from *France*, to incite him to a War; and tho' there were not wanting Encouragements from many to the same Purpose, and the Distrust which he had before conceived of the Imperialists was not diminished, yet he resolved to proceed in all Affairs after such a Manner as to give no Cause for entertaining any Suspicion of his Actions. Wherefore as soon as he understood that the Viceroy had accepted and published the Convention that was made in *Rome*, he caused it to be also published in *St. John Lateran*, without waiting the Arrival of the promised Ratification of *Cæsar*, for the more effectual Demonstration of his Mind, honouring the Publication, which was made the first of *May*, with his Presence, and the Solemnity used at his Coronation. He solicited the *Florentines* to pay the Money they had promised, and employed all his Interest to bring the *Venetians* into an Agreement with the

Im-

The Pope  
aggrieved  
by them.

A. D. 1525. Imperialists, who, on the other hand, gave him many just Causes of Complaint. For they would not accept, in Part of the Money promised, the Twenty Five Thousand Ducats paid by the *Florentines* according to his Orders while the Agreement was under Negotiation, the Viceroy having the Conscience to pretend that if it had been stipulated otherwise it had been done without his Commission. The Soldiers also had not evacuated the Dominions of the Church, but, on the contrary, the *Piacentine* was full of Garrisons. To these Grievances from the *Cæsareans*, which perhaps might in some measure be excused by the Want of Money and Quarters, was added that not only in the Change of the State of *Siena*, they gave Suspicions of Disaffection to the Pontiff, but afterwards suffered the Citizens of the *Monte de' Nove* to be abused, and spoiled of their Goods by the *Liber-tines*, tho', on his frequent Complaints, they had given him Hopes of Redress. But what above all Things gave him most Uneasiness was the Viceroy's hearken-

kening to the Duke of *Ferrara*, and giving him Hopes that he would not

A. D.

1525.

compel him to evacuate *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and to prevail with *Cæsar* to take his State under his Protection, tho' he had every Day promised the Pontiff that as soon as the *Florentines* had finished their Payments he would put him in Possession of those Towns. The Pontiff, to solicit the Accomplishment, and to obtain that the Troops should evacuate the State of the Church, sent to him Cardinal *Salviati*, his Legate in *Lombardy*, and deputed Legate to *Cæsar*. The Viceroy assured the Cardinal that he would make the Duke restore *Reggio* by Force of Arms, if he refused to do it voluntarily; but the Effects did by no means correspond with his Words, which, being a Point not excusable by a Want of Money, for there would be a larger Sum coming to him on account of the Restitution of those Towns, gave Room for probable Conjectures that it proceeded either from a Desire to humble the Pope, or to gain over the Duke of



*A. D. Ferrara*, or from a Design, which they  
 1525. constantly had in View, to oppress the  
 Liberties of *Italy*.

THESE Things gave Suspicion, and almost incredible Vexation of Mind to the Pontiff, which were much exasperated by his imagining that these Proceedings were conformable to the Will of *Cæsar*. That Prince, having sent the Pontiff the Letters of Ratification of the Confederacy made in his Name by the Viceroy, delayed to ratify the Three Articles stipulated separately from the Capitulation; alledging that, as to the Restitution of the Towns held by the Duke of *Ferrara*, it was not in his Power to prejudice the Rights of the Empire, nor use Force with that Duke, who declared that he held them in Fee from the Empire. He proposed therefore that this Difference should be decided by a Trial at Law, or by an amicable Composition; and it was understood that he would have been well pleased that the Towns should remain to the Duke under his Investiture, for which

*Cæsar* re-  
 jects the  
 separate  
 Articles of  
 the Trea-  
 ty with  
 the Pope.

which he should pay him One Hundred Thousand Ducats, paying also to the Pontiff the like Sum for the Investiture of *Ferrara*, and for the Penalty charged on the Contract which he had made with *Adrian*. He alledged that it was impertinent to make an Agreement with his Ministers about supplying the Dutchy of *Milan* with Salt; because the head Profits of that Dutchy, by the Investiture, which is granted, tho' not yet consigned, belonged to *Francesco Sforza*: And therefore the Viceroy had not bound himself simply in the Article to bring *Sforza* under an Obligation to take the Salt, but to procure his Consent; which Promise, including in it the Act of a Third Person, was notoriously, as to any Effect of obliging either himself or others, null and invalid. However, out of a Desire to gratify the Pontiff, he would have brought it about that the Duke should give his Consent, had not the Affair no longer concerned his own Interest, but that of another, because the Duke of *Milan*, in Recompense for the Assistance he had received from the

A. D.

1525.

A. D.

1525.

Archduke, had agreed to take the Salt of him; and that he would yet interpose his Endeavours that his Brother, on receiving in Compensation a handsome Sum of Money, should give his Consent, not for Perpetuity, as was expressed in the Article, but during the Life of the Pontiff. Nor did he admit of the Article relating to Benefices, unless to what was expressed in the Investiture were added the Clause, "what had been practised by the Kings his Predecessors."

ON account of these Difficulties the Pope refused to accept the Letters of Ratification, and to send his own to *Cæsar*, demanding that, since *Cæsar* had not ratified within the Term of Four Months, according to the Promise of the Viceroy, the *Florentines* should be reimbursed the One Hundred Thousand Ducats. To this Demand he received an Answer, rather captious and cavilling than reasonable and solid: That the Condition of the Restitution of the One Hundred Thousand Ducats was not inserted

serted in the Instrument, but promised, *A. D.*  
 in a separate Article, by the Agents of <sup>1525.</sup>  
 the Viceroy, with an Oath, nor had  
 any Reference to the Ratification of  
 the Confederacy, which *Cæsar* had ra-  
 tified within the Term of Four Months,  
 and sent the Letters of Ratification in  
 due Form. The Pontiff also came to  
 have Notice that the Talk of all the  
 Court of *Cæsar* fully discovered their <sup>The Pope</sup>  
 evil Disposition towards the Affairs of <sup>apprehen-</sup>  
*Italy*, and he knew also that the Gene- <sup>sive of</sup>  
 rals of his Army went about to per- <sup>*Cæsar's*</sup>  
 suade him that, in order to secure <sup>Power.</sup>  
*Italy* wholly to himself, it was the best Way  
 to cause *Modena* to be restored to the  
 Duke of *Ferrara*, to reinstate the *Ben-*  
*tivogli* in *Bologna*, and to take upon  
 himself the Dominion of *Florence*, *Siena*,  
 and *Lucca*, as Towns appertaining to  
 the Empire Finding himself therefore  
 full of Anxiety and Suspicion, and at a  
 Loss where to apply for Support, and be-  
 ing apprised that the *French* offered to  
 give up *Italy* as a Prey to *Cæsar*, he  
 was of necessity obliged to have recourse  
 to Temporising and Dissimulation.



## THE HISTORY OF

THE Pontiff was at this Time employed in negotiating an Accommodation between the *Venetians* and the Viceroy, who, besides obliging themselves anew to defend the Dutchy of *Milan* for the future, demanded of them a very large Sum of Money by way of Satisfaction for Non-observance of the past Confederacy. Many were the Reasons which inclined the *Venetians* to yield to Necessity, many which, on the contrary, moved them to stand in Suspense; so that their Counsels were variable, and full of Irresolution. At last however, after many Disputes, astonished, like the rest, at so great a Victory of *Cæsar*, and seeing themselves standing alone and destitute on all Sides, they commissioned their Ambassador *Pietro da Pesaro*, who resided with the Viceroy, to confirm the League anew, in the same Manner as it had been done before, but paying *Cæsar*, in Satisfaction for what was past, Eighty Thousand Ducats. But the Viceroy farther insisting, and absolutely determining not to renew the

Con-

Confederacy unless they paid One Hundred Thousand, it happened, as it often falls out in Affairs which are debated with an ill Will, that so much Time was spent in disputing about this small Sum, that the *Venetians* received Notice that the King of *England* was no longer so much incensed against the *French* as had been hitherto apprehended; and besides, such a Multitude of *German* Foot in the Imperial Army, after Payment of their Arrears, were dismissed, that the *Venetian* Senate, secure of not being molested for the present, resolved to stand a little longer in Suspense, and to reserve to themselves, as much as possible, the Liberty of taking such Resolutions as, from the universal Progress of Affairs, they should conclude to be most for their Advantage.

A. D.  
1525.

Treaty  
between  
the Vice-  
roy and  
*Venetians*  
miscarried

THESE Causes, besides a constant Desire to put the Thing in Execution, stimulated the Viceroy and the other Generals to remove the Person of the *French* King into a secure Place, judg-

A. D.  
1525.

ing that, from the bad Disposition of all around them, they could not keep him without Danger in the Dutchy of *Milan*. They resolved therefore to conduct him to *Genoa*, and from thence by Sea to *Naples*, in order to confine him in *Castel Nuovo*, where an Apartment was already prepared for him. The King was extreamly concerned at this Resolution, for it had been his ardent Desire from the Beginning to be conducted to *Spain*, flattering himself, I know not whether from imagining the natural Disposition of others the same with his own, or because Men are apt to deceive themselves with vain Hopes of what they eagerly desire, that, if he were once admitted to *Cæsar's* Presence, he could, either trusting to his Goodness, or by the Conditions he intended to propose to him, easily prevail upon him to set him at Liberty. The Viceroy ardently desired the same for the Exaltation of his own Glory, but being restrained from executing his Design by Fear of the *French Fleet*, *Montmorency*, by common Consent, was dispatched to Madam the

Re-

Regentess, and obtaining of her Six <sup>A. D.</sup> Light Gallies of those that were in the <sup>1525.</sup> Port of *Marseilles*, on a Promise that, as soon as the King was arrived in *Spain*, they should be restored, he returned with them to *Porto Fino*, whither the Person of the King was already conducted. These Gallies, joined with Sixteen others of *Cæsar's*, that had at first been designed to convey him to *Naples*, and all manned with *Spanish* Foot, on the Seventh Day of *June* set Sail, steering their Course for *Spain* (while <sup>King of</sup> not only the *Italian* Princes, but all the <sup>France</sup> Imperial Generals, and *Bourbon*, assured <sup>conducted</sup> to *Spain*. themselves that the King was on his Voyage to *Naples*) and, after a prosperous Navigation, arrived in Eight Days at *Roses*, a Port of *Catalonia*, to the inexpressible Joy of *Cæsar*, who knew nothing till that Day of this Resolution. On the first Notice of the King's Arrival he gave Orders that, in all Places through which he passed, he should be received with the greatest Honours; but took Care however, till it should be otherwise determined, that he should be



A. D. <sup>1525.</sup> he kept under safe Custody, in the Castle of *Sciativa* near *Valentia*, a Castle appropriated by the Kings of *Aragon*, in antient Times, to the Imprisonment of great Men, and in which the Duke of *Calabria* had last of all for many Years been confined. But this Resolution appearing too rigorous to the Viceroy, and very different from the Promises he had made the King in *Italy*, he obtained of *Cæsar*, by his Letters, that, till a new Resolution, he should have a Residence in a Country Seat near *Valentia*, where he had the Convenience of Hunting and other Diversions. After the Viceroy had settled him in this Place under a sufficient Guard, leaving with him General *Alarcone*, in whose Custody he had continually remained, he waited, together with *Montmorency*, on *Cæsar*, to report to him the State of *Italy*, and of Affairs hitherto debated with the King, advising him, for many Reasons, to think seriously of coming to some Agreement with him, since he could expect no sincere Friendship, nor faithful Alliance from the *Italians*.

*Cæsar*

*Cæsar* therefore, after he had heard the Viceroy and *Montmorency*, resolved that the King of *France* should be conducted to *Castile*, and confined in the Castle of *Madrid*, a Place at a great Distance from the Sea, and from the Borders of *France*, where, tho' he was treated with all the Ceremonies and Reverence due to so great a Prince, he was under careful and strict Custody, with Leave to ride out several Times in a Day on a Mule. Nor did *Cæsar* consent to admit him into his Presence till an Agreement should either be settled, or brought to such a Forwardness as should give certain Hopes of settling it. And that this Agreement should be negotiated by an honourable Person, and in Effect the same as the King, *Montmorency* was dispatched with Speed to *France*, to procure the Coming of the Dutches of *Alençon*, the King's Sister, a Widow, with full Power to conclude an Accommodation; and, to prevent all Obstacles from new Difficulties, a Truce was soon after made between *Cæsar* and the Government of *France* till the End  
of

A. D.

1525.

A. D. of *December* next ensuing. *Cæsar* also  
 1525. ordered that Part of the Gallies which  
 came with the Viceroy should return  
 to *Italy*, for conveying the Duke of  
*Bourbon* to *Spain*, without whose Pre-  
 sence he declared he would make no  
 Agreement; but the Gallies for Want  
 of Money were but slowly equipped.

CÆSAR seeming much disposed to an  
 universal Peace among Christians, and  
 at the same time to put in Order the  
 Affairs of *Italy*, solicited with many In-  
 stances the Pontiff to hasten the De-  
 parture of Cardinal *Salviati*, or of  
 other proper Persons, with full Powers.  
 And as he had determined to join in  
 Matrimony with the Infanta of *Portu-  
 gal*, his Cousin-German, and conse-  
 quently related to him in the second  
 Degree, he dispatched *Lopes Urtado* to  
 the Pontiff, to demand a Dispensation,  
 having first excused himself to the King  
 of *England*, by declaring that he knew  
 not how to resist the Will of his Peo-  
 ple. By the same *Lopes*, who set out  
 at the End of *July*, he sent the Privi-  
 leges

*Cæsar*  
 sues for a  
 Dispensa-  
 tion to  
 marry his  
 Cousin-  
 German.



## THE WARS IN ITALY.


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leges of the Investiture of the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Francesco Sforza*, on Condition of his paying down One Hundred Thousand Ducats, and obliging himself to pay Five Hundred Thousand more at different Times, and to take Salt from the Archduke his Brother. He also carried Orders for all the Troops in the Marquisate of *Saluzzo*, except the *Spanish* Foot, to be disbanded, that Six Hundred Men at Arms should return to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the rest remain in the Dutchy of *Milan*, and that the Marquis of *Pescara* should be Captain General of the Army. To these Orders *Cæsar* added that a Sum of Money which he had remitted to *Genoa* for fitting out Four Caragues, with an Intention of passing immediately into *Italy* in Person, should be appropriated to the Use of the Army, for he had determined not to leave *Spain* at present, and that the Protonotary *Caracciolo* should repair from *Milan* to *Venice*, with a Commission to induce that Senate to a new Confederacy, or at least that every one

might

A. D.

1525.



His Or-  
ders.



*A. D.* might be satisfied that all his Actions  
 1525. tended to the universal Peace of Christians.

Pope and  
*Venetians*  
 uneasy at  
 the Removal  
 of the  
 King of  
*France.*

BUT the Removal of the King of *France* into *Spain* had given very great Uneasiness to the Pope and the *Venetians*, because, as the Army of *Cæsar* was pretty much diminished, it appeared to them that, in whatever Part of *Italy* the King's Person was confined, the Necessity of keeping him well guarded would sufficiently embarrass the *Cæsareans*; whence either some Opportunity might easily present itself for setting him at Liberty, or at least the Difficulty of conducting him to *Spain*, or the little Security of holding him in *Italy*, would constrain *Cæsar* to model the public Affairs by the Patterns of Honour and Justice. But when they saw that he was gone for *Spain*, and that he himself, deceived with vain Hopes by his Enemies, had furnished hem with the Means for conveying him into a secure Prison, they perceived that whatever was the Subject of Treaties or Debates

was

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was absolutely in the Power of *Cæsar*, and that nothing could be founded on the Negotiations and Offers of the *French*. Hence *Cæsar's* Reputation every Day increasing, the Laws of all Proceedings were begun to be expected from that Court.

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NOR am I certain whether the Duke of *Bourbon*, and the Marquis of *Pesca-*  
*ra* were not, tho' for different Reasons, as much dissatisfied that the Viceroy had, without their Knowledge, conducted the most Christian King to *Spain*: *Bourbon*, because, finding himself driven out of *France* on account of the Friendship which he had contracted with the Emperor, it more concerned him than any other to be present at all the Negotiations for an Agreement; and therefore he was disposed to pass also himself into *Spain*, but being necessitated to wait the Return of the Gallies which were gone with the Viceroy, he delayed his Departure longer than he could have wished: And the Marquis was  
not

The same  
creates  
Misunder-  
standings  
between  
*Cæsar's*  
Generals.

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Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
dissatisfied  
on what  
Grounds.

not only provoked at his being slighted by the Viceroy, but also dissatisfied with *Cæsar* for not acknowledging, as he fancied, in a due Proportion, his Merits, and the noble Exploits performed by him in the late Wars, and especially in the Battle of *Pavia*, from which Victory he had acquired more Glory than all the rest of the Generals; and yet it seemed to him that *Cæsar* was lavish enough of his Acknowledgments to the Viceroy, bestowing on him all his Praises, and Marks of Esteem. This the Marquis no longer able to bear, wrote Letters to *Cæsar* full of most bitter Invectives against the Viceroy, complaining that he had been undeservedly slighted by him to such a Degree as not to be thought worthy to be at least privy to such a Resolution; and that if Matters had been ordered, and Measures taken in pursuance of the Viceroy's Counsels and Determination, not only the King of *France* would not have been taken, but as soon as *Milan* was lost the *Cæsarean* Army would have abandoned the Defence of  
*Lombardy*,

*Lombardy*, and retired to *Naples*: That <sup>A. D.</sup> he was gone to triumph for a Victory <sup>1525.</sup> in which it was notorious to the whole Army that he had no Share; and that being in the Heat of the Battle he lost all Courage and Counsel, and was heard by many to cry out several Times, “We are undone;” which, if he should deny it, he offered himself ready to prove to his Face, according to the military Laws, with Arms in Hand. The Discontent of the Marquis was increased, because when, immediately after the Victory, he had sent to take Possession of *Carpi*, with an Intention to obtain that Town of *Cæsar* for himself, his Desire was frustrated, because *Cæsar*, having granted it to *Prospero Colonna* two Years before, declared that, tho’ he had never received the Investiture, he was resolved, for the Benefit of *Vespasiano* his Son, to preserve to the Memory of *Prospero* dead that Reward which he had given to the Merit and Services of him living. This Reason, tho’ it was just and grateful, and the Marquis ought to have been pleased with Examples of Gratitude,



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tude, if on no other account, yet because they increased the Hopes that his great Services would in time come to be rewarded, had however no Effect upon him. For, as he had a high Opinion of himself, he thought it fit that this Desire in him, sprung from a covetous Ambition, and an implacable Hatred borne to the Name of *Prospero*, should be preferred to all other, tho' never so just, Regards. Wherefore he made most heavy Complaints against *Cæsar* and the whole Council, and lamented his Case so publicly in *Italy*, and with such Detestations of *Cæsar's* Ingratitude, as gave Encouragement to others to attempt the Execution of new Projects. Hence was *Cæsar*, even if he had entertained no Thoughts of making any farther Seizures in *Italy*, furnished with a just Cause, and in a manner necessitated to form new Schemes; and even, supposing that he had ambitious Ends, he had Opportunities of covering them with the most plausible Pretences, and most specious Colourings that his Heart could have wished; and because this was the  
Origin

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Origin of very great Movements, it is <sup>A. D.</sup> necessary that it should be very particu- <sup>1525.</sup> larly explained.

THE War which, in the Time of <sup>Causes of</sup> *Leo X.* was commenced by him and <sup>new Com-</sup> *Cæsar* for driving the King of *France* <sup>motions</sup> *in Italy.* out of *Italy*, was undertaken under Pre-  
tence of restoring *Francesco Sforza* to  
the Dutchy of *Milan*; and tho' in the  
Execution of it, after the Victory was  
obtained, he was put in Possession of  
that State, and of the Castle of *Milan*,  
and of the other Fortresses as soon as  
they were recovered, yet, from the  
Splendor and flourishing State of that  
Dutchy, and the Conveniency of its Situa-  
tion, many were still apprehensive, as  
they had been from the Beginning, that  
*Cæsar* aspired to the Sovereignty, fancy-  
ing to themselves that the powerful  
Opposition which he met with from the  
King of *France* was the Cause that as  
yet he concealed his ambitious Desire,  
because he would otherwise have put  
the People in a Ferment, who were  
ardently desirous of *Francesco Sforza*,

*A. D.* and have stirred up against him all  
 1525. *Italy*, which would by no means be satisfied at such an Increase of his Grandeur. *Francesco Sforza* therefore held that Dutchy, but under very great Subjection, and Burdens almost intolerable. For his whole Resort for defending himself against the *French* consisting in *Cæsar* and his Army, he was necessitated not only to respect him as his Prince, but also to stoop to the Will of his Generals, and was forced to maintain those Troops which were not paid by *Cæsar*, sometimes by giving them Money, which he drew from his Subjects with very great Strainings and Difficulties, sometimes by suffering them to live at Discretion, now in one Quarter, then in another of his State, except in the City of *Milan*. These Proceedings, tho' very grievous in themselves, were yet rendered intolerable by the Temper of the *Spaniards*, which is avaricious, fraudulent, and, when they have Room for displaying their natural Disposition, most insolent. The Dangers however which hung over the People  
 from

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from the *French*, to whom they were bitter Enemies, and the Hopes that their Troubles would some Time or other have an End, made them bear even beyond their Strength, and more than their Means would admit. But after the Victory of *Pavia* the People could no longer endure to see the same Necessities ceased, since the King was taken Prisoner, and yet to feel themselves labouring under the same Calamities, and therefore demanded that all or the greater Part of the Army should be removed out of that Dutchy. The Duke, who had hitherto enjoyed nothing of the Sovereignty but the bare Name, was eagerly desirous of the Removal, and the more because he apprehended that *Cæsar*, now secure of the King of *France*, would either seize on his State for himself, or grant it to Persons who should wholly depend on him. This Suspicion, which arose from the very Nature of Things, was not a little increased by the insolent Speeches thrown out by the Viceroy before he conducted the King of *France* into *Spain*, and also by the



A. D. 1525. other Generals, and by the Marks of  
 Disrespect which they shewed to the  
 Duke, as well as by their openly wish-  
 ing that *Cæsar* would oppress him, but  
 much more when *Cæsar* having, after  
 many Delays, put into the Hands of  
 the Viceroy the Articles of the Investi-  
 ture, that Minister, in offering it to the  
 Duke, had demanded that, for the Reim-  
 bursement of the Charges which *Cæsar*  
 had been at for the Acquisition and  
 Defence of that State, he should pay at  
 certain Times One Million and Two  
 Hundred Thousand Ducats: So exor-  
 bitant a Charge, that the Duke was oblig-  
 ed to have recourse to *Cæsar* for redu-  
 cing it to a tolerable Sum\*! But these  
 Difficulties raised a Doubt that those  
 extravagant Demands were interposed in  
 order to delay the Investiture. There  
 have since been alledged, by those who  
 have endeavoured to excuse *Francesco*  
*Sforza* from Necessity, many other  
 Causes

\* The Viceroy in making this Demand affirmed that it was not by way of Sale, for the Emperor had spent a greater Sum in acquiring that State. *Capilla.*

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Causes that justly raised his Suspicion, and particularly his having received Notice that the Generals had appointed to detain him, for which Reason, when he was called by the Viceroy to a certain Meeting, he had refused to go, feigning himself sick; and observed the same Caution as to all other Places where they had it in their Power to offer him Violence. This Suspicion, whether true or vain, was the Cause that when he saw there were but few Troops left in the Dutchy of *Milan*, Part of the *Spaniards* being gone, first with the Viceroy, and afterwards with *Bourbon* into *Spain*, and many also who had enriched themselves by such vast Plunder, having retired one after another into various Places, and considered also the high Indignation which appeared in the Marquis of *Pescara*, applying his Thoughts on securing himself from this Danger, he entered into Hopes that, with the Consent of the Marquis, he might get rid of the Army. The Author of this Counsel was *Girolamo Morone*, his Great Chancellor, and of the highest Authority

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A. D. 1525. rity with him, and for his Wit, Eloquence, Dexterity, Invention, and Experience, and for his often resisting, with the greatest Constancy, the Shocks of adverse Fortune, was a noted Man in our Times, and would have been more so, if those Talents had been accompanied with a greater Sincerity of Mind, a Love of Honesty and Justice, and with such a Maturity of Judgment, as that his Counsels had not been often rather precipitous or imprudent, than honourable and circumspect.

Character  
of Morone.

THIS Minister, founding the Mind of the Marquis in their private Conference, pushed the Matter so far that they had under Debate the cutting those Troops in Pieces, and making the Marquis King of *Naples*, provided they could procure the Concurrence of the Pope and *Venetians*. The Pontiff, full of Suspicion and Anxiety, being consulted by the Direction of *Morone*, did not seem at all averse to the Project, but, on the other hand, not to discover the Plot, but to prepare himself a Refuge in case it

it did not succeed, under a Show of A. D. Affection, admonished *Cæsar* to keep <sup>1525.</sup> his Generals well contented. The *Venetians* embraced the Scheme with great Eagerness, and every one persuaded themselves they should find no less Readiness in the Mother of the King of *France*, who was already sensible that since her Son was arrived in *Spain* his Deliverance would not proceed with that Facility as had been imagined. It is not doubted but that such a Project would have succeeded, if the Marquis of *Pescara* had sincerely proceeded against *Cæsar*; but whether he hearkened to those Counsels at first, or not, there are various Opinions even among the *Spaniards*, and in the Court of *Cæsar* itself. The Generality, making an Estimate of the Times, and of the Movements of Affairs, have believed that, in the Beginning, he really concurred with the rest, but that afterwards, on considering the Multitude of Difficulties that might arise in Process of Time, and deterred especially by the continu-  
al



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al Negotiations of the *French* with *Cæsar*, and at last by the Resolution taken to send the Dutcheſs of *Alençon* to *Cæsar*, he took other Measures. Some go farther, and affirm that he ſo long delayed to give Notice to *Cæsar* of the Innovations that were contriving in *Italy*, till Advice of the Plot coming from *Antonio da Leva*, and *Marino* Abbot of *Nagera*, Commiſſary in the *Cæſarean* Army, all the Court ſtood amazed at the Silence of the Marquis. But, however the Caſe then ſtood, it is certain that not long after he ſent *Giovanni Battista Caſtaldo* to *Cæsar*, and laid open to him the whole Plot, and by his Conſent continued the ſame Practices; and, what is more, that he might dive into the Thoughts of every one, and deprive them of all Shifts and Power of ever denying that they had given their Conſent to the Plot, he undertook of himſelf to ſpeak of it to the Duke of *Milan*, and perſuaded *Morone* to uſe his Intereſt with the Pontiff, who had very lately conferred upon him the perpetual Government of the City of *Benevento*,

*nevento*, and with whom the Marquis himself corresponded with the greatest Professions of Friendship and Service, so far that his Holiness deputed *Domenico Sauli*, a *Genoese*, with a Brief of Credentials, to confer with him on the same Subject.

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League  
forming  
against  
Cæsar.

THE Articles under Debate were in Substance, That between the Pope, the Government of *France*, and other States of *Italy* should be contracted a League, of which the Marquis of *Pescara* was to be constituted Captain General; and that the said Marquis, after distributing the *Spanish* Infantry into Quarters in different Places in the Dutchy of *Milan*, should put himself at the Head of those who were willing to follow him, and that the rest with *Antonio da Leva*, who was next to him in Command, should be stripped and put to the Sword: And that the Enterprize on the Kingdom of *Naples* should be undertaken by the joint Forces of all the Confederates in favour of the Marquis, on whom the Pope was to confer the Investiture.

To

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To all this the Marquis seemed to interpose no other Difficulty than that he was willing, before he ventured any farther, to be well satisfied that he could undertake such an Enterprize without staining his Honour and Loyalty, in case it should be commanded him by the Pope. On this Point it came to be considered, to whom the Marquis, who was a Native, and a Baron of the Kingdom of *Naples*, owed most Obedience, whether to *Cæsar*, who, by the Investiture of the Church, had the Profits of the Dominion of that Kingdom, or to the Pontiff, who, by virtue of being supreme Lord, had the direct Dominion. On this Article, both at *Milan*, by Order of *Francesco Sforza*, and at *Rome*, by Appointment of the Pope, the ablest Civilians were consulted very privately, with a Suppression of the true Names.

THE Hopes conceived against *Cæsar* were increased by the Offers of the Princess Regent, who imagining that *Cæsar's* Necessities, or at least his Fears would

would promote the Treaty that was in A. D. 1525. Agitation for the Delivery of her Son, solicited the taking up Arms, promising to send into *Lombardy* Five Hundred Lances, and to contribute a great Sum of Money towards the Expences. Nor was *Morone* wanting to confirm the Minds of the rest in this Resolution ; for, besides demonstrating the Facility, even without the Assistance of the Marquis of *Pescara*, of destroying that Army, which was considerably diminished in Number, he promised, in the Name of the Duke, that if the Marquis did not stand firm to the Measures concerted, as soon as the other Designs were in Readiness, he should be secured in the Castle together with the other Commanders who daily resorted thither to consult. Though these Opportunities appeared very promising, they would not have been thought by the Pontiff sufficient to induce him to take up Arms without the Marquis of *Pescara*, if, at the same time, he had not heard that Provisions were ordered to *Genoa* for fitting out Four Caragues,  
and



A. D. and had also received Information from  
 1525. *Spain* of *Cæsar's* Inclination to pass in-  
 to *Italy*. These Advices creating him  
 vast Uneasiness, both from the Condi-  
 tion of the present Times, and from  
 the inveterate Disposition of the *Roman*  
 Pontiffs, to whom nothing used to be  
 more dreadful than the Coming of *Ro-*  
*man* Emperors armed into *Italy*, out of  
 a Desire to obviate that Danger, he  
 dispatched, with Consent of the *Vene-*  
*tians*, privately to *France*, one *Sigismondo*,  
 Secretary to *Alberto da Carpi*, a Per-  
 son of Dexterity, and a great Confident  
 of the Pope, in order to conclude the  
 Treaty negotiated with Madam the Re-  
 gentess. *Sigismondo*, riding Post, was  
 murdered in the Night by some High-  
 waymen, near the *Lago d' Iseo*, in the Ter-  
 ritory of *Brescia*. This Accident not  
 coming to Light for many Days, the  
 Pontiff much doubted that the Man had  
 been way-laid, and taken privately into  
 some Place by Orders of the Imperial  
 Generals, and perhaps of the Marquis  
 himself, whose Proceedings, on account  
 of

Pope's  
 Envoy to  
*France*  
 murdered

of the Delays which he interposed, began to be much suspected.

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IN this State of Affairs arrived Dispatches given by *Cæsar* to *Lopes Urtado*, who lying sick in *Savoy*, sent them by a proper Messenger to *Milan*, with Letters Patent, vesting the Office of Captain General in the Person of the Marquis of *Pescara*, who, to continue in the same Dissimulation with the others, pretended that he was not very well pleased with his Advancement, tho' he immediately accepted of the Patent. He carried also a Commission to the Protonotary *Caracciolo* to repair to *Venice* in the Name of *Cæsar*, for inducing that Senate to a new Confederacy, or at least for satisfying all Persons of *Cæsar's* Desire to live in Peace with all Christian Powers. *Francesco Sforza*, who began already to labour under a dangerous Disorder, accepted of the Investiture of the Dutchy, and paid towards the Cost Fifty Thousand Ducats, but did not on that account break off the Negotiation begun with the Marquis.

Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
made  
Captain  
General.

VARIOUS

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Dubious  
Step of  
*Cæsar*.

VARIOUS were the Opinions whether these Dispatches or Instructions of *Cæsar* were sincere or artificial; for many believed that it was not his real Intention to give Peace to *Italy*: Others doubted that, under Fear of new Movements, he was willing to keep Men under Suspense with various Hopes, and thought of gaining Time by granting the Investiture, and giving in Appearance a Commission for calling off the Army, which would be highly acceptable to all *Italy*, but that he had given private Orders to his Generals not to remove the Troops. Nor were there wanting afterwards some who persuaded themselves that *Cæsar* was before well informed by the Marquis of *Pescara* of the Plot carried on with *Morone*, and had therefore given such Orders, not that they should be obeyed, but should serve for his Justification, and by these Hopes to lull the Minds of the People in Security till a proper Time appeared for putting his Designs in Execution. It being very difficult,  
in

in so doubtful a Case, to come to the Knowledge of the Truth, especially since it is not known whether at the Time when *Giovanni Battista Castaldo*, sent by the Marquis to make a Discovery of the Plot, arrived at the Court, *Lopes Urtado* had been as yet dispatched; but, considering the Steps taken afterwards by *Cæsar* in many Affairs, it is without Doubt less fabulous to adopt for Truth the better and more favourable Interpretation.

THE Marquis in the mean time continued to entertain *Morone* and the rest with the same Hopes, and yet to delay the Execution under various Pretences, for which he had an Opportunity given him by the Sickneſs of the Duke of *Milan*, which increased to such a Degree that every one expected his Death. For all the Generals pretending that in such a Case that State would revert to *Cæsar*, the supreme Lord of the Fief, the Marquis would not only be prevented from removing the Army, but be under a Necessity of sending for Two

Marquis  
of *Pescara*  
continues  
his Diffi-  
cultation.



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Thousand more *German* Foot, and to give Orders for keeping in Readiness a greater Number. Such a powerful Body of Forces quartered in the Dutchy of *Milan*, he alledged, would deprive him of the Means of disbanding or injuring them, but gave them Hopes that he would execute the Measures concerted between them as soon as ever it lay in his Power. In the mean time, while an Opportunity was expected, to declare to the World, by his Proceedings, the profound Reverence he had for the Pontiff, he freed the State of the Church from the Garrisons of which his Holiness had made such heavy Complaints.

BUT at the same time a new Accident that happened in *Spain* had like to have introduced a new Scene of Affairs: For the King of *France*, extremely mortified at *Cæsar's* refusing to afford him his Presence when he requested it, took it so much to Heart that he fell into a Disorder while he was in the Castle of *Madrid*, which reduced him to such Extremity, that the Physicians

King of  
*France*  
sick and  
recovers.

Physicians appointed to attend him signified to *Cæsar* that there were no Hopes of his Recovery if he himself did not come in Person to comfort him, and give him Hopes of his Liberty. While he was proposing to go, his Great Chancellor dissuaded him, telling him that his Honour required him not to go thither, unless with a Disposition to release him immediately, and without any Sort of Convention: Otherwise it would be not a royal but mercenary Humanity, and a Desire to procure his Recovery not out of a Tenderness of his Health, but purely from a Regard to Self-interest, and a Fear of losing by his Death the Opportunity of reaping the Fruits expected from the Victory: Advice certainly deserving Remembrance, and worthy to be accepted by so great a Prince; but others counselling him to the contrary, he set out Post to pay the King a Visit. The Visitation was but short, because the most Christian King lay, in a manner, at the Point of Death, but full of kind Words, and certain Assurances of Release immediately upon Recovery.

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very. And, whatever was the Cause, whether the Consolation which he received, or that Youth was of itself superior to the Nature of the Disorder, he began after this Visit to find such Relief, that in a few Days he was out of Danger, tho' he was but slow in recovering his former Health.

BUT neither the Difficulties which appeared on the Part of *Cæsar*, nor the Hopes given by the *Italians*, had diverted the Journey of Madame d' *Alençon* to *Spain*, because nothing was more difficult to the *French* than to break off the Negotiations for an Agreement with those who had it in their Power to restore them their King; and nothing more easy to *Cæsar* than by feeding the *French* with Hopes to divert them from the Thoughts of taking up Arms, and by this Artfulness to keep the *Italians* in Suspense, so that they should not venture to take new Resolutions: And thus sometimes by slackening, sometimes by straining the Reins of his Conduct, he

Artful  
Conduct  
of *Cæsar*.

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he held the Minds of all in Confusion and Perplexity.

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1525.

MADAME *d' Alençon* met with the Marks of a gracious Reception, and Hopes from *Cæsar*, but the Success of her Affair proved hard and difficult. For in a Conference on the Fourth Day of *October*, when she requested of him his Widow Sister in Marriage for the King, *Cæsar* answered her Demand by saying that it was not in his Power without the Consent of the Duke of *Bourbon*. The other Particulars were debated by Commissioners appointed on each Side, *Cæsar* obstinately insisting on the Restitution of *Burgundy* as his proper Inheritance, and the *French* not consenting unless he would either receive it in Dowry, or have it legally tried to which of the two Princes it belonged; in the other Conditions the Parties might have easily come to an Agreement. But there remaining so wide a Difference between them in the Affair of *Burgundy*, Madam *d' Alençon* at last returned into *France*, without ob-

taining



A. D. 1525. taining any other End by her Journey  
 Madam than the Opportunity of seeing her  
 d' Alençon Brother, who, at parting with her, de-  
 returns to spairing now more than ever of his  
 France Liberty, is said to have ordered her to  
 without recommend, on his Part, to his Mother  
 Success. and those of the Council, a strict Re-  
 gard to the Honour and Benefit of  
 the Crown of *France*, without any Con-  
 sideration of his Person any more than  
 if he were dead. The Negotiations,  
 however, were not interrupted by her  
 Departure, for there remained the Pre-  
 sident of *Paris*, with the Bishops of  
*Ambrun* and *Tarbe*, who had been treat-  
 ing till now, but with small Hopes,  
*Cæsar* not hearkening to any Condition  
 without the Restitution of *Burgundy*, nor  
 the King consenting to yield it up with-  
 out the utmost Necessity.

Cardinal At this Time arrived at Court Car-  
 Salviati dinal *Salviati*, the Pope's Legate: He  
 Pope's Legate to was received by *Cæsar* with very great  
 Cæsar. Honour, and began to treat of the  
 Heads of his Commission, which princi-  
 pally contained the Ratification of the  
 Articles

Articles stipulated by the Viceroy, soliciting also the Grant of the Investiture to the Duke of *Milan* for the common Security. But the Viceroy himself dissuaded the Restitution of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and by his Advice, and encouraged by the Hopes he had given him, the Duke of *Ferrara*, desirous of managing his own Cause at the Court of *Cæsar*, having obtained of the Pontiff a Promise that his State should not be molested by him for six Months, took a Progress as far as the Borders of the Kingdom of *France*, with a Resolution to pass forwards; but the Regentess refusing him a Pass, he returned at last to *Ferrara*.

THERE came also on the Carpet the Cause, between the Pontiff and *Cæsar*, of obtaining a Dispensation for enabling *Cæsar* to join in Matrimony with the Sister of the King of *Portugal*, whom he was determined to marry, tho' he had formerly promised the King of *England* with an Oath, that he would never take any other for his Wife than

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that King's Daughter. The Pontiff proceeded but slowly in granting this Dispensation; being perswaded by many that the Desire of obtaining this Favour would render *Cæsar* more easy of Compliance in the Points under Debate; or at least that it was an imprudent Step, if a War should break out between them, to furnish him with Means for accumulating such a Mass of Money as he would certainly accumulate by this Matrimony; for the King of *Portugal* offered him in Dowry Nine Hundred Thousand Ducats, from which deducting that Part which by Agreement was to be allowed in Payment of Debts contracted by him to the King, it was supposed there would remain clear to him at least Five Hundred Thousand Ducats, besides Four Hundred Thousand Ducats, which, his own People consented to give him for what they called *Service-Money*, which, taking its Rise in antient Times from the Free Will of the People to succour the Necessities of their Kings, was reduced to an ordinary and stated Subsidy; and they offered

ed besides to give him Four Hundred A. D. 1525.  
 Thousand more in case he consummated this Matrimony. On the other side the Pontiff knew not how to resist the Importunities of the Duke of *Sessa*, the *Cæsarean* Ambassador: For you might Foible of Pope Clement. observe in him an almost constant Repugnance between the Disposition of Things and the Execution of them, since being by Nature extreamly averse from granting any Favour demanded of him, he knew not also how to raise Difficulties, or to refuse with Constancy, but often suffered his Will to be overcome by the Importunities of the Petitioners; so that seeming for the most part to grant what was requested more out of Fear than Favour, he did not proceed in this Part of his Conduct with that Constancy, nor with that Majesty which the Greatness of his Dignity, and the Importance of the Business under Negotiation required. Thus is happened with respect to the Dispensation that was demanded, where, amidst the inward Struggles of his own Interest on one Side, and his Softness on the other, he



A. D. <sup>1525.</sup> he eased himself, as his Custom was, on the Backs of others, of a Load which, I know not whether for want of Boldness, or Constancy of Resolution, he was unable to support himself. He expedited by a Brief the Dispensation in the Form demanded by *Cæsar*, and sent it to Cardinal *Salviati*, with an Order that, if his Affairs with *Cæsar* took a happy Turn, as he was made to believe they would, the Cardinal, as soon as he arrived at Court, should give the Brief to *Cæsar*; otherwise should keep it in his Custody: A Commission in which the Servant, as shall appear in its proper Place, shewed as much Weakness and Inconstancy as his Lord.

BUT while the Cardinal was negotiating with *Cæsar* on the Heads of his Instructions, and was continually fed with Hopes that they would be ratified according to his Desire, there fell out in *Lombardy* Events of a very different Tendency. For the Duke of *Milan* being relieved from his Disorder in such a manner as to make it believed that he

was

was at least out of Danger of dying soon, the Marquis of *Pescara*, who had Orders from *Cæsar* by *Castaldo* above-mentioned to provide against those Dangers by such Means as he thought most convenient, resolved to make himself Master of the Dutchy of *Milan*, under a Pretence that the Duke, by the Plot which he had carried on with the Assistance of *Morone*, had forfeited the Rights of Investiture, and that the Fief was reverted to *Cæsar*, the supreme Lord. The Marquis therefore being at *Novara*, tho' labouring under a considerable Disorder, Part of the Army being at *Pavia*, and the *Germans* quartered about *Lodi*, which two Cities he had caused to be fortified, sent unexpectedly for the Troops quartered in *Piedmont* and in the Marquisate of *Saluzzo*, which last they had seized soon after the Victory, to come to *Novara*, under colour of distributing them into Quarters through the whole State of *Milan*. He sent also for *Morone*, in whose Person, it may be said, consisted the Importance of every Thing ; for it was

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was certain that as soon as he should be secured the Duke of *Milan*, being left destitute of Men and Counsel, would make no Resistance; but while he was at Liberty it might be doubted that by his Parts, by his Experience, and by his Reputation, he would greatly obstruct the Execution of his Designs. It was also necessary that *Cæsar* should have in his Power the Person of *Morone*, who had been the Author and Instrument of all the secret Practices, that he might be enabled, from his Process, to justify the Charge against the Duke of *Milan*. There is nothing more difficult to avoid than Fate, and there is no Remedy against predestined Misfortunes. *Morone* might long since have known that what was concerted with the Marquis of *Pescara* would not take Effect, he knew that he was extreamly hated by all the *Spanish* Soldiers, who already talked very freely of his Unfaithfulness, and that *Antonio da Leva* had threatened in Public to have him assassinated. It is not to be supposed that he had not considered the Importance of his Person,

Person, and that he had not considered the melancholy Condition of the Duke of *Milan*, at that Time useleſs and of no more Signification than if he were dead. Not many Days before the Plotters had been in Suſpenſe, and full of Jealouſies among themſelves, every one adviſed him not to go, and he himſelf ſtood in doubt whether to go or not. And yet, whether he had his Mind ſtill poſſeſſed with the Diſſimulation and Artiſces of the Marquis, or relied on the great Friendſhip which he fancied he had contracted with him, or, truſting to his Word of Honour, which, as he ſaid afterwards, he had obtained of him in one of his Letters, or, to ſpeak more truly, drawn by that Neceſſity which drags along thoſe who will not ſuffer themſelves to be led, he reſolved to go as it were to a manifeſt Priſon: A Conduct to me the more ſurpriſing as I remember to have heard *Morone* ſay ſeveral Times in the Army, in the Time of *Leo*, that there was not a Man in *Italy* of greater Malignity, or of leſs Faith than the Marquis of *Pefcara*.



*A. D. 1525.* *cara. Morone* was kindly received by him, and they conferred together in a Chamber by themselves on the first Scheme of the Plot, and of cutting the Throats of the *Spaniards* and of *Antonio da Leva*, but in a Place where *Antonio*, whom the Marquis had concealed behind some Hangings of Tapestry, heard all the Discourse, and who, as soon as the Marquis was gone, it being the Fourteenth day of *October*, took *Morone* into Custody, and committed him to the Castle of *Pavia*, whither the Marquis himself went to examine him on the Particulars of what they had debated together, and where he gave an ample Detail of the whole Proceeding of the Conspiracy, accusing the Duke of *Milan* as privy to every Thing, which was the chief Point in View.

*Morone*  
made a  
Prisoner.

*Demands*  
*of the*  
*Marquis*  
*of Pescara*  
*on the*  
*Duke of*  
*Milan.* *MORONE* being imprisoned, the Marquis, who was before in Possession of *Lodi* and *Pavia*, demanded of the Duke that, for Security of the Emperor's State, he would give Orders for resigning into his Hands the City of *Cremona*, and the

the Fortresses of *Trezzo*, *Lecco*, and *Pizzichitone*, which, for their Situation on the Passes of the *Adda*, are accounted the Keys of the Dutchy of *Milan*, promising, on Compliance, to make no further Innovation. The Duke finding himself bare of every Thing, and destitute of Counsel and Hopes, immediately ordered the Places to be put into the Hands of the Marquis, who, after this was done, demanded farther to be admitted into the City of *Milan*, to confer, as he said, with the Duke; which was granted with the same Facility. As soon as he was entered *Milan* he sent to insist on the Delivery of the Castle of *Cremona*, not requiring that of *Milan*, because it was an improper Demand, since that Fortress was the Residence of the Duke's Person; he demanded however that, for the Security of *Cæsar's* Army, the Duke should consent that the Castle should be surrounded with an Entrenchment. Moreover he required him to deliver into his Hands *Gian Angelo Riccio* his Secretary, and *Politiano*, Secretary of *Morone*, that they might be examined on

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an

A. D. 1525. an Information which he had received of their having acted against *Cæsar*.

The  
Duke's  
Answer.

To these Demands the Duke answered that he held the Castles of *Milan* and *Cremona* in the Name, and at the Request of *Cæsar*, to whom he had always been a most faithful Vassal, and that he would not resign them to any one before he knew his Will, which that he might clearly understand he would immediately depute to him a proper Person, provided the Marquis would grant him a Passport; and that it did not appear to him consistent with Decency to consent to be in the mean time shut up in a Castle, from which Violence he would defend himself by any Means that lay in his Power: That he could not part with *Gian Angelo*, because he was intrusted in all his important Affairs, and was the only Minister he had at present about him; and that he had still greater Need of *Morone's* Secretary, in order to bring him before *Cæsar*, and by his Evidence to justify himself, in proving that  
during

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during his Sickness his Master had, in his Name, without his Knowledge, made many Dispatches, which might be laid to his Charge, if he did not by this Means justify his Innocence; and make it appear that the Business and Correspondence of *Morone* were different and separate from what concerned him. At last, after a Multitude of Protestations and Replies that passed from one to the other in writing, the Marquis constrained the People of *Milan* to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Emperor, contrary to their Will, and with extream Reluctance and Mortification of all Parties; he bestowed Offices through the State in the Name of *Cæsar*; and began to cast an Entrenchment about the Castle of *Cremona*, and that of *Milan*, in which the Duke, being mightily encouraged with the Hopes of Relief given him by the Pope and *Venetians*, was determined to defend himself, having with him Eight Hundred chosen Men, and furnished it with as great a Stock of Provisions as the Shortness of Time would permit. Nor did he omit to obstruct

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as much as possible the Working on the Trenches, which were carried along on the Outside, with a Ditch before them, at a greater Distance from the Castle than those cast up by *Prospero Colonna*.

- ALL *Italy* was alarmed, and with Reason, on the Seizure of the Dutchy of *Milan*, being sensible that there would be no way left to avoid manifest Slavery whenever *Cæsar* should become Lord of *Milan* and *Naples*. The Pontiff above all was afflicted, seeing, with utmost Concern, those Negotiations which he had carried on with such Secrecy, not only for the Security of *Milan*, but for the Destruction of *Cæsar's* Army, and depriving him of the Kingdom of *Naples*, all blown up, and laid open to the World. This Discovery, perhaps, procured the Marquis of *Pescara* Favour with *Cæsar*, but in the Sight of all others eternal Infamy, not only because most People were still possessed with an Opinion that in the Beginning he had really an Intention to fall off from

from *Cæsar*, but also because, on a Sup-  
 position that he had been always faith-  
 ful to him, it was esteemed an infam-  
 ous Piece of Treachery to have given  
 Encouragement to Men, and drawn  
 them in by such a Strain of Double-  
 dealing, and over-reaching Arts of Fraud,  
 to enter into a Conspiracy with him, on  
 purpose that he might have an Opportu-  
 nity to detect them, and to make himself  
 great out of the Sins of others pro-  
 cured by his own Deceits and Subtleties.

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 Conduct  
 of *Pescara*  
 censured.

THIS Change in the Face of Affairs  
 damped the Hopes of an Agreement,  
 which was negotiated by the Protonota-  
 ry *Caracciolo* with the *Venetian* Senate,  
 and was in such a Forwardness as to seem  
 drawing to a Conclusion, by which the  
*Venetians* would have been obliged to renew  
 the first Confederacy on the same Con-  
 ditions, and to pay unto *Cæsar*, in Re-  
 compense of past Failings and Omissi-  
 ons, Eighty Thousand Ducats, excluding  
 all Demands of future Contributions in  
 Money. But this new Event which  
 happened at *Milan* threw the Senate

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into very great Perplexity, being on one hand vastly concerned to find themselves the only Power left in *Italy* to make Resistance against *Cæsar*, with the Danger, already threatened by the Marquis of *Pescara*, of having the War transferred into their own Dominions, for which Purpose there appeared already some Preparations ; and no less embarrassed on the other hand, as knowing how mightily an Agreement with themselves would facilitate to *Cæsar* the Acquisition of the *Milanese*, which added to so many States, and to so many other Advantages, was the ready Way to bring themselves, with all the rest of *Italy*, under the Yoke. This Reflexion was enforced by the continual and pathetic Persuasions of the Bishop of *Bajeux*, whom Madam the Regentess had appointed to treat of a Union between herself and the *Italians* against *Cæsar*. In this Exigency their Consultations were frequent, but dubious, and full of various Opinions ; and, tho' it were most conformable to their Custom to accept of an Agreement, because it removed  
the

the present Danger, whence they might have Hopes to trust their Affairs to Length of Time, and to Opportunities that Republics, which, in Comparison to Princes, are immortal, have Reason to expect, yet it appeared also to them a Matter of too much Importance that *Cæsar* should establish himself in the State of *Milan*, and that the *French* should be excluded from all Hopes of having any Friend or Ally in *Italy*. Wherefore, being determined at last to enter into no Obligation, they answered the Protonotary *Caracciolo*, That their past Conduct was sufficient Evidence to all the World, and he himself, who had been present at the Conclusion of the Confederacy, was a good Witness, how much they always coveted the Friendship of *Cæsar*, with whom they had confederated at a Time when their joining with the *French* would have been, as every one knew, of mighty Importance: And that they had always persevered, and now more than ever, in the same Disposition; but that they were of necessity held in Suf-

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Answer of  
the *Veneti-*  
ans to the  
Imperial  
Plenipo-  
tentiary.



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1525.

penſe by obſerving a Change of ſo great Importance newly made in *Lombardy*, and eſpecially when they reflected that both their Confederacy with *Cæſar*, and ſo many other Movements which had been ſet on Foot of late Years in *Italy*, were made for no other End than with a Deſign that the Dutchy of *Milan* ſhould be ſettled on *Francesco Sforza*, as the principal Foundation of the Liberty and Security of *Italy*. Wherefore they intreated his Maſteſty, that, acting in this Caſe ſuitably to his own Temper, and known Goodneſs, he would remove this Innovation, and eſta- bliſh the Repoſe of *Italy*, as it was in his Power to do it, ſince he ſhould al- ways find them moſt readily diſpoſed, both by their Authority and Forces, to follow this holy Inclination; nor would they ever give him any Cauſe to charge them with being wanting in any good Office that concerned either the uni- verſal Good, or his own particular In- tereſts. This Answer, giving no Hopes of a Concluſion, did not however pro- duce a Rupture and Hoſtilities, becauſe  
the

# THE WARS IN ITALY. 343

the Disorder of the Marquis of *Pescara* A. D. 1525. increased every Day, and *Cæsar's* Desire of first making himself Master of the whole State of *Milan*, and to establish that Acquisition on a firm Bottom, and so many other Affairs which lay upon his Hands, and wanted first to be dispatched, gave him no Leisure to set about an Enterprize of such great Moment.

BOURBON was by this time arrived, and on the Fourteenth Day of *November* he appeared at the Imperial Court. Memorable Passage of Bourbon. Of this Nobleman it deserves to be recorded that, tho' he was received by *Cæsar* with all the Demonstrations of Honour and Regard, and carested as a Brother-in-Law, yet all the Lords of the Court, who are accustomed, as it always happens, to follow, in other Cases, the Example of their Prince, abhorred him as an infamous Person, calling him a Traitor to his own King; and, what is more, when one of them was requested, in the Name of *Cæsar*, to consent that his Palace should be assigned

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him for his Lodgings, he answered, with a *Castilian* Greatness of Soul, that he would not refuse *Cæsar* whatever he pleased to desire, but knew that as soon as *Bourbon* should leave it, he should set it on Fire, as a Palace infected with *Bourbon's* Infamy, and unworthy to be inhabited by Men of Honour.

BUT the Honour paid by *Cæsar* to the Duke of *Bourbon* increased the Despondency of the *French*, who, on this account, and more by the Return of Madam d' *Alençon* without Effect, entertaining but small Hopes of an Agreement, tho' it was continually negotiated by proper Persons residing at *Cæsar's* Court, insisted with all Eagerness on making a League with the Pope, in which they were seconded by the Advice and Authority of the King of *England*, and by the frequent and earnest Sollicitations of the *Venetians*. Besides, there offered itself an Opportunity doubtless of great Moment, for about this Time, which was in the Beginning of  
*December,*

December, died the Marquis of *Pescara*, A. D. perhaps by the just Judgment of God, <sup>1525.</sup> who would not suffer him to enjoy the Fruits of that Seed which he had sown with so much Malignity \*. This Gentleman was of the House of *Avalos*, by Origin a *Catalan*, his Ancestors came into *Italy* with King *Alfonso* of *Aragon*, who first of that House conquered the Kingdom of *Naples*. Since the Battle of *Ravenna*, in which, while yet a Youth, he was taken Prisoner, he served in all the Wars of the *Spaniards* in *Italy*, so that, tho' young in Years, for he was not past Six and Thirty, he was old in Experience, ingenious, courageous, very diligent, and very crafty, and in vast Credit and Favour with the *Spanish* Soldiers, of which he had been a long Time

\* The Marquis of *Pescara* was of the *Davala* Family in *New Castile*, near *Toledo*, rather antient than illustrious. He died of a lingering Consumption, occasioned by his continual drinking of Water, and the many Fatigues and Watchings that he endured in the Wars. He was buried at *Milan*, November 30, 1525, and afterwards carried to *Naples*, and interred in the Church of *San Domenico*.



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Time Captain General, whence the Victory of *Pavia*, and all the memorable Exploits performed by that Army for the Space of some Years, were principally owing to his Counsel and Conduct. He was a General certainly of great Worth, but one who knew very well by his Artifices and Diffimulation how to promote and increase his own Interest, was also haughty, treacherous, malicious, void of Sincerity, and worthy, as he often used to wish, of having *Spain* for his native Country rather than *Italy*. His Death then occasioned considerable Confusion in that Army, with which he was in such great Favour and Reputation, and put others in Hopes that it might be destroyed with much greater Ease, since it was deprived of a General of such great Worth and Authority. Those Powers, therefore, who were desirous that a League should be made, were so much the warmer and more importunate in their Instances with the Pontiff. But on the other hand his Doubts and Suspensions were equivalent, and justly; for  
very

very persuasive Arguments offered themselves on both Sides of the Question, sufficient to puzzle and perplex a Man however warm and resolute, and much more *Clement*, who always proceeded slowly and with Deliberation in his Affairs.

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It was no longer expected that *Cæsar* would take any Resolution for the Security of *Italy*, he seemed very intent on making himself Master of the Castle of *Milan*, which being taken, all the other Powers, and especially the Pope, whose State was but weak, and situated in the Midst between *Lombardy* and the Kingdom of *Naples*, would manifestly become his Prey. And supposing it should lie in his Power to oppress him, it was much to be doubted whether he would not make use of it, either out of Ambition, which is in a manner natural to Emperors against Popes, or for his own Security, or to revenge himself, as he was reasonably supposed to be full of Indignation and Distrust on account of the Plot carried on with the

A. D. the Marquis of *Pescara*; and tho' the

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Neceſſity of providing againſt that Danger was great, yet the Foundation and Hopes of being enabled to accompliſh it did not appear to be flight, ſo that either the Remedy muſt ſucceed by means of ſo potent a League and Conjunction, or the Caſe muſt be thought deſperate for ever. The Government of

Deſign of  
the Princes  
formed  
againſt  
*Cæſar*.

*France* promiſed Five Hundred Lances, and to contribute, every Month during the War, Forty Thouſand Ducats, with which it was propoſed to hire a Body of Ten Thouſand *Swiſs*. It was deſigned that the Pope and *Venetians* together ſhould bring into the Field Eighteen Hundred Men at Arms, Twenty Thouſand Foot, and Two Thouſand Light Horſe: The *French* and *Venetians* were to put to Sea a large Fleet, for attacking either *Genoa* or the Kingdom of *Naples*. Madam the Regentſs promiſed to open the Campaign, without Delay, with a numerous Army on the Frontiers of *Spain*, that ſo *Cæſar* might be prevented from ſending Troops for maintaining the War in *Italy*. The

*Cæſarean*

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*Cæsarean* Army that remained in *Lombardy* was not great, had no Generals of Authority as formerly, the Marquis being dead, and *Bourbon* and the Viceroy in *Spain*, it had no Means of raising Money, and did not abound with Provisions, was extremely hated by the People, from a Desire of their Duke, and the intolerable Exactions of the Soldiers, both in the City of *Milan*, and throughout the State; the Castles of *Milan* and *Cremona* were in the Hands of the Duke, and the *Venetians* gave Hopes that the Duke of *Ferrara* would also enter into this Confederacy, provided *Clement* would be content to grant him *Reggio*, of which City the Duke was determined at any Rate to keep Possession.

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ON the other Side Difficulties arose from the Cunning and Valour of the Enemies, from their being accustomed to maintain themselves for a long Time, when Necessity required, with a little Money, and to put up with many Wants and Inconveniencies; the Towns  
in



A. D. in their Possession were fortified, and, <sup>1525.</sup> from their Situation in a Plain, easy to have their Fortifications repaired, and strengthened with new Works ; in these they might maintain themselves till Succours arrived from *Germany*, of such a Nature as to reduce the whole War to the Fortune of one Battle. The Troops of the League could be no other than new-raised Men, and of small Value in comparison of that veteran Army, flushed with so many Victories. It was difficult to fix on a Captain General, for the Marquis of *Mantoua*, at that time General of the *Venetians*, was not equal to so great a Charge, nor could it with any Security be intrusted in the Hands of the Duke of *Ferrara*, or of the Duke of *Urbino*, who had received so many Injuries that it was impossible for them to be pleased with the Pope's Greatness. The Weapons of the Church had naturally blunt Edges, and those of the *Venetians* were no keener, and if each were but a bad Cutter when alone  
and

and acting separately, what could be expected when employed in Conjunction ! In the Armies of the League there never would be a Concurrence of all the necessary Provisions at one Time ; for amidst so great a Variety of Wills, where are different Interests, and different Ends, there will be apt to arise Disorders, Indignation, Resentments and Distrust, and, at best, you will never find among them that Promptness and Alacrity for vigorously pursuing the Favour of Fortune when she shews herself kind, nor a firm Disposition to make a resolute and constant Resistance when she looks upon them with a frowning Aspect. But, that which above all occasioned the greatest Difficulty and Fear in this Resolution, was an Apprehension that the *French*, whenever *Cæsar*, on finding himself straitened, should offer to release their King, would not only break off from the League, but assist him against the Confederates. And tho' the King of *England* passed his royal Word for them that they should come to no Agreement, and it was proposed that

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that they should give Security in *Rome*, *Florence*, or *Venice*, for three Months Payments, yet no Means were found to remove that Suspicion: For the *French* having no other End than the Recovery of their King, and it being well known that they had no Inclination to a War but when they had no Hopes of an Agreement, it seemed probable that, whenever it pleased *Cæsar* to consent to their Wishes, they would prefer an Accommodation with him to all other Interests and Regards; nay further, every one was sensible that the greater the Preparations and Forces of the League should appear, the more would *Cæsar* shew himself inclined to agree with the King of *France*, and therefore it seemed a very dangerous Step to engage in a War in which the powerful Forces of the Confederates might do as much Hurt as Good. With these Reasons was the Pontiff plyed on all Sides, by the Ambassadors of the Princes, and no less by his own Ministers, for there was a Division in his Family and in his Council, where every one favoured his own

Incli-

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Inclination, with so much the less Re-  
spect, as the Authority which they had  
arrogated with him was the greater ;  
for he had till this Time suffered  
himself in a great measure to be car-  
ried by those who ought to have paid  
Obedience to his Nod, and to look up-  
on themselves as no other than Ministers  
of the Will and Orders of their Master.  
To understand this and many other  
Occurrences, it is necessary to look back  
on some Transactions of an older Date.

LEO, who brought the chief Ecclesi-  
astical Dignity into the House of the  
*Medici*, and with the Authority of the  
Cardinalship so well sustained himself  
and that Family, which was fallen from  
the Height of Grandeur to so low a  
State of Decay, that it had reason to  
expect a Vicissitude and Return of prospe-  
rous Fortune, was a Man of consum-  
mate Liberality, if it be proper to give  
that Name to a Profuseness in Expences  
that passes all Bounds and Measures.  
After his Assumption to the Pontificate  
he displayed so much Magnificence and



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would have been surprizing even in one who had descended by long Succession from Kings and Emperors. Nor was he only most profuse of Money, but of all Favours which are at the Disposal of a Pope, which he bestowed so unmeasurably that he brought the Spiritual Authority into Contempt, disordered the Oeconomy of the Court, and by his excessive Expences brought himself under a Necessity of perpetually contriving to raise Money by extraordinary Means. To this so remarkable an Easiness was added a most profound Dissimulation, with which he circumvented every one in the Beginning of his Pontificate, and made himself pass for a very good Prince; I dare not say of an Apostolical Goodness, for in our corrupt Times the Goodness of a Pontiff is commended when it does not surpass the Wickedness of other Men; but he was reputed merciful, desirous of doing Good to all, and quite averse from every Thing that might give Offence to any Person. Among other good Gifts of Fortune, which were

were very great, he was so happy <sup>A. D.</sup> as to have about him *Giulio de' Me-* <sup>1525.</sup> *dici*, his Cousin, whom from a Knight of *Rhodes*, tho' illegitimate, he raised to the Cardinalship. For *Giulio* being naturally grave, diligent, assiduous in Business, averse from Pleasures, temperate and thrifty in every Thing, and having in his Hands, by Appointment of *Leo*, the Management of all the important Affairs of the Pontificate, restrained and moderated many Disorders proceeding from his Profuseness and Easiness; and, what is more, not following the Customs of other Nephews and Brothers of Popes, but preferring the Honour and Grandeur of *Leo* to the Consideration of making a comfortable Provision to support himself after his Death, he approved himself a most faithful and most obedient Minister to him, in such a manner that it seemed as if he were really his second Self. On these accounts he was continually more and more promoted by the Pope, and still more and more entrusted with Business, which, in the Hands of two Persons


*A. D.* 1525. sons of such different Natures, is a Demonstration how well the Mixture of two Contraries may sometimes agree together ; as here, for Instance, Assiduity, Diligence, Conduct, and Gravity of Manners, with Indolence, Prodigality, and an inordinate Love of Pleasure and Mirth. This Management made it believed by many that *Leo* was governed by *Giulio*, and that he himself was not a Man qualified to undertake so great a Charge, but of a harmless Disposition, unwilling to hurt any Body, and very glad to enjoy the Sweets of the Pontificate ; and that, as a Contrast, *Giulio* was full of Spirit, Ambition, and a Desire of Innovations. Hence all the Severities, all the Movements, and all the Enterprises that happened during the Time of *Leo* were imagined to proceed from the Instigation of *Giulio*, who was reputed of a malignant Temper, but a Man of Parts, and of a great Spirit. This Opinion of his Merit was confirmed and increased after the Death of *Leo*, for, amidst all the Opposition and Difficulties with which he was surrounded,

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ed, he supported his Affairs with such *A. D.*  
Dignity, that he appeared almost like a *1525.*  
Pope, and preserved his Authority with  
many of the Cardinals to such a De-  
gree, that he entered into Two Con-  
claves absolute Master of Sixteen Votes,  
and at last after the Death of *Adrian*,  
in spite of the infinite Contradictions  
and Oppositions of the greater Part and  
of the senior Members of the College,  
he made his Way to the Pontificate,  
not full Two Years from the Decease  
of *Leo*, entering on his Office with such  
high Expectations, that it was the uni-  
versal Opinion he would be the greatest  
Pontiff, and perform the greatest Acti-  
ons that had ever been performed by  
any one who had hitherto sat in the  
Papal Chair. But it was soon known  
what vain Judgments they had formed of  
*Leo* and of him; for *Clement* had ma-  
ny Qualities different from what was at  
first imagined of him, since he had no-  
thing of that ambitious Desire of No-  
velties, nor was endowed with that  
Greatness of Soul, and Inclination of  
Mind to generous and magnanimous



A. D. 1525.  Ends, as the Public had at first believed ; and it appeared that he had been with *Leo* rather a Minister and Executor of his Designs, than a Director and Introducer of his Counsels and Will ; And tho' he had a very capacious Understanding, and a wonderful Knowledge of all public Affairs, yet his Resolution and Execution were by no means answerable ; for being hindered, not only by a remarkable Timorousness of Mind, and by a Desire to save Expences, but also by a kind of Irresolution and Perplexity, which was natural to him, he stood almost continually in Suspense and Ambiguity, when he was brought to a Determination of such Affairs as he had oftentimes foreseen at a Distance, considered, and in a manner settled. Hence it happened that, both in his resolving as well as executing what he had resolved, every trifling Concern that just then discovered itself to him, every slight Impediment that came athwart his Way, appeared sufficient to make him relapse into the same Confusion in which he had stood hesitating

ing before he had resolved, as he al- <sup>A. D.</sup>  
 ways fancied, after he had taken a Re- <sup>1525,</sup>  
 solution, that the Counsel which he had  
 rejected was the best: For, represent-  
 ing to himself at the present Instant  
 only those Reasons which he had ne-  
 glected, he never recalled to Examina-  
 tion those which had moved him  
 to make his Choice, by the Clashing  
 and Comparison of which the oppo-  
 site Reàsons would have their Force  
 weakened; nor could the Memory of  
 his being often under the Power of  
 vain Fears teach him to avoid giving  
 way to such Weakness for the future.  
 In this intangled Situation, and confused  
 Manner of Proceeding, suffering himself  
 to be often biaßed by his Ministers, he  
 seemed rather led than counselled by  
 them.

OF the Ministry those who had a <sup>Two</sup>lead-  
 mighty Interest with him were *Nicolas* <sup>ing Mini-</sup>  
*Schomberg*, a German, and *Gian Matteo* <sup>sters of</sup>  
*Giberto*, a Genoesè; the former revered, <sup>Pope Cle-</sup>  
 and in a manner feared by the Pontiff; <sup>ment.</sup>  
 the other very acceptable, and greatly  
 Z 4 beloved

A. D. 1525. beloved by him; *Schomberg*, following the Authority of *Girolamo Savonarola*, entered himself, while he studied the Law, in the Order of Preaching Friars; but afterwards, relinquishing his Convent, tho' retaining the Name and Habit, he applied himself to secular Business. *Giberto* was dedicated to a monastic Life in his Childhood, but afterwards leaving his Cloister, by his Father's Authority, tho' he was but a Bastard, quite abdicated his Profession, with the Name and Habit.

At Vari-  
ance.

THESE two Ministers, while they agreed together when *Giulio* was but a Cardinal, and afterwards in the Beginning of his Pontificate, guided him at their Discretion; but since, falling at Variance, either out of Ambition, or from a Difference of Tempers, they put all Things in Confusion, and ruined his Affairs. For Friar *Nicolas*, on account of a national Tye, or for some other Respect, being devoted to the Interest of *Cæsar*, and by Nature obstinately attached to his own Opinions, which  
were

were often different from those of *A. D.* 1525. others, so immoderately favoured the Cause of *Cæsar*, that he was often suspected by the Pontiff as one who had more Concern for the Interests of others than for those of his Master. The other in truth knew no other Patron, or Object of his Affection, than the Pontiff; but, being naturally eager and vehement in the Management of his Affairs, tho', in the Time of *Leo*, he had been a most bitter Enemy to the *French*, and a Favourer of *Cæsar's* Cause, yet since his Death he was become quite the contrary. Hence those two Ministers, who bore the greatest Sway with the Pontiff, being at open Variance, and not proceeding with Maturity, or with any Regard to the Honour of their Master, but exposing his Coldness and Irresolution to all the Court, rendered him contemptible and in a manner ridiculous to the Generality of Mankind. As he was then by Nature irresolute, and those whose Duty it was to assist him in coming to a Determination on so difficult and perplexed an Affair helped



A. D. 1525. ed only to increase his Doubts and Confusion, he knew not which Way to turn himself. At last, rather from a Necessity of coming to some Determination, than out of a manly Resolution, or firm Judgment, especially as he found himself in such a Situation that to come to no Determination was a kind of Determination, he inclined to make a League and to join with the others in beginning a War with *Cæsar*.

*Errera*  
arrives at  
*Rome*  
from  
*Cæsar*.

THEY had agreed on Articles, which were drawn up in Writing, and only wanted to be signed, when the Pope received Advice that the Commendatory *Errera* was arrived at *Genoa*, deputed to him from *Cæsar*, and coming with all Diligence would soon be at *Rome* with good and gracious Dispatches. He resolved therefore to wait his Arrival, tho' with very heavy Complaints - from the Ambassadors, to whom he had given strong Assurances of signing the Confederacy the same Day. *Errera* was sent on this Message because *Cæsar*, after he had given such a Commission to the  
Marquis

Marquis of *Pescara* as gave him full <sup>A. D.</sup> Power at least to seize on the State of <sup>1525.</sup> *Milan*, doubting that such a Step would occasion new Movements in *Italy*, carried on with great Application the Negotiations for an Agreement with the Legate *Salviati*, so that a Capitulation was made between them, with a Reserve however on Condition of its Ratification by the Pontiff. By this Agreement Provision was made for the Restitution of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and there was included in it the Defence and Preservation of the Duke of *Milan*, which were the principal Points that *Clement* desired, but with one express Condition that, in case of his Death, *Cæsar* should neither keep that Dutchy for himself, nor give it to his Brother the Archduke, but invest with it *M. de Bourbon*, whom, together with *George*, the natural Brother of *Maximilian Cæsar*, the Pontiff himself, at the Persuasion of the Archbishop of *Capua*, had been so inconsiderate as to propose at the Time when *Francesco Sforza* lay so ill that every one despaired of his Life.

A. D.

1525.

*Cæsar*  
obtains a  
Dispensa-  
tion for  
his Mar-  
riage.

THE Capitulation being made the Le-  
gate, without waiting for *Clement's* Rati-  
fication, could not, or knew not how  
to deny giving *Cæsar* the Brief of Dis-  
pensation that he so much desired,  
which having been drawn before with  
an Expression only of the Impediment  
in the second Degree, without nomi-  
nating the Daughter of the King of  
*Portugal*, for the sake of giving the  
less Offence to the King of *England*,  
or because, there being a double Tye of  
Kindred between them, Mention had  
been made only of the stronger Tye,  
it was necessary to draw up another,  
which should comprehend all the Im-  
pediments, together with an express No-  
mination of the Persons. The Com-  
mendatory *Errera* set out from *Cæ-*  
*sar's* Court with the Dispatches of this  
Confederacy a Day or two after *Cæsar*  
had received Advice of the Imprison-  
ment of *Morone*, and on the sixth of  
*December*, being conducted before the  
Pope, besides many Offers, and most  
ample Protestations of the good Dispo-  
sition

sition of *Cæsar*, presented him with the Articles of the Capitulation; and tho' those Articles that concerned the Salt, and the beneficial Matters in the Kingdom of *Naples* were different from those which had been concluded with the Viceroy, yet because the principal Point which he had in View was to free himself from Suspicions, he would have accepted them had he been convinced of the Sincerity of the Proceedings in relation to the Duke of *Milan*: But since, in the Article that related to *Francesco* Pope's *Sforza*, there was no Mention made of what had been laid to his Charge, nor any Promise to restore the State of which he had been deprived, nor of pardoning the Errors which he had committed, but on the contrary *Cæsar*, in the Conclusion made with the Legate, and in the Instructions given to this his Agent, had not given the least Indication that he knew any Thing of it, one might easily comprehend the Subtleties and Artifices of his Ministers. For the Confederacy, and the Promise to defend and preserve *Francesco Sforza* in

A. D.

1525.

Excep-  
tions to the  
Treaty  
with  
*Cæsar*.



*A. D.* 1525. in the Dutchy of *Milan*, did not deprive *Cæsar* of the Power of proceeding against him as his Vassal, and of declaring the Fief devolved on account of the Charge of his having conspired against his Majesty; and *Bourbon*, who was substituted in case of his Death, would also succeed him on his Deprivation, because the Laws consider a civil Death as equivalent to a natural, and he, they say, who is condemned for a Crime of that Nature, is dead in Law. The Pope therefore very gravely answered, that he had no private Cause of Disagreement with *Cæsar*, but, on the contrary, in all Differences and Disputes that might happen between them, he would never chuse any other Judge than him; but that it was also necessary to settle the public Affairs on such a Foundation as might put *Italy* in a State of Security, which could not be effected without once more restoring the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Francesco Sforza*. He shewed him also the Reasons why this Article, so generally worded was not satisfactory; concluding that he should be extremely

treably mortified to find himself under <sup>A. D.</sup> a Necessity of taking new Resolutions, <sup>1525.</sup> and to break off from *Cæsar*, to whom he had always been most firmly attached.

To this the Duke of *Sessa* replied, <sup>Duke of Sessa's Reply.</sup> that *Cæsar* was very sincere in his Intentions, and was doubtless contented that, notwithstanding what had happened, the Dutchy of *Milan* should remain in the Possession of *Francesco Sforza*; but that, through Inadvertency, the Article had not been drawn up in ample Form, but the Pope might make what Corrections or Alterations in it he saw fit; that he promised him the Ratification within the Term of Two Months, provided that his Holiness would also promise that, during that Time on his Part, he would not conclude the League he was negotiating with *France* and the *Venetians*.

EVERY one daily perceived that this Offer had no other Foundation than a Desire to gain Time by a Delay of  
Two

*A. D.* 1525. Two Months, for *Cæsar* the better to regulate his Resolutions, and to provide himself with Remedies against so formidable an Union. The Pontiff, however, after many Disputes, to the very great Displeasure of the other Ambassadors, consented to this Demand, as well out of a Desire to defer, as long as he could, the involving himself in Expences and Troubles, as because it appeared to him a very dangerous Step to contract an Alliance with the King's Mother while he himself was a Prisoner, it lying in the Power of *Cæsar* to dissolve it whenever he pleased, and this Delay might possibly, tho' he saw but little Hopes, bring about the Accomplishment of his desired Ends; and tho' it should occasion an Agreement between the two Kings, he profoundly considered, tho' others were of a contrary Judgment that it was best to have it effected at a Time when *Cæsar* was under less Necessity, because the better should be the Situation of his Affairs, the harder would be the Conditions that he would propose to the King of *France*, the  
Rigour

Rigour of which gave Hopes that the King, after he should be released, would not think himself bound to observe them. It was also inserted in this Treaty that at the same time no new Works should be raised, or any Thing farther undertaken against the Castle of *Milan*, provided *Francesco Sforza* would oblige himself not to annoy or molest the Troops that lay before it; which Condition he would not accept.

Thus ended the Year of the Nativity of the Son of God Almighty 1525, with Dispositions rather for War than for Peace, and we are now entering on 1526, a Year full of great Events, and surprising Commotions. In the Beginning of it *Errera* returning to *Cæsar*, the Pope writ a long Letter to that Prince, with his own Hand, in which neither wholly denying nor confessing the Plot formed against him, but laying the Fault on the Marquis of *Pescara*, he endeavoured to excuse *Francesco Sforza*, who, if he had committed any Error, was seduced by the Counsels of



A. D. *Girolamo Morone*; intreating him also  
 1526. in the most pathetic Manner, that, for  
 the Quiet and Benefit of all Christen-  
 dom, he would prevail with himself to  
 pardon him.

CÆSAR, at that Time, in Expecta-  
 tion of the Pontiff's Answer, put a Stop  
 to all Negotiations with others; and tho'  
*Bourbon*, who was pretty much carested  
 and confirmed in his Hopes of the  
 Affinity; insisted on the Celebration of  
 the Nuptials, he was put off with an  
 Excuse that *Cæsar* was willing first to  
 solemnise his Marriage with his *Portu-  
 guese* Spouse, who was every Day expect-  
 ed: But this Delay was designed to  
 leave Room for making an Accommoda-  
 tion with the King of *France*, in which  
 it was proposed to give him the same  
 Lady in Matrimony as had been pro-  
 mised to *Bourbon*, Interest, as it is cu-  
 stomary with all Princes, being preferred  
 before Honour and Honesty. *Cæsar* had  
 solemnised his Nuptials at *Seville*, when  
*Errera* arrived from *Rome*, with the  
 Minutes of a very long Article drawn  
 up

up by the Pope in favour of *Francesco Sforza*. Wherefore *Cæsar*, being certified also that the Legate had no Commission but what concerned the Contents of that Article, and his whole Council concurring in the Opinion that it was necessary to break the League that was in Agitation, and dangerous to have so many Enemies to deal with at once, found himself reduced to a Necessity, either of satisfying the Pope and the *Venetians* by restoring *Francesco Sforza*, or to agree with the King of *France*. That King at last, after many Disputes, Offers about *Burgundy*, finding no Hopes of <sup>of the</sup> obtaining from *Cæsar* his Liberty on <sup>King of</sup> *France*, any other Conditions, offered to restore that Province, together with its Appurtenances and Dependencies, and to yield up his Rights and Pretensions to the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*, and to give his Two Sons as Hostages for the Performance of his Engagements.

VERY warm were the Debates on the Choice of either of the Expedients: The Viceroy, who had conducted the most Christian King into *Spain*, and had given him such great Hopes, and so ardently sollicitated his Deliverance, more earnestly insisted on it than ever; and his Authority, with regard only to his Fidelity and Good Will, had great Weight with *Cæsar*. But his Counsel was opposed, rather with exclaiming than disputing against it, by *Mercurio di Gattinara*, the Great Chancellor, a Man who, tho' born of low Parentage in *Piedmont*, was yet of great Credit and Experience, and had for several Years the Management of the important Business of that Court. These two great Men one Day assisting in Council, and *Cæsar* being present, in order to put a final Determination to an Affair that had been under Debate so many Months, the Great Chancellor spoke thus:

“ I HAVE been always under Apprehensions, most invincible *Cæsar*, that our excessive Desires, and immoderate Views would be the Cause that in the End we should reap neither Honour nor Profit from so great and famous a Victory; but I did not however imagine that the coming off Conquerors would endanger your Reputation and your State, which I now plainly see is like to be the Result. For we have now under Debate the making an Agreement, by which all *Italy* may be thrown into Despair, and the King of *France* set at Liberty, but on such burdensome Conditions, that, if not by Inclination, yet at least out of Necessity, he may become a greater Enemy to us than he was before. I could wish, as heartily as others, that at the same time *Burgundy* might be recovered, and the Foundations laid for the subjecting *Italy*; but I know that he who is thus hasty in grasping so much is in Danger of holding fast nothing, and that no Rea-

Speech of  
the Great  
Chancel-  
lor against  
releasing  
the King  
of *France*.



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son requires that the King of *France*, after he is set at Liberty, should fulfil his Engagements to you, in such important Articles. Does he not know that if he restores to you *Burgundy* he opens you a Gate of *France*? and that it will be in your Power to make Incursions, as far as *Paris*? and that, when you have the Means of annoying *France* on so many Quarters, it will be impossible for him to resist you? Does he not know, and every one else, that his consenting that you should go to *Rome* armed, that you should put a Bridle on *Italy*, and that you should reduce the spiritual and temporal State of the Church to your Devotion, would be the Cause of doubling your Power? and that you never can want for Money nor Arms to molest him, and that he must be necessitated to accept all the Laws you shall please to impose on him? Who then can believe that he will think himself bound to an Agreement, by which he may become your Slave, and you his Lord? Can he want for the Complaints  
and

and Exclamations of the whole Kingdom of *France*, the Persuasions of the King of *England*, and the Stimulations of all *Italy*? The Love perhaps that subsists between you two will be the Cause that he will repose Confidence in you, and willingly see the Increase of your Power; or were there ever two Princes between whom there were more Grounds for Hatred and Contention? Here is not only an Emulation of Greatness, which uses to put Weapons in the Hands of Brothers against one another, but antient and very bitter Enmities, commenced from the Times of the Fathers and Grandfathers of your Grandfathers, so many Wars long carried on between these two Houses, so many Treaties of Peace and Agreement not observed, so many Injuries and Affronts given and received. Can we chuse but believe that he burns with Indignation to reflect that he has been for so many Months your Prisoner, kept under so strict a Guard, without ever having had the Favour of being conducted into your Presence? That

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A. D. 1526. in this Prison, thro' Vexation and Inconvenience, he had been at Death's Door; and that he was not now set at Liberty out of Magnanimity or Love, but from the Apprehensions of so formidable an Union against you? Can we believe that an Affinity contracted by Necessity is of more Force than so many Incentives? And who knows not what Value Princes set upon these Ties? And where is there better Evidence of the Regard they pay to Affinities than among ourselves? Some perhaps may fancy that passing his Word, which he will give us for his returning to Prison, may be sufficient for our Security; but, alas! what inconsiderate Grounds, what imprudent Hopes would this Consideration suggest for our Reliance! The extream Grief that affects me, when I find some are for taking so pernicious and dangerous a Resolution, constrains me, *Cæsar*, to speak my Mind freely. We all know but too well what Value is to be set on the Word of Honour, when the Interest of the State is concerned, and what Stress is to be laid on the Promises

Promises of the *French*, who, tho' frank <sup>A. D.</sup> and open in all other Matters, are in <sup>1526.</sup> this Regard perfect Masters in the Arts of Dissimulation and Deceit, and that their King is by Nature as much deficient in Deeds as he is redundant in Words. We may therefore well conclude that no Benevolence between two Princes, whose Injuries and Hatred descend with their Blood by antient Inheritance; no Faith nor Promises, which in the important Concerns of State have but little Weight with many, and with the *French* none at all, will induce that King to make good an Agreement, that will exalt his Enemy to Heaven, and bring himself and his Kingdom under manifest Subjection. You would answer I am sensible, that, for Fear of what is here suggested, there is demanded of him Security in the Persons of two of his Sons, one of them his Eldest, the Love of whom must needs occasion him to set a higher Value on them than on *Burgundy*. But I am afraid that this Love of his Children will rather have a contrary Effect, when their Memory shall



## THE HISTORY OF

shall present itself to his Mind, and he shall consider that by observing the Agreement he lays a Foundation for making them your Slaves. I know not whether this Pledge would be sufficient, when he should be quite deprived of all Hopes of recovering them any other Way \*. For it is a Matter of too serious Concern to endanger his Kingdom, which once lost is very difficult to be recovered ; but he might well hope to recover his Sons with Time, or by Agreement, or on some other Occasion, and the Delay will be less troublesome on account of their tender Age. But having found Means to bring almost all the Christian Princes to unite with him against you, who doubts but he will enter into close Confederacy with them, and seek to moderate the Agreement by Force of Arms, and that the Fruits we shall reap from the Victory will be a very

\* He doubts whether the King's Children be a sufficient Pledge for restoring *Burgundy*, supposing that the King had no other Way to recover them, because such a Restitution would open a Door of *France*, as before observed.

very vigorous and dangerous War, excited by Hatred, Necessity and Desperation, from the King of *England*, King of *France*, and all *Italy*? from all which we should be able to defend ourselves, would it please God not to slacken his Hand in working for us every Day those Miracles which he has so often wrought for us till this present Time; and if Fortune should change her Nature in our Behalf, and her Inconstancy and Mutability should become towards us an Example of Stability and Constancy, contrary to all the Examples of past Events. We have in all our Counsels, for so many Months together, concluded that we are to use our utmost Endeavours that the *Italians* might not join with the Government of *France*; and now we precipitate ourselves into a Resolution which removes all the Difficulties that have hitherto kept them in Suspense, that multiplies our Dangers, that multiplies the Forces of the Enemy: For who knows not how much more potent a League will be which shall have for its Head the King of *France*,  
than

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than one made with the Government of *France* while the King remains your Prisoner? Who knows not that no Cause has hitherto held the Pope in Ambiguity and Hesitation from confederating against you, but the Fears that you may separate the *French* from them by offering them their King? That they will fear less, when we shall have his Children and not him? Thus the Remedy which we provide for avoiding the Danger will, without Comparifon, do more Hurt than Good, and increase the Evil, and, instead of breaking that Union, we shall ourselves be the Instruments of rendering it more firm and powerful. It will be said to me, What is then your Opinion? Is it your Advice that we reap no Profit from so great a Victory? Are we to remain continually in this State of Perplexity? I confirm what I have often said, that it is very pernicious to take in more Food at one Time than the Stomach is able to digest, and that it is necessary for us to regain the Friendship of *Italy*, which demands nothing of us but its Security,

rity, and to endeavour to obtain of the *French King Burgundy*, with whatever
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else shall be possible for us; or otherwise to make an Agreement with him, by which *Italy* may be left to our Discretion, but so mild and moderate with regard to his Interests that he may have Reason to observe it. And in making a Choice between these two Ways it is requisite, *Cæsar*, that your Prudence and Goodness should prefer what is stable and juster to that which at first Sight may perhaps appear more profitable and grand. The State of *Milan*, I confess, is richer, and more convenient on many accounts than that of *Burgundy*, and there is no Friendship to be contracted with the *Italians* but by leaving *Milan* in the Hands of *Francesco Sforza*, or of some other who shall content the Pope. And yet I much prefer taking this Course to an Agreement with the *French*, because *Burgundy* is more yours in Justice than *Milan*, and easier to keep than the other, where you have not a single Person that is well affected to you. To attempt the

Resto-



A. D. Restoration of *Burgundy*, your antient  
 1526. Inheritance, is highly commendable :  
 To aspire after *Milan*, either for your-  
 self or one who shall wholly depend on  
 you, discovers some Marks of Ambition.  
 The first is required of you by the  
 Memory of so many of your glorious  
 Progenitors, whose Bones interred in Cap-  
 tivity cry for nothing but to be de-  
 livered and removed by you, and their  
 so just, compassionate, and holy Prayers  
 are perhaps the Cause of rendering God  
 the more propitious to you. It is a more  
 prudent as well as more feasible Resolu-  
 tion to seek to establish a Friendship with  
 one who unwillingly becomes an Ene-  
 my, than with him who cannot possibly at  
 any time be your Friend. For in the  
 King of *France* will never harbour any  
 other than Hatred, and a malicious De-  
 sire to oppose your Designs: But the  
 Pope and the other Powers of *Italy*, as  
 soon as the Army is removed from  
*Lombardy*, being freed from Jealousies,  
 will have no Occasion to contend with  
 you either from Fear or Emulation, but  
 remaining your steady Friends you will  
 now

now and always enjoy the Convenience and Profit of their good Correspondence.

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You are invited therefore to chuse that Friendship by Honour, Utility, and Security, and, if I deceive not myself, no less by Necessity. For, even supposing that you should make an Agreement with the King on no other Obligation than of assisting you in your Enterprize on *Italy*, it does not appear to me probable that he will fulfil it, because he will imagine that his leaving *Italy* to be your Prey will too much endanger his own Kingdom. And, on the other hand, he will appear to himself to have vast Opportunities and Hopes, by means of so potent an Union, to create you much Trouble and Uneasiness, and to reduce you to an Agreement on less burdensome Conditions. Thus of a King Prisoner we shall make him free, and our Enemy, and shall give a Head to the Kingdom of *France*, that, in Conjunction with so many others, he may make War upon us with more Forces, and with greater Advantage. How much better is it to agree with the *Italians*!

to

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to enter into a firm and sincere Alliance with the Pontiff, who has continually desired it, and to deprive the *French* of all Hopes of a Conjunction with the *Italians*; for in such a Case not Necessity, nor the Fears of new Leagues, but your own Will, and the Quality of the Conditions will be sufficient to draw you to an Agreement with the *French*; then you will see that Want and Despair will force them not only to restore *Burgundy*, and to make you greater Offers, but also to put into your Hands such Security as shall leave no Room to doubt of the Performance of their Engagements; since the Children are not sufficient to secure you while they can feed themselves with Hopes of so considerable a Conjunction, and if they were to make an Addition of *Bayonne*, *Narbonne*, and the Fleet, it would hardly be enough to warrant their Observance. In this Manner you will be sure to reap great, honourable, just, and secure Fruits from your Victory; otherwise, either I have no Understanding at all in any Affair, or this Agreement

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ment will so endanger your State, that I know not what will secure it if the Imprudence of the King of *France* proves no greater than ours.”

THE Great Chancellor by this accurate and vehement Speech, and by the Reputation of his Wisdom, had affected the Minds of a great Part of the Council, when the Viceroy, who was the Author of the contrary Opinion, spoke, as it is said, in the following Manner.

“ IT is undoubtedly true, most glorious *Cæsar*, that the Man who, out of a greedy Desire of having too much, aims at grasping more than he can hold fast, is by no means to be commended; but then he is no less to be blamed who, from a needless Suspicion and Distrust, voluntarily deprives himself of vast Opportunities, acquired with a Multitude of Difficulties and Dangers. The Errors are indeed very considerable on both Sides; but a Fault that proceeds from a Timidity and Meanness of Spi-

Speech of  
the Vice-  
roy of Na-  
ples in An-  
swer to the  
foregoing.



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rit is more inexcusable in so great a Prince, than that which arises from a certain Generosity and Greatness of Mind; and it is more laudable to seek with Danger the Acquisition of too much, than, for the sake of avoiding Danger, to let slip and vanish the rarest Opportunities that a Man is blest with. Now this however is in effect the Counsel of the Chancellor, who doubting that this Agreement will not procure both *Burgundy* and *Milan* (for we are by no means to suspect that he is under the Influence of a Love to *Italy*, his Country, or of the Good Will that he bears to the Duke of *Milan*) proposes a Way by which, according to him, you gain *Burgundy* and lose *Milan*, a State without Comparison of the greater Importance, but, according to me, by which you lose *Milan* without gaining *Burgundy*! And thus, where this Victory has most gloriously opened you a Way to the Lordship of all Christendom, there will remain nothing for us, if we follow his Advice, but Loss and Disgrace. And indeed I see no Safety in his Counsel, but

but rather very great Danger attended with very small Advantage, which besides may easily slip out of our Hands. But, on the contrary, an Agreement with the King of *France* appears to me attended with very great Glory, very great Profit, and sufficient Security. For I would ask you, Chancellor, what Reason have you, what Security, what Promise, that the *Italians*, after we shall have evacuated the Dutchy of *Milan*, will take care not to violate the Agreement, nor intermeddle between the King of *France* and us? And not rather that, after we shall have debased our Reputation, after we shall have disbanded that Army, which is a Bridle on their Malice, after they shall be secured from the Coming of new Bodies of *Germans* into *Italy*, because there will be no Place in *Lombardy* to receive them, nor where they can shelter themselves; what Security, I say, have you that the *Italians*, at such a Time, continuing their Plots, besides threatening the Kingdom of *Naples*, which will remain in a manner at their Discretion, will not make

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A. D. an Effort to deliver the King of *France*?

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Have you any Trust, Chancellor, in the Gratitude of *Francesco Sforza*, who, after so many Benefits, has requited you, O *Cæsar*, with such base Treachery? What will he not do now, when he has been made sensible that you are desirous to punish so heinous a Piece of Iniquity with Justice? now, that he fears Punishment from you, and expects Safety from our Enemies? Have you any Confidence, Chancellor, in the Friendship of the *Venetians*, who are both Enemies to the Empire and to the House of *Austria*, and trembling at remembering that as it were but yesterday your Grandfather *Maximilian* bereaved them of so many of those Towns which they now possess? Have you any Faith in the Goodness of *Clement*, or in his Inclination to the Emperor? The Motive of *Leo's* Alliance with *Cæsar*, after he had attempted many Things against us, was a Desire of Revenge, or of Security from the *French*, or an ambitious Design of seizing on *Ferrara*. After the Death of *Leo*, this Man, hated  
by

by Half the World, continued our Friend out of Necessity ; but after he was made Pope, immediately returning to the Nature of the Pontiffs, which is to fear and hate the Emperors, he has nothing in more Detestation than the Name of *Cæsar*. All these Parties excuse themselves by pretending, that their Plots and Devices proceeded not from Hatred, or from any other Passion, but only from a Jealousy of your Greatness, which ceasing all their Machinations have ceased with it. This is either not true, or, tho' it might perhaps have been true in the Beginning, it is necessary that it must have since taken other Roots, and become another Passion ; for it is natural for Jealousy to be followed by Hatred, and by Injuries, attended by a Conjunction and Intimacy with the Enemies of the injured Person, together with Designs not only of being secured from his Resentment, but also of profiting by his Ruin, the Memory of Injuries being greater without doubt, and more implacable in him who does, than in him who receives them. Wherefore

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granting that in the Beginning they might be incited only by Jealousy, the same would have been the Cause of making them become your Enemies, of diverting their Inclinations, and placing their Hopes on the *French* Side, and afterwards of beginning, as they have done in all the Conventions which they have negotiated, to divide the Kingdom of *Naples* among themselves. And now whatever Security we give them, or whatever Agreement we make with them, the same Passions of Hatred and Fear will always remain kindled in their Breasts; and putting no Faith in what they imagine extorted from you by Necessity, but thinking they may with the greater Facility bend us to a Compliance with their Will, apprehensive also that at last there will be an Appointment between us and the King of *France*, like to that made at *Cambray*, and desirous, to use their own Words, of freeing *Italy* from the Barbarians, they will have the Boldness to think of prescribing Laws to you, and to demand the Deliverance of the King of *France*. If  
you

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you should deny their Demand, *Cæsar*, <sup>A. D. 1526.</sup> how will you defend the Kingdom of *Naples* against them? If you should grant it, you lose all the Fruits of the Victory, and remain the most dishonoured, the most debased of all Princes. But let us grant that *Italy* would be disposed to observe the Agreement, and that you would be under a Necessity either of relinquishing *Milan*, or of not recovering *Burgundy*, what Comparison is there between one Side and the other? *Burgundy* is a little Province, of small Revenues, and besides not of such mighty Conveniency as many persuade themselves. The Dutchy of *Milan*, for the Riches and Beauty of so many noble Cities, for the Number and Quality of its Subjects, for the Greatness of its Revenues, and for its Capacity of subsisting all the Armies in the World, is superior to many Kingdoms. But tho' it be so large and so powerful, yet the Conveniences that arise from its Acquisition are more to be valued than the Country in itself considered: For while *Milan* and *Naples* are at your Devoti-

on,

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on, the Pontiffs must of necessity, as they used formerly, depend on the Emperors. All *Tuscany*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, and the Marquis of *Mantoua* may be subjected to you: The *Venetians*, surrounded by *Lombardy* and *Germany*, will be obliged to accept your Laws. Thus, I do not say with Arms or with Armies, but with the Reputation of your Name, with a Herald alone, with the Imperial Ensigns you will command all *Italy*. And who knows not what is *Italy*? A Country, for the Commodiousness of its Situation, for the Temperateness of the Air, for the Multitude and Ingenuity of its Inhabitants, who are extremely well disposed for all honourable Undertakings, for the Abundance of all Things convenient for human Life, for the Largeness and Beauty of so many most noble Cities, for Riches, for the Seat of Religion, for the anti-ent Glory of the Empire, and for infinite other Respects, the Queen of all Countries, which if you command, all other Princes will tremble before you. To compass this Design is more conducive

ducive to your Greatness, and to the *A. D.*  
Augmentation of your Glory, and more *1526.*  
grateful to the Bones of your Grand-  
fathers (since they too must be called  
into Council) who, on account of their  
Goodness and Compassion, must be sup-  
posed to desire nothing but what is  
most convenient for you, and most glorious  
to your Name. If we follow then the  
Counsel of the Chancellor we shall lose  
a very large Acquisition for a small  
one, and that too very inconsiderable,  
and besides very uncertain, of which we  
ought to have taken Warning by what  
was like to have happened some Months  
past. Does he not remember, when the  
King of *France* was in such great Dan-  
ger of Death, in what an uneasy Situa-  
tion we were, as knowing that by  
his Death we should lose all the Fruits  
expected from the Victory? Who can  
secure us that the same Accident may  
not possibly intervene at present, and  
more easily, because the Reliques of the  
Disorder remain upon him since that  
Time, and because the Hopes, that have  
hitherto supported him, being cut off,  
his



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his Anxiety, which was the Cause of his Disorder, will return upon him with greater Violence ; and especially when, in debating on inextricable Conditions and Security, the new Negotiations must of necessity be spun out to a tedious Length, which will be subject to the same Accident, and perhaps to others as great, and no less dangerous. Don't we know that nothing has so much conduced to keep the Government of *France* in due Order and Steadiness, as an Expectation of a speedy Releasement of the King, by which the great Men of that Kingdom have been kept in Quietness and Obedience to the Mother ; and that as soon as this Hope should fail the Kingdom would easily be sensible of it, and the Government would be altered ? And when once the Nobles have got the Bridle in Hand, they will take no Care of the King's Liberty, but will rather be pleased with his Captivity, for the Sake of maintaining themselves independent and absolute Lords. Thus instead of *Burgundy* and of such a Multitude of Acquisitions,

we

we shall no longer have any Thing to <sup>A. D.</sup> expect either from his Imprisonment or <sup>1526.</sup> Release-ment. But I would ask you farther, Chancellor, is *Cæsar* in this Resolution to have any Regard to his Dignity and Majesty? Now what greater Disgrace can he incur, what more remarkable Diminution of his Honour, than to be constrained to pardon *Fran-cesco Sforza*? than that a Man who has one Foot in the Grave, your Rebel, a singular Example of Ingratitude, not by humbling himself and flying to your Mercy, but by throwing himself into the Arms of your Enemies, should force you to yield to him, to restore the State so justly taken from him, and to receive Laws from him? It is better, *Cæsar*, and more suitable to the Dignity of the Empire, and to your own Greatness, to trust once more to Fortune, and again to hazard every Thing, than, forgetting your Rank, the Authority of a Prince supreme above all other Princes, and the *Cæsarean* Name, and the Glory of so many Victories over a most potent King, to accept, from Priests  
and

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Nature, that more grievous and more unworthy could not have been imposed, had you been overthrown and conquered. Wherefore, on considering all these Reasons, and how small the Advantage is that can possibly result from an Agreement with the *Italians*, and by how many Accidents it may easily slip out of our Hands, how unsafe it is to repose Confidence in them, how full of Indignity to abandon the State of *Milan*, that it is necessary for us to come to a Resolution, and to have for once some Consideration of the End, and that the Imprisonment of the King is of no Service to us, but only on account of the Profits which may be drawn from his Freedom, I have advised, and do advise, that an Agreement be first made with him before you agree with the *Italians*; which none can deny to be more glorious, more reasonable, and more useful, provided we can secure ourselves of the Observance: And of this I have some Grounds for Hope, both from the Gratitude of the King  
for

for the Benefit that he will receive from us, and from the Tie of Affinity, and also from the Virtues of your Sister, a fit Instrument for maintaining this Friendship, but much more from the Pledge of the two Sons, one of them the First-born, and the greatest and most important Pledge, I think, that we can possibly receive of him. And, since Necessity constrains us to come to some Resolution, we ought surely to put more Confidence in a King of *France* with so great a Pledge, than in the *Italians* with no Pledge at all; to have more Faith in the Word of so great a King, than in the immoderate Covetousness of Priests, or in the suspicious Baseness of Merchants; and we may with more Ease contract, as our Ancestors have often done, an Alliance for some time with the *French*, than with the *Italians*, our natural and eternal Enemies. Nor do I only see in this Way of proceeding greater Hopes that Faith will be kept with us, but less Danger in case of any Infringement: For tho' the King should not yield you up *Burgundy*,



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*gundy*, he will not dare, while his Children remain as Hostages, to give you any further Provocations, but will seek to moderate the Agreement by Negotiations and Intreaties; besides, as he was in a manner but yesterday overcome, and to-day let out of Prison, he will still stand in Awe of your Arms, and never have the Boldness to make another Tryal of your Fortune: And if he does not take up Arms against you, *Cæsar*, it is certain that all the rest will stand still, till you shall have acquired the Castle of *Milan*, and confirmed yourself in that State in such a Manner, that you shall no longer have any Thing to fear from the Malice of any Person whatsoever. But as for the *Italians*, if you should now make an Agreement with them, and they should have a Mind to break it, there will be no Bridle capable of curbing or restraining them; and as their Power of doing you Injuries increases, their Inclination to do them will be more free, and increase in proportion. Wherefore, in my Opinion, it would be the highest Timidity

midity and Imprudence to lose, out of A. D. 1526.  
 Jealousy, an Opportunity of making an Agreement attended with so much Glory, with so much Greatness, and with sufficient Security, and in its Stead to take a Resolution very dangerous, if I mistake not, and very pernicious."

WHEN the Viceroy had done speaking various were the Opinions of the other Members of the Council, it appearing to all who were of sound Judgment that to make an Accommodation with the King of *France*, in the Manner proposed, would be a very dangerous Step. The *Flemings*, however, were possessed with such a longing Desire of recovering *Burgundy*, as it was the ancient Patrimony and Title of their Princes, that it would not suffer them to discern the Truth. It was reported also that the large Gifts and Promises of the *French* had a considerable Influence on many: And above all *Cæsar*, either because such was his first Inclination, or because the Authority of the Viceroy, especially in conjunction with that

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that of *Nansau*, who was of the same Opinion, was of very great Moment, or else because he thought it too much beneath his Dignity to be constrained to pardon *Francesco Sforza*, willingly hearkened to those who advised an Agreement with the King of *France*. Hence, after he had ordered the Legate *Salviati* to be once more sounded whether he would consent that the Dutchy of *Milan* should be bestowed on the Duke of *Bourbon*, and was certified that he had no Commission to accept that Expedient, in which Case he would have preferred the Friendship of the Pontiff, he took a Resolution to agree with the King of *France*, with whom, the chief Points having been already discussed beforehand, and in a manner settled, he came in two or three Days to a Conclusion, without the Intervention of the Pope's Legate in any Matter, *Cæsar* having before obtained the Consent of the Duke of *Bourbon* that his Sister promised to him should be married to the King of *France*. The Duke, it seems, after much Intreaty, had given his

*Cæsar*  
chuses to  
agree with  
the King  
of *France*.


his Consent, not so much out of a <sup>A. D.</sup> Desire of possessing the Dutchy of *Milan*, <sup>1526.</sup> which was promised him contrary to the Sentiments of the Great Chancellor and of the Viceroy, tho' with the Obligation of heavy Payments, as because his Affairs were reduced to such a Situation, that, neither having nor capable of having, Dependence on any but *Cæsar*, he was forced to accommodate himself to his Will. As soon as he had given his Consent, that he might avoid appearing at Court at so unseasonable a Time, he set out with all Expedition, by Orders from *Cæsar*, towards *Barcelona*, to wait there for the Provisions necessary for his Passage into *Italy*, which, for want of Ships, there being at that Time no more than three Light Gallies in *Spain*, and of Money, proceeded but slowly.

THE Contents of the Capitulation, <sup>Articles of</sup> stipulated on the Fourteenth of *February*, in the Year 1526, were in Sub-<sup>the Con-</sup> stance, That between *Cæsar* and the <sup>French</sup> King of *France* should be a perpetual <sup>King</sup> <sup>obtained</sup> <sup>his Liber-</sup> Peace, <sup>ty.</sup>



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Peace, in which should be comprehended all those who should be nominated by common Consent: That the King of *France*, on the Tenth Day of *March* next, should be set at Liberty on his own Borders on the Coast of *Fontera-bia*; and within the Term of Six Weeks following should resign unto *Cæsar* the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, the County of *Charolois*, the Lordship of *Noyers*, and *Chateau Chinon*, Dependencies on the said Dutchy, the Viscounty of *Aussone*, and *Le Resfort de St. Laurent de la Roche*, Dependencies of the *Franche Comte*, with all the usual Appurtenances of the said Dutchy and Viscounty, all which should for the future be separated and exempt from the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of *France*: That, at the Time, and at the same Instant the King should be set free, should be delivered into the Hands of *Cæsar* the Dauphin, and besides him either the Duke of *Orléans*, the King's Second Son, or twelve of the principal Lords of *France*, who should be nominated by *Cæsar*, referring it to the Regentess, either to give the Second Son

Son or the Twelve Barons, and remain as Hostages till Restitution should be made of the said Territories, and the Peace ratified and sworn with all its Articles by the States General of *France*, and registered (which they call *enterined*) in all the Parliaments of that Kingdom, with the necessary Formalities, for which was prefixed the Term of Four Months; at which Time the Hostages being restored, *Angoulesme*, the King's Third Son, should be put into the Hands of *Cæsar*, to be educated near his Person, for the better cultivating and maintaining the Peace: That the Most Christian King should renounce and yield up to *Cæsar* all his Rights to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and even those which would have come to him by the Investiture of the Church: That he should make the same Renunciation and Cession of his Rights to the State of *Milan*, *Genoa*, *Asti*, *Artois*, *Arras*, *Tournay*, *Lisle*, and *Doway*; that he should restore also the Town and Castle of *Hedin*, as a Member of the County of *Artois*, with all the military Stores, Artillery and Mov-

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ables which were in it when taken last: That he should renounce the Sovereignty of *Flanders* and of *Artois*, and of every other Place in the Possession of *Cæsar*. On the other Side, that *Cæsar* should renounce all Rights to any Place whatsoever in the Possession of the *French*, and particularly to *Peronne*, *Mondidier*, the Counties of *Bologne*, *Guines*, and *Ponthieu*, and to the Towns situated on both Sides of the River *Somme*: That there should be a League between them, and a perpetual Confederacy for the Defence of their States, with an Obligation of assisting each other, when it should be needful, with Fifteen Hundred Men at Arms, and Ten Thousand Foot: That *Cæsar* should promise to give Lady *Eleonora*, his Sister, in Marriage to the Most Christian King, to whom, as soon as a Dispensation could be procured from the Pope, she should be betrothed with obligatory Words for the present, and be conducted into *France*, for solemnising the Matrimony, at the same time that the Hostages, according to the Articles,

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ticles, were to be restored ; and that her Dowry should be Two Hundred Thousand Crowns, with suitable Gifts, one Half to be paid within Sixteen Months, and the other Half afterwards within the Year next ensuing : That between the Dauphin and the Daughter of the King of *Portugal* by *Eleonora*, a Marriage should be contracted, as soon as the Parties came of Age : That the King of *France* should use his utmost Endeavours for inducing the old King of *Navarra* to yield to *Cæsar* the Rights of that Kingdom ; and, in case of Refusal, the King should give him no Assistance : That the Duke of *Guelderland*, Count of *Zutphen*, and the principal Towns of those States should promise, under sufficient Security, to surrender themselves, after his Death, to *Cæsar*, and that the King should give no Assistance to the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, nor to *Robert de la Marche* : That the King should furnish *Cæsar*, when he had a Mind to pass into *Italy*, and within two Months after it should be required, with twelve Gallies, four Ships, and Four Galleons,

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fitted out wholly at his own Expence, except the Payment of the Soldiers on board ; and that these Vessels should be restored within Three Months from the Day of Embarkation ; That, instead of the Land Forces which the King offered for *Italy*, he should pay unto *Cæsar* Two Hundred Thousand Crowns, one Half within Six Months, and the other Half within the next Year afterwards : That at the Time when the Hostages were to be set at Liberty he should give Bank Bills to *Cæsar* for the Payment of Six Thousand Foot for Six Months, as soon as he should arrive in *Italy*, supplying him also, at his own Cost, with Five Hundred Men at Arms, and a Train of Artillery : That he should indemnify *Cæsar* for his Promise made to the King of *England* to pay him the Pensions due from the King of *France*, the Arrears of which amounted to Five Hundred Thousand Crowns, or else pay *Cæsar* in ready Money : That both should supplicate the Pontiff to give public Notice, as soon as possible, of a general Council for treating of Peace  
among

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among Christians, and forming Enterprises against the Infidels and Heretics, and to grant a general Croissade for Three Years: That the King should within Six Months restore the Duke of *Bourbon* in ample Form to the Possession of all his States, and of his Goods movable and immovable, with all the Profits received, and should not be at Liberty to molest him for what was past, nor constrain him to inhabit or come into the Kingdom of *France*, but should leave him at full Liberty to proceed in a Course of Law concerning the County of *Provence*; and should also restore all those who had followed the Duke, and namely the Bishop of *Autun*, and *M. de St. Valier*: That the Prisoners on both Sides taken in War should be set at Liberty: That the Princess *Margaret* of *Austria* should be restored to the Possession of all that she enjoyed before the War: That the Prince of *Orange* should be set at Liberty, and be restored to the Principality of *Orange*, and to whatever he possessed at his Father's Death, which

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
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had been taken from him on account of his following the Party of *Cæsar*; and the same Benefit was allowed to some other Noblemen: That the Marquis of *Saluzzo* should be restored to his State: That the King, as soon as he arrived in the first Town of his Kingdom, should ratify this Capitulation, and cause it to be ratified by the Dauphin as soon as he came to the Age of Fourteen Years. They nominated many by common Consent, among others the *Swiss*, but not one of the *Italian* Potentates except the Pontiff, who was named to be a Conservator of this Agreement, more out of Form and Ceremony than for any substantial Reason. To all this they added, that the King gave his Word of Honour, that if at any Time he should, for any Cause whatever, refuse to fulfil his Engagements, he would, of his own Accord, voluntarily return to Prison.

THIS Agreement was Matter of vast Surprise to all Christendom; for, as soon as it was understood that the first Thing

to be put into Execution was the Deliverance of the Most Christian King, <sup>A. D. 1526.</sup> it was the universal Opinion that, after he was set at Liberty, he would on no account give up *Burgundy*, because it was a Member of too great Importance to the Kingdom of *France*: And, except those few who had advised *Cæsar* to this Step, his whole Court had the same Sentiments; and, above all the rest, the Great Chancellor blamed and detested the Convention, and with such Vehemence that, tho' he had been commanded to subscribe the Capitulation, yet he refused to do it, alledging that the Authority with which he was invested ought not to be employed by him in dangerous and pernicious Affairs, as this before him certainly was. Nor could he be removed from his Resolution by all the Indignation of *Cæsar*, who at length, finding him to persist in his Obstinacy, subscribed the Instrument with his own Hand, and a few Days after went to *Madrid*, to settle the Affinity, and by familiar and friendly Conversation to lay a Foundation for a lasting Friendship



A D  
1526King of  
France  
espouses  
Eleonora.

Friendship and Benevolence between himself and the King. Wonderful were the Ceremonies and outward Professions that passed between them, they were often seen together in Public, had several long Conferences in private, went in one Coach in the Middle of the Day to a neighbouring Castle where resided Queen *Eleonora*, with whom the King made a Contract of Matrimony. But among so many Tokens of Peace and Friendship the Guards were not slackened, the Liberty not enlarged, but at the same time that he was caressed like a Brother he was guarded like a Prisoner: Whence it might easily be judged that this was a Concord full of Discord \*, an Affinity without Affection, and that the old Emulations and Jealousies between them would, on every Occasion, prevail over all Regard to Tyes and Aliances contracted by Force more than from any other Cause.

AFTER

\* He seems here to allude to a Verse of *Lucan*, speaking of an Agreement between the Triumvirate,  
*Temporis angusti mansit Concordia discors.*

AFTER several Days spent in this Manner arrived the Ratification of the Regentess, with a Declaration that she chose to have the Dauphin of *France* accompanied by the Second Son rather than by the Twelve Lords. The King then set out from *Madrid* for the Frontiers, where he was to make an Exchange of his Person for his Two little Sons. He was accompanied by the Viceroy, the Author of his Liberty, on whom *Cæsar* had bestowed the City of *Asti*, and other States in *Flanders*, and in the Kingdom of *Naples*.

AT this Juncture *Cæsar* wrote a ceremonial Letter to the Pontiff, signifying that, out of a Desire of Peace, and of the common Good of Christendom, burying in Oblivion a Multitude of Offences and Enmities, he had restored Liberty to the King of *France*, and given him his own Sister in Marriage, and that he had chosen for Conservator of the Peace his Holiness, of whom he always desired to be a most obedient Son.

*Cæsar*  
notifies  
the Agree-  
ment to  
the Pope.

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Son. And a few Days after he writ him another Letter with his own Hand and sent it by *Errera*, the same who had brought him a Letter from the Pontiff written with his own Hand, in which he answers his, partly in a mild Strain, partly intermixed with somewhat harsh Expressions ; concluding that he would restore the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Francesco Sforza*, if he should not be found guilty of the Crime laid to his Charge, and that he intended to have the Cause tried in a Court of Justice by Judges appointed by himself as his Superior : But if it should appear that he had transgressed, he could not dispense with himself from giving the Investiture of that State to the Duke of *Bourbon*, to whom his Holiness himself had been the Cause that he had promised it, having proposed it to him when *Francesco Sforza* lay sick : That to satisfy him, and to make the *Italians* easy, he had resolved not to keep it for himself, nor to give it to his own Brother ; protesting, upon his Honour, that this was really his Intention, which he earnestly beseeched

ſeeched him to approve, offering him A. D.  
1526.  
 at all times his Authority and Forces, as an obedient Son of the Apoſtolic See. *Errera* carried alſo an Answer to the Minutes of the Articles that had been drawn up by the Pope in Favour of *Franceſco Sforza*, which *Cæſar*, perſiſting in his firſt Reſolution had not been willing to approve.

HE ſent alſo by him to the Duke of *Seſſa* the Form of an Agreement, which was his ultimate Reſolution, with Authority to conclude it, in caſe the Pope would accept it. The Contents Articles  
propoſed  
by *Cæſar*  
to the  
Pope. of it were in Subſtance, That *Franceſco Sforza* ſhould be comprehended in their Confederacy, if he ſhould be found not guilty of Treason againſt *Cæſar*; but, in caſe of his Death or Deprivation, the Duke of *Bourbon* ſhould ſucceed in the Confederacy, and be inveſted by the Emperor with the Dutchy of *Milan*. The Obligation contracted by the Viceroy, for the Reſtitution of the Towns poſſeſſed by the Duke of *Ferrara*, was confirmed, but on Condition that the Pope  
ſhould



## THE HISTORY OF

should be bound to grant him the Investiture of *Ferrara*, and release him from the Penalty of the Contravention; a Thing contrary to the Pope's Intention, for he designed to exact of him the Penalty of One Hundred Thousand Ducats, to pay the One Hundred Thousand promised to *Cæsar* in case of that Restitution. He did not consent that the State of *Milan* should be obliged to take Salt from the Church, nor that in Matters concerning the Collation of Benefices in the Kingdom of *Naples*, Reference should be made to the Tenor of the Investitures, but to the Cession of preceding Kings, who in many Cases had despised the Rights and Authority of the Apostolic See. And because it had been agreed with the Legate that, in order to remove from *Lombardy* the Army, that was become burdensome to all *Italy*, there should be disbursed by the Pope, by himself, as King of *Naples*, and by the other Powers, One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Ducats, in which Case it would be conducted to *Naples*, or to some Country out of *Italy*,  
where

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where it pleased *Cæsar*, who, it was said, had a Design to make it pass over to *Barbary*, it was proposed that, the Arrears of the Army being increased since that Time, the said Sum should be augmented to Two Hundred Thousand Ducats. The Duke of *Sessa*, and *Errera*, presented a Copy of these Articles to the Pontiff, with a Protestation that it was not in their Power to alter so much as one Syllable of it: All the Difficulties however would have been easily removed, had the Dutchy of *Milan* been disposed of in such a manner as to give no Cause of Jealousy to the Pontiff, and to the other Powers. But it was considered that the Duke of *Bourbon* was so implacable an Enemy to the King of *France*, that, either for his own Security, or from a Desire of invading *France*, he had always been very submissive to *Cæsar*, nor could it be expected that he would ever be uneasy at his exorbitant Greatness; and that the Article of removing the Army from *Lombardy*, which was so much desired by all, and for which Purpose they would

A. D.

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*A. D.* 1526. would not have grudged any Sum of Money, was of no Signification, since at *Milan* remained a Duke who would not only at every Beck from *Cæsar* admit his Troops, but perhaps desire and solicit their Presence for his own Interest.

Pope  
rejects  
them.

WHEREFORE the Pontiff, who, because, in the Agreement made by *Cæsar* with the King of *France*, there had been no material Mention made of him, and none at all of the Security of the States of *Italy*, had confirmed himself in the Persuasion he had before entertained that the Greatness of *Cæsar* must prove his Slavery, resolved not to accept the Agreement in the Manner in which it was proposed to him, but to preserve himself free till he should be certified of the Measures taken by the King of *France* with respect to the Observance of his Appointment. And he was the more encouraged because, besides the Probabilities of the Case, he had been informed of some Words spoken by the King before he was set at Liberty, and  
by

by others who were privy to his Coun-  
 sels, by which it appeared he had no  
 Mind to fulfil his Engagements with  
*Cæsar*. To confirm the King in this  
 Resolution, as a Point on which his  
 own Security depended, he dispatched  
 away post to *France Pagolo Vettori*, a  
*Florentine*, Commander of his Gallies,  
 that he might be at Court at the same  
 Time as the King should arrive, mak-  
 ing this Speed not only to know as  
 soon as possible his Mind, but also that  
 the King, by receiving Hopes of an im-  
 mediate Alliance with the Pontiff and  
*Venetians* against *Cæsar*, might the more  
 readily determine himself. *Pagolo* there-  
 fore was commissioned, in the Name  
 of the Pope, to congratulate his Maje-  
 sty on his Deliverance, and to inform  
 him of the Means used by the Pope  
 for bringing about this happy Event, and  
 how greatly the Treaty that he had  
 held for confederating with his Mother  
 had inclined *Cæsar* to set him at Liberty:  
 That after this he should represent to  
 the King that the Pope was very de-  
 sirous of an universal Peace among Chri-  
 stians,

A. D.  
 1526.



*A. D.* 1526. Christians, and that *Cæsar* and his Most Christian Majesty should jointly undertake an Expedition against the *Turks*, who were intent on making mighty Preparations for invading the Kingdom of *Hungary* this very Year. These were the apparent Subjects of his Commission, but the substantial and secret Point was, first to attempt, with all his Dexterity, to know the Inclination of the Most Christian King, and, if he should find him disposed to observe the Agreement, to proceed no farther, lest he should, to no Purpose, bring him more out of Favour with *Cæsar* than ever: But if he should perceive him otherwise inclined, or ambiguous, he should endeavour to confirm him, and take all Opportunities for encouraging him to take that Course, by Assurances of the Pontiff's Desire to unite with him for the common Good. He also dispatched into *England* the Protonotary *Gambara*, to use his Endeavours with that King to the same End: And, at his Sollicitations, the *Venetians* sent into *France*, with the like Commission, *Andrea Rosso* their Secretary.

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Secretary. And because *Pagolo*, as soon A. D. 1526.  
as he arrived at *Florence*, fell sick and  
died, the Pontiff, tho' he took it for  
an ill Omen that the Ministers, whom  
he had now twice sent to *France* on  
this Negotiation, had perished on the  
Road, dispatched away in his Place  
*Capino da Mantoua*. In the mean time  
his Holiness and the *Venetians* were not  
wanting to employ all possible Means for  
encouraging and keeping alive the Hopes  
of the Duke of *Milan*, lest his Fears,  
and the Peace of *Madrid*, should drive  
him to precipitate himself into some  
Accommodation with *Cæsar*.

By this time the King of *France* Ceremo-  
was arrived at *Fonterabia*, a Town of nies ob-  
*Cæsar*'s, situate on the Ocean, upon the served on  
Borders between *Biscay* and the Dutchy King of  
of *Guyenne*; and, on the other Side, the *France* at  
Mother with the two Children were come Liberty.  
to *Bayonne*, a few Leagues distant from  
*Fonterabia*, where she staid several Days  
before the Day appointed for making the  
Exchange, because she had been seized  
with the Gout on the Road. On the

A. D.  
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attended by the Viceroy, General *Alarcone*, and about fifty Horse, was conducted to the Bank of the River that divides the Kingdom of *France* from that of *Spain*, and at the same time *Lautrech* presented himself on the Bank with the Regentess, and an equal Number of Horse, and in the Middle of the River was a large Barge at Anchor with no Person in it. The King approached the Barge in a Skiff, in which, besides himself, was the Viceroy, *Alarcone*, and Eight others, all armed with short Weapons: On the other Side of the Barge came up *Lautrech* in another Skiff, or small Boat, with the Hostages, and Eight Men armed in the same Manner; then the Viceroy mounted the Barge with all his Men, and the King with them, and immediately after mounted *Lautrech* with his Eight Attendants; so that in the Barge was an equal Number on both Sides, the Viceroy having with him *Alarcone*, and Eight others, and the King attended by *Lautrech* and his Eight Men. As soon as they were all on board the Barge, *Lautrech* took the Dauphin out of

of the Skiff into the Barge, and put <sup>A. D.</sup> him into the Hands of the Viceroy, <sup>1526.</sup> who delivered him to *Alarcone*, by whom he was immediately put into their Boat; and at the same Instant the little Duke of *Orleans* was taken into the Barge, and was no sooner in, than the Most Christian King leaped out of the Barge into his own Boat with such Quickness that this Exchange came to be made in the same Moment. As soon as the King got out of the Boat, on the Bank, he mounted a *Turkish* Horse of wonderful Swiftmess, provided for that Purpose, and without stopping posted to *St. Jean de Luz*, a Town of his own, four Leagues distant, from which, after taking some short Refreshment, he spurred on with the same Speed to *Bayonne*, where he was received with inexpressible Joy by the whole Court. From hence he immediately dispatched, with all Diligence, a Messenger the to King of *England*, with a Letter written with his own Hand, signifying to him his Deliverance, and acknowledging, in the most kind and affectionate Manner,



A. D.

1526.

Manner, that he was entirely indebted for his Liberty to his good Offices, notifying his hearty Desire to enter into a strict Union and Intimacy with him, and his Resolution to proceed in all Occurrences by his Advice : And not long after he dispatched other Ambassadors to ratify, in a solemn Manner, the Peace which his Mother had made with him, laying a vast Stress on the Friendship of that King.


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
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THE Sixteenth Book properly terminates the History of *Guicciardini*, for here he finished the Revival of his Works, and therefore his Nephews, -who, after his Death, obliged the World with this excellent Performance, gave us no more than Sixteen Books, which passed several Editions. But finding afterwards, by the Quickness of the Sale, that neither their own Profit, nor the Reputation of their Uncle were like to suffer by the Addition of the other Four which had not received his last Hand, they ventured to publish the whole Twenty Books, without regarding the Inequality and Incorrectness of the Four Last, which were the Reasons why the Translator, till the Publication of the Second Volume, intended only to give the first Sixteen, and comprehend them in Seven Volumes, as may be seen in his first Proposals. But these Reasons have been since outweighed by the Consideration of the usual Candour shewn by the Public to the imperfect tho' genuin Remains of a great Genius, and by the Encouragement given him by the unexpected Number of those who have favoured him with their Subscriptions; and therefore he is translating these Four Books, which will be delivered to the Subscribers without any additional Expence.

















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